Important piece by @EvanFeigenbaum on why viewing the meeting between Xi Jinping and Putin in Uzbekistan purely through #China and Russia's bilateral relationship without considering #Beijing's investment in Central Asia is a mistake. carnegieendowment.org/2022/09/13/wro…
"Over the past two decades, the Chinese have invested heavily in a policy that builds strong ties with Beijing’s Central Asian neighbors. Those countries, which used to be part of the Soviet Union, are deeply uncomfortable with Russian actions in Ukraine—threatened by them, ...
... perpetually under pressure from Moscow, and looking for some breathing space. Kazakhstan, in particular, has found ways to put a bit of distance between itself and Moscow over the war."
"Xi’s dilemma is threefold. First, he has a lot riding on his personal investment in a strategic partnership with Russia. He will want to buck up Moscow generally and Putin personally.
But second, if he leans too hard into that, he will drive a wedge with the other neighbors, whom Beijing wishes to cultivate, and split the SCO in the process.
Third, it would be spectacularly inept to choose the moment of maximum Russian tactical retreat in Ukraine to lean into Moscow even harder than Beijing already has."
"For this reason, it seems more likely that Xi will continue what I have called the “Beijing straddle.” On the one hand, China will provide diplomatic support for Russia and broad commitments to a Beijing-Moscow entente ...
... whose principal rationale and focus is to counterbalance Washington and backfoot the favored global institutions and policy preferences of the transatlantic West and Japan."
"On the other, China will continue de facto compliance with Western sanctions to avoid painting a target on its own back, and it will deploy mealy-mouthed language about “peace” and “stability” aimed at placating the Central Asian nations and ...
... partners in the Global South that are uneasy about Moscow’s war in Ukraine."
"Beijing’s goal is surely to preserve its entente with Russia at the strategic level, to counterbalance American power and growing economic pressure on China from the West.
But it wants to do this without having to back Moscow at the tactical level, since it also benefits from preserving global market access, avoiding Western sanctions, and building relations with countries, like those in Central Asia, that are terrified of Russia."
"For this reason, reports this week that Li Zhanshu, Xi’s close political ally and the number-three official in the Chinese Communist Party, “expressed support for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine” at a meeting with Putin in Vladivostok seem unlikely to guide his boss’s approach.
Official Chinese accounts of Li’s meetings do not even mention the word “Ukraine.” Instead, Beijing’s Central Asian partners will want to hear vague rhetorical boilerplate that reflects their concerns and interests and preserves the Beijing straddle."
"Because China has invested a great deal of its prestige into the SCO, Beijing will be sensitive to some of these regional concerns. Moscow has never been able to get much traction with SCO members in its effort to extract support for its aggressive actions."
"Put bluntly, regional players in the SCO have come a long way. China generally, and Xi personally, are unlikely to make this entire week solely about China-Russia relations.
Beijing is a multidimensional power that has other relationships and interests at stake. Refracting Chinese diplomacy and Xi’s visit solely through the prism of the Beijing-Moscow condominium would ignore two decades of China’s investments in relations with its neighbors, ...
... downplay the stakes for Xi, and miss the multifaceted interests that have led China to straddle since February 24."
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