Share this page!

Enter URL or ID to Unroll

You can paste full URL like: https://x.com/threadreaderapp/status/1644127596119195649
or just the ID like: 1644127596119195649

How to get URL link on X (Twitter) App

  1. On the Twitter thread, click on or icon on the bottom
  2. Click again on or Share Via icon
  3. Click on Copy Link to Tweet
  4. Paste it above and click "Unroll Thread"!
  5. More info at Twitter Help
| osint_east | Profile picture
| osint_east |
@osint_east
Objective analysis on the war in Ukraine. Verified sources and incisive conversations. Some opinions, many maps. Context matters. RT/FLW/LK ≠ END 🔞
9 subscribers
Jan 3, 2023 • 5 tweets • 2 min read
It's worth noting this occurred 1) on a holiday, and 2) during a holiday celebration, making the strike perhaps more psychologically devastating.

If the same event occurred in, say, November I'm not clear outrage would be as great (though anger over incompetence would be).

1|4 They also did not die in battle...not even during rear area operations. They were just vaporized in a building while partying.

2|
Jan 2, 2023 • 4 tweets • 2 min read
On casualty estimates and their impact:

Regardless of the actual figure: 63 as "official" toll from Russian MoD, "600" from A. Shariy who has made unsubstantiated claims/figures before–the event is considerable because of who has died: the recently-mobilized.

#Makiivka

1|4 The Russian MoD, and Kremlin at-large, has struggled to justify casualties among the mobilized, due in part to its reluctance to "officialize" many reasons for mobilization.

This has been a source of frustration among milbloggers, and the Russian public more generally.

2|
Jan 2, 2023 • 5 tweets • 3 min read
Reference on the #Makiivka strike:

The building is not especially old, nor is it small. This was a large three-story building primarily of standing poured columns with likely prestressed hollowcore slabs.

i/s: t.me/grey_zone/16439

1|2 "Destroyed Vocational ... Meaning: a possible reason for such a high death toll (est. 100-150; (500 is exaggerated)) is the result of the GMLRS munitions creating multiple rapid failures in the entire structure, leading to floors pancaking thus crushing most inside.

2|2
Jan 2, 2023 • 4 tweets • 2 min read
I do not yet fully understand what line B. Rozhin is towing; he oscillates between (measured) analysis and open reflections on economic/social factors.

If anything, he often comes across disappointed rather than incensed like the others.

1|3 In a strange way he seems detached at times, bordering on indifferent if only to allow (objective) reporting while others lean overly-performative.

МИГ and Rozhin are similar in this way–far more "matter of fact" language used by the two.

s: t.me/mig41/22995

2| Tranlation: MIR Sourced: J...
Dec 15, 2022 • 49 tweets • 19 min read
Wagner is engaged on multiple fronts, but its battlefield worth is in question—most recently in a seemingly unending & futile attempt at capturing #Bakhmut. But why would a famed outfit struggle so much?

A new look at #WagnerPMC

#UkraineRussianWar
#Mercenaries

🔞

1 of 48 PART ONE: In the Shadows W... Studies on #Wagner, a unofficial quasi-state military apparatus, illustrate #Kremlin shadow efforts aimed at enabling foreign policy objectives.

Simply, Wagner brings to bear the levers of organized violence where (official) #Russian forces cannot.

2|
Dec 14, 2022 • 6 tweets • 3 min read
It appears Wagner elements are aiming straight-west using low-density residential as an attack vector, but that likely halts when they reach the Bakhmutova River.

Unclear if toehold is a fixing action as forces N/S attempt encirclement, or a disjointed effort.

#Bakhmut

1/N This is not an ideal vector (poor cover, flexible) but is a more efficient route to city center & river crossings.

Breaking secondary AFU defensive lines is a clear goal.

As suspected, Wagner is moving off main approaches to avoid interception.

2/
Dec 6, 2022 • 12 tweets • 8 min read
At approx. 07:00 UTC+3 a fire was reported at the airfield in #Kursk [#курск ] where a suspected - and later reported - drone attack occurred.

