The battle of #Kherson is not over, but Russian forces have entered a new phase—prioritizing withdrawing their forces across the river in good order and delaying Ukrainian forces, rather than seeking to halt the Ukrainian counteroffensive entirely. /1 isw.pub/UkrWar110922
2/ The Ukrainian counteroffensive in the #Kherson direction since August—a coordinated interdiction campaign to force Russian forces to withdraw across the #Dnipro without necessitating major Ukrainian ground offensives—has likely succeeded.
3/ As @TheStudyofWar has observed over the previous months, Ukrainian forces engaged in a purposeful and well-executed campaign to target Russian concentration areas, military assets, and logistics nodes throughout #Kherson Oblast...
...to make continued Russian positions on the west bank untenable without having to conduct large-scale and costly ground maneuvers to liberate territory.
4/ Ukrainian troops launched constant attacks on bridges across the #Dnipro River and targeted supply centers and ammunition depots on the east bank of the Dnipro that degraded the ability of Russian forces to supply the grouping on the west bank...
...Ukrainian forces combined these strikes with prudent and successful ground attacks on key locations such as Davydiv Brid.
5/ This campaign has come to fruition. #Surovikin directly acknowledged that Russian forces cannot supply their grouping in #Kherson City and the surrounding areas due to Ukrainian strikes on critical Russian supply lines to the west bank.
6/ Russian sources noted that the withdrawal is a natural consequence of targeted and systematic Ukrainian strikes that cost the Russian grouping on the west bank its major supply arteries, which gradually attritted their overall strength and capabilities. isw.pub/UkrWar110922
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Lebanon: Documents seized by the IDF in the Gaza Strip highlight Iranian efforts to promote interoperability between Hamas and Lebanese Hezbollah. The documents depict Iran-Hamas discussions to send thousands of Hamas fighters to Lebanon to integrate into Hezbollah SOF units. These units are trained to conduct ground attacks into Israel.
2/ Iran: The United States and E3 submitted a censure resolution against Iran to the IAEA Board of Governors in response to Iran's refusal to cooperate fully with the IAEA. Iran is trying to prevent the censure resolution from passing by threatening unspecified retaliation.
3/ Iraq: The Iraqi federal government is trying to prevent Iranian-backed Iraqi militia attacks on Israel in order to prevent Israeli strikes on Iraq. Iranian-backed Iraqi attacks on Israel increased by almost 150 percent between September and October 2024.
NEW: Ukrainian drone operations continue to play a critical role in constraining Russian mechanized maneuver and preventing Russian forces from fully exploiting Ukraine's ongoing manpower constraints.
Special Report: The Ukrainian Defense of Pokrovsk Has Compelled Russia to Change Its Approach in Eastern Ukraine 🧵(1/6)
2/ Russian forces launched offensive operations intended to seize Pokrovsk in Donetsk Oblast during Spring 2024 at the moment of greatest constraints on Ukraine's manpower and materiel following the suspension of US assistance in Fall 2023.
3/ Russian forces have not taken Pokrovsk after eight months of grinding but consistent advances in western Donetsk Oblast.
NEW: Ukrainian drone operations continue to play a critical role in constraining Russian mechanized maneuver and preventing Russian forces from fully exploiting Ukraine's ongoing manpower constraints.
🧵(1/7)
2/ Zelensky said during an interview that Russian forces are currently advancing along the frontline due in part to decreased Ukrainian morale exacerbated by delays in staffing & equipping new Ukrainian brigades and granting frontline Ukrainian defenders necessary rest/rotation.
3/ Zelensky stressed the importance of standing up new brigades to replace and reinforce Ukrainian forces currently serving on the frontline but noted that Russian forces also continue to take significant manpower losses in exchange for minimal gains.
1. Putin modified compensation promised for Russian servicemen wounded while fighting in Ukraine — a clear indicator that the Kremlin is trying to cut the mounting short- and long-term costs of the war and restore balance to the Russian economy. 🧵(1/5)
2/ Putin originally introduced the policy offering all wounded Russian servicemen three million rubles to incentivize military recruitment after he had decided against declaring general mobilization in Spring 2022.
3/ Financial incentives became the key pillar of the Russian military's recruitment campaign and personnel retention efforts over the past nearly three years, and the reversal of such incentives indicates that the system is becoming economically unsustainable for the Kremlin.
ICYMI: Russia cannot defeat Ukraine or the West - and will likely lose - if the West mobilizes its resources to resist the Kremlin. If we lean in and surge, Russia loses. (🧵1/5)
2/ The notion that the Ukraine war is unwinnable because of Russia’s dominance is a Russian information operation, which gives us a glimpse of the Kremlin’s real strategy and only real hope of success. The Kremlin must get the United States to the sidelines, allowing Russia to fight Ukraine in isolation and then proceed to Moscow’s next targets, which Russia will also seek to isolate.
3/ The Kremlin needs the United States to choose inaction and embrace the false inevitability that Russia will prevail in Ukraine. Vladimir Putin’s center of gravity is his ability to shape the will and decisions of the West, Ukraine, and Russia itself.
Russian forces will eventually make operationally significant gains if Ukrainian forces do not stop ongoing Russian offensive operations, but the Russian military cannot sustain such loss rates indefinitely, especially not for such limited gains. 🧵(1/7)
2/ ISW previously observed data indicating that Russian forces have lost at least five divisions' worth of armored vehicles and tanks in Pokrovsk Raion alone since October 2023.
3/ Russian forces have likely accumulated a large amount of equipment in priority frontline areas, but dwindling Soviet-era tank and armored vehicle stockpiles and current armored vehicle production rates will likely make such losses prohibitive over the longer term.