Thread by @osint_east

The recent deep-strikes by #Russian drones marks a shift in Russian strategy, and the dynamics of the #UkraineRussiaWar in the short-term.

I've gathered info, analysis, and developed graphics for a deeper look at a key component of this trend: the #Shahed136.

A mega thread

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The application of #drones in this war is well-documented: reconnaissance, direct-attack, fire-correction, harassment, and at least in one instance—aerial combat.

Drones are used as force-multipliers and enablers serving numerous roles—sometimes simultaneously.

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The Shahed-136 is no different. It's recent introduction in Ukraine is a means to circumvent or saturate Ukrainian air defense, strike targets in the rear, and instill terror.

That terror manifests night after night, defined by the distinctive whine of it's motor.

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The lineage of the Shahed-136—Russian designation Geran-2 [Герань - 2] (Geranium-2)—is traced to Iran's nascent drone development program following the Iran-Iraq war. Severe import restrictions, driven in part by US sanctions, forced a reliance on domestic defense production.

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Prioritization of drone development emanated from Iran's learned limitations of reconnaissance capabilities during the war.

Iran also sought to extend its capabilities to allied proxies promulgating it's revolutionary goals in the Middle-East.

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washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysi…

As the strategy for drone development and deployment was codified, and domestic defense industries formed the necessary collaborations for iterative weapons advancement, the application of drones became an salient feature of Iranian militaristic aims in the region.

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By late 2018, thirty years of iterative development resulted in several capable UAV platforms successfully fielded by Iran.

Among them: a stable, long-range airframe, simple in design, and mass-producible via common materials, and a commercial prop-motor.

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Only recently has the Shahed-136 been deployed as an offensive capability by Iran or it's allies and proxies.

It's first potential offensive use may have been the attack on the Abqaiq–Khurais Aramco refinement facilities in 2019, with flight paths originating in Yemen.

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In early-to-mid 2020, illicit cargoes of Shahed-136, and it's smaller 'cousin' the Shahed-131, were confirmed as supplied to Houthi forces in Yemen. By 2021, the drone had been potentially implicated in another pair of high-profile maritime attacks.

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nytimes.com/2021/07/30/wor…

However, Iran's enablement of allied proxies allowed for a shield of deniability in most use-cases. Moreover, it maintained an ability to continue development of fielded capabilities by illicit means, while drawing the interest of other nation-state and non-state buyers.

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It is at this point we arrive at the war in Ukraine. Russia—having largely failed to execute a combined arms invasion, and struggling to achieve battlefield successes—has turned to modifying its attack plans in Ukraine, opting for a wider scope of targeted destruction.

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The earliest documented use of the Shahed-136 in Ukraine is supposed to have occurred in mid-August. Initial visual confirmation was made on September 13.

Shortly after, mass-deployment through wave attacks began, and often in combination with PGMs.

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time.com/6223204/iran-k…

The results of these attacks are apparent: a steady degrading of Ukraine's energy infrastructure, civilian spaces and structures, military command centers and equipment.

While many drones are intercepted, their effect on Ukraine's populace—in the short-term—is significant.

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Russia has decidedly opted to use Shahed-136, and other drones, given their flight-range, relative accuracy, and high cost-efficiency. It is also likely that declining stocks of PGMs present ongoing challenges to maintain deep-strike capability as the war slowly grinds on.

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It's advantages, however, should not be overlooked. At a time where Russia's strategic initiative strains under pressure of repeat Ukrainian counteroffensives, the probabilistic gains of new tactics and weapons is a necessitated gamble.

Graphic: Hypothesized Launch System

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Russia can positon, deploy, launch, and refit the drone at a rapid rate, and largely undetected. Reports suggest Russia has purchased between 2,000 and 2,400 Shahed-136, though expressed deniability has made verification challenging, and at times, rather awkward.

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This is not unusual. This veneer of deception employed by Russia also rests on the shield of deniability. It is likely that Russia means to sustain what remains of diplomatic relationships deeply strained over it's actions in Ukraine. A similar case may apply for Iran.

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However, the simplicity of design, common materials, commercial motor, and basic warhead make the drone a candidate for mass-production by Russia's military industries.

Recall that the drone is an outcome of a design program operating within the constraint of sanctions.

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Despite increasing losses by Ukrainian ADA (in all its forms) Russia may retain an ability to marshal industrial capacity to mass-produce Shahed-136 in order to sustain the momentum of its revised operational objectives, even as strategic objectives falter.

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Ukraine initially struggled to manage the onslaught; the past three weeks shows that reality. In time, gun-armed SHORAD + intelligence will fill the gaps, but it will remain a task of both forces to exhaust the other of it's new capabilities.

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nytimes.com/2022/10/23/wor…

But the impression of the Shahed-136 leaves is unmissable. It's quickly assumed a near-cult status within pro-Russian narratives and observers, despite evidence of the systems inherent limitations.

It's known as the 'moped', 'lawnmower', and most peculiar: 'dorito'

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It's gone so far as to adapt western cultural iconography to further embellish this cult-like status.

[ t me link ]

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But for Ukraine, and Ukrainians, it is yet another weapons system it must contend with. Growing demand for more, and more complex, air defense has forced Western allies to dig deep into available and surplus stocks, and under more urgent timelines.

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csis.org/analysis/can-u…

Recent additions of Gepard SPAAG, IRIS-T, and MIM-23 HAWK will expand ADA coverage to areas recently targeted by Shahed-136, but these options too have limits: the cost-per-intercept by missile is out-of-proportion to the drone's relatively low-cost of approx. 20,000 USD.

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And in their absence, the volume of attacks have drawn out across the country, imperiling Ukraine's electrical grid at the local and regional levels.

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https://twitter.com/ChrisO_wiki/status/1585574189565726720?s=20&t=zwtheMtOCTjVxr1M6-oLcQ

As the war grinds on, the relative ease of which Russia deploys the Shahed-136 into battle, and the urgency Ukraine commits to intercepting them, will define it's overall impact in the war.

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Its contribution to the evolving story of drones and the nature of warfare, and intentional use on civilian infrastructure, raises challenging questions on what form any response may take.

@realcyncialfox notes this in @PKurzin 's space/podcast @theglobalgambit on Oct. 20.

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For further exploration on drones, their impact, and contributions to the war in Ukraine, I highly recommend the work of @KhalilDewan and @SamBendett

Photos from @YasuyoshiChiba & GlebGaranich

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I'm moving towards long-form analytical threads like this one. I have more opportunity to explore context this way, and hopefully stimulate real and necessary discussion.

Thanks for following!