This comes less than 24 hours after suspected drone attacks on Engels and Diaghilev airbases.

a/v s: t.me/gistapapapa/54…

1/N The Governor of Kursk, Roman Starovoit, does report that the fire is the result of an #UAV attack, on airbase oil/fuel infrastructure specifically, and that the fire is localized.

s: t.me/gubernator_46/…

2/
Dec 6, 2022 • 6 tweets • 3 min read
After observing the information space re: #Zaporizhia and #polohy it can be determined that no current proof of a wide-scale Russian withdrawal exists.

Timeline covers events from 02/12 - 05/12. Sources included & timestamped.

1/6 What may be deduced: troop rotation in conjunction with redoubling of defensive operations across the LOC.

s: t.me/RSaponkov/4096

This can be surmised from expansion of defensive structures across the entire Southern AO, from Mariupol west to E. Kherson Oblast.

2/
Dec 4, 2022 • 5 tweets • 3 min read
@TheStudyofWar released its daily (12/03) assessment:

"...[a] limited Ukrainian incursion onto the east bank could open avenues for Ukrainian forces to begin to operate on the east bank."

#UkraineRussianWar
#Kherson

1/4
🔽 The challenge with this assessment is that it takes a video-based claim and extrapolates and operational outcome from it.

s: t.me/aerocarlson/689

Albeit ISW's language leaves room for interpretation, this should not be considered as a practical assessment. Emil expands:

2/
Dec 2, 2022 • 12 tweets • 9 min read
Claim: #Russian Forces are Evacuating in the #Zaporizhzhia AO.

A fact-based thread tracking communications regarding this evolving claim & related events.

Claims sorted by type & origin [ 1️⃣ , 2️⃣ ... ; 🇷🇺 🇺🇦 ]

#OSINT
#UkraineRussianWar

1/N
mapclips: @DefMon3 Area of claims observation: Russian forces "evacuating 1️⃣🇺🇦 18:00 UTC+2

On Thursday 01/12 the #GSUA stated in its daily report that individual Russian units & officials were repositioning, or evacuating, from the #Zaporizhzhia AO.

Specifically IVO settlements:

#Polohy (city)
#Mykhailivka
#Inzhenerne

s: facebook.com/GeneralStaff.u…

2/ GSUA Daily Report Statement. December 01, 2022.
Dec 1, 2022 • 11 tweets • 6 min read
@TheStudyofWar released its daily (11/30) assessment:

"Disruptions associated with partial #mobilization and Russian setbacks on the battlefield likely contributed to increasing war weariness among #Russian public, as reflected in the polling."

1/10

#UkraineRussiaWar️ The most recent poll referenced was conducted by the Federal Protective Service (FSO), a #Kremlin apparatus. Its results show a relatively-unchanged number of respondents are "in favor of peace talks" as compared to a similar poll conduced in October.

2/
meduza.io/en/feature/202…
Nov 30, 2022 • 5 tweets • 2 min read
Good point. We can expand on this.

Ukraine has deftly controlled their information space (in a way that will be studied for years), and through the backing of Western partners/supporters.

This includes not only promulgation of narratives, but also intelligence operations.

1/3 Russia does have tight control of the narrative internally, but the open-source nature of the war, and the sheer volume of Ukraine supporters processing available data, makes it a near-impossible task to contain info spread, or embed disinformation.

2/
 meduza.io/en/short/2019/…
Nov 29, 2022 • 5 tweets • 3 min read
Observation: in the past three weeks the reported use of #shahed136 has declined significantly.

Early estimates (September) suggested Russia had planned to obtain 1,800 - 2,400 aerial munitions from Iran, either directly, or through relicensed assembly; many are Shahed-136. Interceptions have slowed, implying use of the drone has declined. Increasing failure rate of interception is highly unlikely.

A few possibilities:

1. Attrition
2. E/W countermeasures
3. Stock replenishment cycle
4. Fewer media reports
5. Supply interruption
6. Training cycles Claimed Shahed-136 Intercep...
Nov 29, 2022 • 5 tweets • 2 min read
An expansive and comprehensive essay by @LawDavF illustrating the difficultly of the entrenchment of Russian leadership, and their inability to see the reality of the war's progression.

