Thread by @WarintheFuture

The Ukrainian southern campaign continues to play out. While their forces fix Russian defenders in the south west, the Ukrainians are advancing from the north. Some observations on the Kherson & Kharkiv offensives. 1/20 🧵

https://twitter.com/war_mapper/status/1577449160760074242

2/ While this may appear to be a ‘sudden’ breakthrough in the south, it is actually the continuation of a long series of orchestrated actions in the south and north east of Ukraine.

3/ Ukrainian attacks in the south began months ago. Not only did these recapture territory, they were part of the reconnaissance battle to gain intelligence while denying information to Russian recon elements.

4/ These early actions shaped the battlefield, and eventually drew Russian reinforcements. Planners in Kyiv would have then started exploiting the opportunity to isolate Russian forces west of the Dnipro. #HIMARS helped, but clever planning for its use was vital.

5/ At the same time, the Ukrainian strategic planners in Kyiv would have been looking further afield for other opportunities where the Russians might have thinned out their defences to cover the responsibilities of the troops sent to the south.

6/ It is highly likely that the north east would have been on their radar for some time. But, as the Russians thinned out there, Ukraine would have made the final decision to launch a second campaign in the north east.

7/ Then, with the Kharkiv campaign rampaging through the north east, the Ukrainians again would have been looking for opportunities elsewhere, and scanning for Russian weaknesses. They found an opportunity in northern #Kherson.

8/ What might we take from this? I think there are a few observations that might be made, even with the limited amount of information we have.

9/ First, the Ukrainians had a broad overall operational design featuring potential operations in the south, north east - and probably elsewhere. However, launching these was not only based on time, but also about when opportunities presented themselves.

10/ Second, the Ukrainians clearly had both dedicated and situational reserves that they had allocated for planned offensives - and for exploiting opportunities. Creating these required a good appreciation of risk, deception, operational security and logistic stockpiling.

11/ Third, the Ukrainians have fought a superior recon battle. A senior military officer, during our Kyiv visit, confirmed the Russians were poor at tactical recon. This is an essential part of preventing surprise and recognising enemy weaknesses to exploit.

12/ This recon battle, undertaken by ground, air and EW recon elements, paints a picture of the ground, enemy dispositions, reserves, C2, key transport routes and logistics. And Ukraine’s tactical recon is probably complemented by strategic recon from other sources.

13/ Fourth, after nearly 8 months of operations (and 8 years since Russia started this war), Ukraine has several senior commanders who are seasoned strategists and operational artists. They clearly know their enemy well, and know how to balance strategic risk & opportunity.

14/ And these commanders, including Generals Zaluzhnyi, Syrskiy and Kovalchuk, are adept at guiding their staffs and subordinate commanders through the planning and execution of large scale military operations. This is a rare skill that few military institutions master.

15/ Fifth, the asymmetry in command philosophies, where Russia centrally controls operations and Ukraine allows more freedom to exploit opportunities through mission command, has been telling.

16/ In fast moving operations, like the Kharkiv and northern Kherson operations, those who do not have to constantly refer back to higher headquarters will be able to set and dominate operational tempo, ultimately seizing the initiative.

17/ It is the combination of these five factors - as well as the courage of Ukrainians in close combat and the lack of purpose among Russian soldiers - that has been central to Ukraine’s success in recapturing so much of its territory in the past several weeks.

18/ The Russian Army do not appear to have an answer to what the Ukrainians are doing to them. We are seeing cascading failures which are likely to continue for a while yet. The injection of mobilised troops is likely to provide only human speed bumps for the Ukrainians.

19/ Not since the initial part of Operation Barbarossa in WW2 has the Russian Army had such a terrible series of reverses on the battlefield. And with large numbers of troops stuck west of the Dnipro, the days ahead could get much worse for them yet. End.

20/ Thank you to the following, whose images were used in this h to read: @Haruspexut @ChuckPfarrer @DefMon3 @War_Mapper