@ChapmanScpa does some good work here with the information that is available to him. And here I am to offer my extra bit of colour. A few of my thoughts below:
Firstly - Chapman identified the enrichment level of some inventory (~2%) and that BWRs are wonky. Put another way - if one were to sell material, it’s easier to sell “standard assay” in the 4.X range (esp 4.95%) and harder to sell low assay odd lots.
Secondly - it is my impression that Japanese nuclear fuel accounting uses purchase price rather than mark-to-market accounting. So generally speaking Japanese inventories contracted pre-2011 are probably MORE valuable than market and may look more valuable than they actually are.
Thirdly - and most critically - there is a lot of Japanese material on the books that has been loaned out into the market. HOWEVER, a lot of these loans are fronted by third parties and often appear to be plain sales in the market (hence media reporting of Japanese sales)…
…At some point this material needs to be returned to the Japanese utilities. And so reactor restarts, in aggregate, put pressure on the date of those loan returns. Like the carry trade unwind, the future of #uranium is in debt to “inventory raiding” of the past…
…I want to drive this point home. Inventory is about *ownership* but the physical reality is that significant uranium listed as inventory might already be in reactors, having been supplied via loans. I’m not sure if we fully understand the impact of these loans in the mid term.
Finally, inventory adequacy is a funny thing. It’s not an exact science, so whereas 4 years of inventory would be a wasteful excess to one utility, it could be below target for another. Purely psychological. And historically the Japanese are very inventory heavy.
So let me conclude with this. I think Chapman is doing a fine job squeezing information from sources that others aren’t looking at. It’s really primary source research and it’s hard. And while I disagree with his conclusions, I’ve got the benefit of having been a fuel buyer…
…The rigour of this particular piece is higher than the UTwit average, and frankly a lot of folks aren’t really asking hard questions anyway and so I’m fine with someone being curious but directionally wrong.
If I am focusing on a number right now, it’s not the 10-year treasury, it’s bond rates for BBB/A- credit. These plus a couple % are the sort of things that drive carry trade financing & provide structure to the uranium market. Absent low rates - long-term constructing dominates.
*contracting
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This conflates two diff things. Russia is allowed to import ~20% of the EUP used by US reactors, and it possesses 39% of the global nameplate SWU capacity.
B/c of trade barriers, TVEL produces less enriched #uranium per input SWU because much of their capacity is excess.
Europe is, on the whole, slightly more dependent on Russian EUP (and fuel fabrication services) - and Europe's Russian uranium imports policy is a recommendation unlike the US', which is law. In 2020, Russian uranium was roughly 20%, and Russian enrichment was about 26%.
In a post-Ukraine War, self-sanctioning world, it seems unlikely that the Russians will be sell any of their currently-unfilled RSA quota, so real imports will likely be less than quota in future years.
So how does a nuclear production tax credit (PTC) increase #uranium requirements? Five key areas:
1.Existing reactors stay on
2.Reactor lifetime extensions
3.Reactor cycle length extensions
4.Reactor power uprates
5.Reduced need for flexible operations
Many US nuclear reactors face periods of negative power prices which are in part driven by existing PTCs for wind & solar. With the certainty of all nuclear generation being worth at least $15/MWh, operators can more easily justify capital expenses to keep existing plants running
Especially as many reactors consider lifetime extension to 80 years – a process which will require significant preparation, upkeep, and maintenance to achieve – the PTC provides more certainty for operators in these investment decisions.
Not exactly a revelation, but the #uranium daily prices are often indicative and sometimes move on zero volume. *Literally* zero volume. And this has been true recently for small price movements in both directions.
We want a daily price, but it feels like a “data vs. information” situation. Unlike, say, a front-month oil price which carries location, specification, and timing information, uranium is fuzzy.
Spot is 15 days out? A month? A year? Price is only one datum we need to understand.
100,000 pounds U3O8 (standard volume) is 0.06% of annual requirements.
As a percentage of total volume, that’s like an oil future being 800,000 barrels rather than 1,000.
It’s not worth comparing the spaces too deeply, but a few dozen shares of SPUT is more “future-sized.”
Been a real Tale of Two Conferences for me lately - first to Montreal with the nuclear fuel buyers and sellers, and then to PDAC in Toronto with the broader mining industry and its many investors.
As far as #uranium is concerned, the vibes couldn't have been more different.
Montreal was a tense room. It's the first big get-together since the Russian invasion of Ukraine, so its implications to the world nuclear fuel market dominated the program.
What was true before is doubly true now: we need greater nuclear fuel capacities across the entire cycle.
The industry is at an impasse.
Who funds new production (esp. conversion & enrichment)? Uncertainty over future Russian deliveries prevents many buyers from going all-in on long-term contracting. But so too are many producers unwilling, warry of the recent cycle of overcapacity.
seeing more discussion on #uranium inventories, so remember that:
1. utilities use different accounting methods, so trying to evaluate inventory using book value won't yield useful comparisons b/w utilities 2. "strategic inventory" and "pipeline inventory" aren't the same thing
regarding #2 - if someone says "utilities have 16 months of inventory," they mean that *in addition* to the pipeline of material which is being purchased to fabricate fuel on an 18/24-month cycle, there is additional material in reserve equal to 16 months of requirements
contrast that with end of year inventory numbers from the EIA UMAR report, which don't distinguish between EUP sitting ready to put into fuel next january and EUP being held as a hedge against missed deliveries/disruptions
year to year trends in the UMAR are important, of course