1/
samf.substack.com/p/is-russia-lo… This brings me back to a discussion from @keithgessen featuring Hein Goemans on the elements that make up war termination theory, and how the war in Ukraine is a case where the forces at play make envisioning an end so difficult.

2/
newyorker.com/culture/annals…
Nov 29, 2022 • 11 tweets • 5 min read
@TheStudyofWar released its daily (11/28) assessment:

"Wagner Group financier Yevgeniy Prigozhin himself observed in October that #Wagner forces operating in the #Bakhmut area advance only 100–200 meters a day."

#UkraineRussiaWar

🔞

1/10 Bakhmut is a working case study on the rigid organizational frameworks that define Wagner, and its associated antagonists, enabling what can only be described as a phenomenally insane operational effort.

(a long thread on Wagner as an organization is in the works)

2/
Nov 27, 2022 • 19 tweets • 8 min read
Some weeks back Dave asked a good question, and I've given some time to think on it. What I've arrived at is exploring how info is used, how I use it, and why context matters.

Spoiler: I'm not publishing a list. *You* need to define that.

#OSINT
#ContextMatters

1/19 First, it's important to ask the question "Why are we here?"

I suppose the answer comes in many forms: political leanings and motivations, military & conflict analysis, offering moral support, news updates, and an intrigue in events beyond one's borders.

2/
Nov 27, 2022 • 4 tweets • 2 min read
@Mike_Eckel skepticism is definitely warranted.

Either this is: very confusingly worded; is misstating the equipment used; or is based on information that few—if any—have in the open-source community.

1/4 One odd detail is the reported 10km distance SPG/s were transported.

The geography of the Danube Biosphere Reserve warrants waterborne transport (deltaic marshland), but the distance of a geolocated firing position from a presumed launch-point at #Vylkoev exceeds 10km.

2/ Image
Nov 26, 2022 • 5 tweets • 2 min read
@TheStudyofWar released its daily (11/25) assessment:

"...responses from milbloggers with Kremlin & external affiliations about ongoing mobilization issues further illustrates extent of erosion of morale & increase in confusion among the pro-war nationalist community."

1/5 Ongoing and increasing confusion and discontent within Russian information spaces is an emergent property of mobilization efforts, and an overall flagging war effort.

This was observed—if not fully-expected—through early analysis of actualized mobilization:

2/
Nov 25, 2022 • 7 tweets • 4 min read
Hey @daxe , pointing out some likely inconsistencies in your recent article for Forbes.

In short: there is still no substantive evidence of a landing at Kinburn, as you state.

#OSINT

1/7
forbes.com/sites/davidaxe… Rumors beginning Nov 11/12 are outcomes of channels (Russian/Ukrainian, official & non-official) essentially repeating, then refuting, similar claims. Some of those claims were repeated verbatim.

This thread tracks those claims in high-detail, and with all sources of claims.

2/
Nov 25, 2022 • 5 tweets • 2 min read
‼️Misleading.

There is still no substantive evidence of ground operations on the Kinburn peninsula. Artillery Fires and/or RECON remain *possible.

The 'political source' Chuck references is Vitaly (Vitalii) Kim, Governor of Mykolaiv.

s: t.me/mykolaivskaODA…

1/4 In V. Kim's November 22 statement he states:

"we have three settlements left...so that we can legally exit the state of the warring region."

This means three settlements within *Mykolaiv Oblast* remain occupied, thus the Oblast remains considered as formally occupied.

2/
Nov 24, 2022 • 6 tweets • 5 min read
"Possible AFU SOF Operations in Kinburn Area"

❌Determination: Staged Event

IVO Vil'noandriivka, #Zaporizhia Oblast

POV (multiple). 47.57'57.77 N; 35.8'5.23 E

@GeoConfirmed @Cen4infoRes

Video Source: @PStyle0ne1

1/5 Location A:

"Beach Withdrawal"

POV. 47.57'57.77 N; 35.8'5.23 E

video timestamp: 1:32 - 1:45

2/ Google Earth. 2022. osint_eastGoogle Earth. 2022. osint_east