Today’s speech by Putin is a milestone in the Russo-Ukraine War. It may be useful for Putin in a domestic politics sense. But, as has been the case throughout this war, it is terrible strategy for Russia. A thread on the implications of Putin’s latest ‘bold’ move. 1/25
2/ The full text of the speech in English. I recommend reading it all - while providing a couple of breaks to vomit. It is anti-Anglo-Saxon, anti-LGBTIQ, anti-‘elites’, anti-West, and anti-US. And anti-Ukraine of course. en.kremlin.ru/events/preside…
3/ The principle audience for the speech was the domestic one. Putin used the speech as a war update, with the message that Russian progress so far is significant, securing 4 regions of Ukraine to return to the Russian motherland.
4/ Another audience was Russia’s military leaders. In essence, Putin said “I have given you this great and historic mission, so sort your act out with mobilisation and get on with deploying more soldiers to Ukraine.”
5/ And, Putin probably believes that this speech will be well-received in certain, non-aligned parts of the world including South Asia and Africa, who still buy his energy and other products. He might be right.
6/ But what does this mean for the course of war in #Ukraine? There are multiple impacts of Putin’s new - and flawed - strategy.
7/ First, it is another demonstration of Putin’s inability to align his desired political outcomes with the capacity of his military. This has been a characteristic of the war from day one. The Russian military is incapable of achieving what Putin has directed it to do.
8/ Even the scaled back strategic objective of liberating the Donbas, announced in Putin’s 9 May speech, has proven beyond the Russian military. This expanded approach, encompassing 4 provinces, is likely to be well beyond Russian military capacity to seize or hold.
9/ So, Putin has actually set himself up for failure in this regard alone. He has set out large objectives, which his military are unlikely to achieve, which will place further strain on his credibility and that of the Russian military. It is terrible strategy.
10/ A second impact is that this will encourage Ukraine to step up its efforts to take back its territory illegally seized by Russia. So far, it is doing a pretty good job of this and battlefield momentum is currently with the Ukrainians.
11/ Ukraine, with its strategy of corrosion, has out fought and out thought the Russians throughout this war. They have brilliantly used the indirect approach to destroy Russian units and morale. And they have magnificently applied the operational art in sequencing campaigns.
12/ As a consequence of Putin’s announcement, the Ukrainians have reinvigorated purpose. We should expect to see offensives continue, including (maybe at a slower pace) through the winter. And resistance attacks in annexed areas will increase.
13/ But the continuation of Ukrainian tactical and operational success also relies of the continuation of western support. This leads to the third impact.
14/ Putin has given the west greater reason to support Ukraine. This illegal land grab goes against the all principles of self-determination and democracy. And it sets a terrible precedent for behaviour by large states - this can’t be allowed to stand. nato.int/cps/en/natohq/…
15/ Fourth, Putin has continued his campaign to normalize the potential use of nuclear weapons. His reference to US use of nuclear weapons in WW2 as a precedent means he may see them as a final option to prevent a catastrophic loss in Ukraine. And to deter further NATO support.
16/ Fifth, Putin is continuing his ‘energy warfare’ against Europe. His speech again asked Europeans why they support the war, noting that “Europe have to convince their fellow citizens to eat less, take a shower less often and dress warmer at home.”
17/ A final impact of the speech is it shows that there is no negotiated end to this war in the near future. Putin stated that the future of the 4 provinces will not be discussed. Coupled with mobilisation, Putin has painted himself into a corner. He now has to win this war.
18/ This makes him probably even more dangerous. But it will also result in greater pressure on the Russian economy and on Russian society. The ultimate impact of this is unpredictable - but unlikely to be good. A good piece on this is from @anneapplebaumtheatlantic.com/ideas/archive/…
19/ Putin may also give the west no option but to further increase its aid to Ukraine. And, possibly, new consideration of Ukrainian entry into #NATO. Putin’s war and annexation nearly guarantees what he sought to prevent by invading Ukraine. president.gov.ua/en/news/mi-rob…
20/ The other irony of the speech is that it comes as Ukraine is about to capture #Lyman & show its military prowess again by humiliating the Russian Army. It is another demonstration of Putin’s constant incapacity to align his political desires with military capacity.
21/ And if the ‘professional’ Russian military that has been trained and re-equipped over the last decade can’t prevail in Ukraine, it is extraordinarily unlikely that a mass of conscripts with just weeks of training will provide a solution to Putin’s territory aspirations.
22/ So Putin’s speech marks a more dangerous phase of the war, because he has shown himself to be more desperate. But the annexations, and mobilisations, are unlikely to change ultimate outcome of this war.
23/ Because, there is little else that Putin can do to Ukraine he has not already done. City destruction, rape, torture, murder, annexation and nuclear threats have not cowed the Ukrainians. They continue to show how a free people can defeat authoritarians. Take note Xi!
24/ The trajectory of the war remains for an eventual Ukrainian victory. But Putin’s recent announcements mean that #Ukraine winning this war will take longer, and have a much higher price - for Ukraine and Russia. End.
