Isolating its wind & solar generation (RES) for the month of Sept however reveals future challenges.
GER had 9 days in Sept with little #wind. Not just Germany, all of Europe. On avg, GER used 2.7GW of its 62GW wind cap.
That is a capacity factor of 4.5%. Ouch!
2/n
While Sept turned GER into an importer for 2d (from CZE, SWE & DK) to cover consumption (FRA couldn't help; coal maxed out), RES also required it to export excesses during 15d.
Its Energiewende already turned GER into an imp/export "junky" as d-s are tough to match.
3/
So what?
Well, GER is scheduled to turn off all coal assets by 2035 (nukes by 2022; ex grid reserve) & replace it with wind & solar.
Only NatGas is permitted to complement intermittant RES in coming years - such are the directives of Germany's green energy laws today.
4/n
Many "experts" claim that this is a good thing, both for the climate and the consumer.
That is because RES will basically bring prices of electricity near-zero.
I kid you not - that is an official claim, among other, by its renewable lobby.
5/n
GER's Energiewende would require many conditions for it to work - none of which will be met by 2035, if ever.
One such condition is higher cross-border cap. In Sept it would have required 720GWh/d of imports (ex coal & nuclear) to cover its load. It has 52GW imp cap today.
6/
Did neighbours agree to increase cross-border cap with GER (future storage & transmissions should reduce total need) or is it uncoordinated?
Will neighbours have excess generation cap ex RES (same climate) to match future peaks? Today's c-border balancing doesn't suggests so!
U see, electricity was never only about energy assets (or their emissions) & always about timing & location too.
Wind will primarily be located offshore (north). Much of it will have to be transported south (industry). That will require a doubling of transmission lines.
7/
I'm afraid this target too will prove impossible to achieve by 2035 (despite a grid acceleration law since 2016) as nobody wants a new transmission line in the backyard.
At the current pace, GER would complete 50% of its grid expansion by 2035.
8/
We covered, among others, the challenges for more chemical storage in our thread here.
GER will require >15TWh of c-storage to cover so called "Dunkelflauten" - prolonged periods without wind or sunshine in Jan/Feb. It has a few MWh today.
For past 20y GER energy policy wasn't about emission.
Instead, ideology (Greens), campaign panic (CDU/CSU; Merkel’s nuclear exit post Fukushima) or personal entanglements (SPD; Schörder’s push for Russian gas) dominated decision making. Blame them all.
10/
For that purpose, the GER public was told that nuclear is an uncontrollable risk - a lie!
Its Energiewende, however, risks an "economic meltdown" if it doesn't allow for a nuclear renaissance to meet its de-carbonisation targets - a fact!
Yesterday, I shared a few thoughts that I’d like to expand on, especially given how volatile the current tariff landscape under this admin has become.
Navigating it isn’t just difficult—it’s nearly impossible to avoid missteps. Hopefully some traders will expand on my thoughts...
1/n
What do we know?
As at 23 March 2025, Comex copper price in New York is trading at 14% premium to LME in London. Buying a tonne of copper in NY costs $11,213 versus 9,842 in London, $1,371 per tonne more than in London.
2/n
Why is that? Because of tariff FEARS, not tariffs.
Traders are hedging future risk of potential tariffs on all forms of the raw material, such as cathodes, concentrates, ores, and even scrap. But there aren't such tariffs in place for copper yet (unlike alumnium).
The current Comex price action in the U.S. is basically a Trump tariff trade mirage and is otherwise as misleading of fundaments as the May 2024 price action of which I warned on multiple occasions.
1/n $/pound
In May 2024 however, U.S. price action was more in synch with London. But it didn't reflect weak Chinese housing & construction fundamentals which has been 15-30% of GLOBAL copper use for the past two decades. Today, U.S. prices trade as if borders close tomorrow.
2/n Comex - LME arb in $/t
Unlike May 2024, copper blue chips like $FCX, however, do not buy the rally. So at least it seems that the equity market understands the tariff aspect of the copper price mirage.
In this episode, we discuss China's 2nd of 5 economic paths it can follow.
This episode will also focus on Xi the leader. To understand Xi means to better understand China's economic path forward.
1/n #China
Can China replace malinvestment with more consumption?
Answer: Maybe a little bit & over a long time frame, but President Xi does not want to focus on this path. Instead, he wants to implement his socialist utopia.
2/n
Yes, China’s rising entrepreneurs were welcomed by the Communist Party for at least two decades. But all of that is in reverse.
Under Xi Jinping, China has moved full circle: from low growth & low freedom in the pre-reform era back towards something similar today.
In this episode, we discuss China's investment-led growth model & the first of 5 economic paths China can follow.
As you would expect, also this episode is full of Chinese characteristics!
1/n #China
Starting in 1990s, China’s economic engine has been fueled by capital investments.
Its central planning bureau defined GDP targets, picked winners and drove growth from debt-driven capital formations (green line).
2/n
Has any other nation tried this before, ever? Not to our knowledge.
We checked at ALL G20 economies and their respective growth models for past 70 years. 45% capital formation share is a unique experiment in economic history.
Over the past 3 years, we made some controversial calls in commodities. We decided to exit our oil holding in Aug 2022, we went short natgas in early 2023 or called for copper to go lower in May.
Why? Because we have an egde on China.
1/n #China
Yes, mainstream media picked up pace on important issues facing China today.
Most came to understand that the property bubble burst, that the economy is slowing, that geopolitical frictions are emerging, that there is too much debt.
But do they understand the underlying forces that drive these issues?
2/n
While the majority of these facts are known, most Western observers, investors & industrialists do not fully appreciate their interdependence & the structural changes that are unfolding in China today.
Pre-2020, Gold had one marginal buyer, that being gold-backed ETFs.
Today, gold has at least 3 marginal buyers that can overlap or alternate each other. They are:
- Gold backed Western ETFs (which buy, sell or hold based on US real rates);
- Central Banks seeking higher gold reserves (China; India; Thailand; Vietnam; Qatar, KSA or even Poland) for geopolitical & other reasons;
- Chinese & other Asian wholesale or retail market participants and professional speculators;
Who bought most last? India!
Why? The government cut import duties on gold by 9% at end of July, triggering a renewed surge in demand. “The impact of the duty cut was unprecedented, it was incredible,” said Philip Newman, managing director of Metals Focus in London. “It really brought consumers in.”
At least for now, there seems to be always somebody.
1/n
Note however that Chinese retail buying has slowed down recently, as best illustrated by the Shanghai gold premium over international prices.
I will elaborate on the Chinese retail clients more soon.
2/n
However, professional Chinese speculators have increased their futures positions somewhat again. Who is the better indicator of what comes next, retail or the pros? IDK