1/ This is a small thread on the the Sudanese Bar Association's draft constitutional proposal, which leaves no role for the military in politics or the economy. #Sudan
2/ This proposal effectively puts an end to talks of a civilian-led transition, which diplomats were calling to restore since October 25 2021 -- the date of the coup.
3/ Instead, about 9 embassies and other international stakeholders have endorsed the SBA. But credit should not be given to these players nor to the FFC or SBA itself.
4/ The SBA's constitutional proposal, which leaves no room to legitimize, negotiate or partner with the military on political power, reflects the three NOs that resistance committees across Sudan have adhered to since the coup.
5/ For months, some western analysts and diplomats believed the 3 Nos 'impeded' Sudan's democratic transition. On the contrary, the SBA is proof that the 3 NOs ushered and shaped a new political vision that Sudanese elites and internationals had no choice but to accept.
6/ Still, there are concerns about the process that produced the SBA. The RC technical committee is producing its transitional political charter which they expect to release in weeks, perhaps longer. The political visions produced by RCs should also be championed and engaged with
7/ Because sustained protests and evolution of RCs have shaped the political discourse at the highest levels, I reckon there will be key points of agreement between the SBA proposal and the political charter that the merger committee produces.
8/ It's equally important that the political charter produced from the RC merger committee does not sideline the previous two charters that RCs released: The Revolutionary Charter for People’s Power and the Charter for the Establishment of the People’s Authority.
9/ An inclusive process on all levels matters more at this point. Elite deal making is the politics of yesterday. To realize a genuine democracy in #Sudan, RCs must stay united and be engaged with. As the most astute political actors, their core demands can't be compromised.
10/ As for the junta, they should see the writing on the wall. A new politics is being born thanks to the persistence of RCs. And with western govs backing a proposal that encodes full-civilian rule, security elites should accept that their days ruling are numbered. #Sudan
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1/My main issue with the CNN investigation on #Sudan is it reduces the October 25 coup to Russian involvement. This is a serious distortion that could negatively impact policy making. Egypt, the UAE, Saudis and Israel had an outsized influence and/or were complicit in the coup.
2/ That does not mean Russia is not a sizable player. But as journos and analysts, we can't impose a simple framing that treats countries as black boxes, whose fates are dictated by a single external player.
#Sudan , and the circumstances that caused the coup, are more complex.
Ultimately, to add, it is competition/fragile cooperation between civilian/armed-groups in #Sudan that has resulted in the coup. External players seek to exploit these divisions and frail alliances to score or exploit Sudan for their own respective reasons.
Short 🧵following this quick explainer on the violence engulfing #Sudan 's Blue Nile.
I believe we should be careful from casually applying the term inter-communal violence since the root causes of conflicts in the peripheries is inherently political.
To elaborate, the coup authorities are adhering to a traditional power structure in Sudan, where the peripheries are militarized to extract resources in order to enrich a new elite class ruling in Khartoum.
Within this framework, communities often battle one another for local political power (often representation in the Native Administrations) in order to lay claim to resources in the land they share.
THREAD on #Sudan : U.S. officials and sources in Khartoum told Foreign Policy that Burhan and Hemeti were wary to hand over power for fear that they could face arrest for committing war crimes—particularly the massacre of nearly 130 civilians protesting Bashir’s rule in June 2019
If this is true, then this validates my reporting and the forecast of Nabil Adeeb, who heads the committee tasked with criminally investigating the massacre on June 3. He told me that the political implications of the probe could lead to mass unrest in the streets or....a coup.
To clarify, he never told me that the implications would deter him from conducting a detailed and objective investigation, which he said was his duty.
This is a small thread pertaining to my investigation for @newhumanitarian . For the last three months I have been preoccupied with one question: What happens to migrants when they are intercepted by the #EU backed coast guard and returned to #Libya?
I discovered that many are going 'missing by the hundreds' and ending up in a labyrinth of unofficial detention centers. In fact, more than half of the 6,200 migrants returned to Libya this year have gone unaccounted for, according to IOM.
Migrants are increasingly being taken to "data-collection centers' which are supposedly used to investigate smugglers. But migrants and aid groups say these facilities are being used to traffic and extort migrants after they're intercepted and returned by the Libyan coast guard.