An initial assessment of the PLA parade that has just finished in Beijing. Overall, no major surprises although there were was some new equipment. The structure and content of the parade was pretty standard. Five key themes stood out for me however. 1/9 🧵
2/ Theme 1. Most of the weapons and platforms were not brand new, but generally, every land, air and sea platform was more modern than that in the inventories of western military organisations. Newer does not always mean better however. While most western military equipment has been tested in Iraq, #Ukraine and elsewhere, none of China's new kit has.
3/ Theme 2. The new weapons and platforms were interesting and demonstrate the ongoing, advanced military R&D eco-system that China now has. The Large Underwater Uncrewed Vessels, the uncrewed rotary wing aircraft and the HHQ-16C (HT @AlexLuck9), DF-61 and DF-31BJ missiles as well as the laser defence systems were new reveals by the PLA. I thought the UAV on the back of the Infantry Fighting Vehicle was interesting. Long gone are the days were China was reliant on Russia or other foreign systems. This level of indigenous capacity infers high levels of sustainability in any future conflict.
Tomorrow's big parade in Beijing will preview new Chinese weapon systems. But the military 'bling' may also provide insights into new and evolved PLA operating concepts for drones and missiles. 1/7 🧵
2/ In my latest piece, I explore the concept of a Pacific drone wall built by China, and how tomorrow’s PLA parade might preview some of its new components. There has been much speculation about the new weaponry that might be unveiled during the 3 September parade. Two key systems that are likely to receive a lot of attention are missiles and drones.
3/ Of course, China is not the only nation capable of assembling a 21st century military barrier comprised of air, sea and land drones. The U.S. Indo-Pacific Command has been discussing and simulating the creation of a drone barrier in the Taiwan Strait called Hellscape.
I have just published my regular update on global conflict. This week: Gerasimov's Ukraine war update, the aerial campaigns of Ukraine & Russia, Japan's missile moves, China's big parade and my Big Five reads. 1/5 🇺🇦🧵(Image: @DefenceU)
2/ This week, Russia's General Gerasimov provided an update on the war in Ukraine. Among his insights, Russia won't stop until it achieves its objectives, and that Russia holds the strategic initiative. He also discussed Russia's attacks on 'industrial targets' in Ukraine.
3/ In the Pacific, Japan made announcements about the deployment of American Typhon missile systems in September, as well as the deployment of indigenous counter-strike missile systems throughout Japan. Also, Exercise Alon 2025 concluded and China practiced for its 3 September parade. (Image: @TaiwanMonitor)
Ukraine has developed a world-class long-range strike capability. My latest assessment explores this topic. Ukraine's strikes in the past few months, especially against the Russian oil industry, reinforce that Russia cannot win this war. 1/6 🇺🇦🧵
2/ The impact of Ukraine's long-range strike campaign shows that Russia can only be handed a victory through a political process, which is why Putin is so desperate to convince the Trump administration about land transfers, and deny the presence of foreign troops in Ukraine.
3/ Ukraine's long-range strike capability has been a vital development for the Ukrainian Armed Forces since February 2022. They have developed an increasingly capable range of weapons to hit further into Russia and hold a wider range of strategic targets at risk.
I have just published a short initial assessment on the outcomes of the Alaska Summit. A caveat is that we are likely to find out more later today, so I will update this if that occurs. There were a few things we might take away from the meeting. 1/9 (Image: @Reuters)
2/ First, Putin appeared to be more upbeat at the press conference than Trump did. While Trump did not appear downcast, there was a marked disparity in the overall posture of the two leaders. This indicates that no overall agreement has been reached but that some small points of common ground may have been agreed.
3/ Second, Putin was laying on the flattery of Trump in a big way. This is an attempt by Putin to ensure the next meeting is also a one-on-one and does not include Ukraine. It will also be an attempt to split Trump from European leaders by convincing him that Putin is not as bad as European leaders have portrayed. Putin also held out the prospect of business ties.
My regular update on global conflicting & confrontation is now available. This week: the envelopment of Pokrovsk, Russia’s war on Ukraine’s cities and its protracted saturation strategy, and Exercise Talisman Sabre. 1/5
2/ The Russians appear to be in the final phases of their double envelopment of the Ukrainian city of Pokrovsk. The Russian campaign for Pokrovsk, which has been a long series of large and small battles, has been underway for more than a year. Russia also continued its large scale bombardment of Ukraine’s cities this week, targeting infrastructure and civilian morale. The largest attack in the past week was on 21 July, when the Russians launched 450 missiles and drones against targets inside Ukraine.
3/ The two key factors at play in this phase of the war pursued by Russia - protraction and saturation - offer a variety of insights for Western defence planners, as well as for Russia’s partners such as China and North Korea. For European and US defence planners, preparations for countering the protraction of war require both political and societal adaptation. Both China and North Korea, already inclined towards strategies of protraction and saturation, will be learning that the protraction and saturation method is a viable strategy for them as well if they decide to engage in military campaigns against Taiwan and South Korea.