Thread by @WarintheFuture

Recently, I have been asked a lot of questions about the impact of winter on the war in #Ukraine. In some respects, this is pretty ironic; I was born & live on the flattest, dustiest & hottest continent imaginable. That said, a thread on the coming winter war in Ukraine. 1/25 🧵

2/ I wrote a short piece on this topic yesterday that you can read in full at my (free) substack. But, because I know a lot of people are on @Twitter but not substack, I thought I would post my thoughts here as well. mickryan.substack.com/p/the-winter-w…

3/ There are many historical insights on this issue. The Indian Army has been conducting high-altitude and very cold operations for a very long time. Korea and WW2 all offer lessons on how wars continue despite the onset of winter.

4/ Given the war is unlikely to stop, but may alter its tempo, what might we expect in the coming months? I will examine both Russian and Ukrainian perspectives.

5/ The Russians. General Surovikin may want to consolidate key enablers like logistics, fires and command & control over winter to ensure they are survivable, but to ensure he has the right assets in the right parts of the country.

6/ With the withdrawal from #Kherson done, Surovikin will also probably review the command & leadership of his forces. He has spent enough time in Ukraine to gain a view of who are the ‘strong swimmers’ in his leadership team, and who are the ‘weak links’ to be removed.

7/ So, expect Surovikin to potentially make some changes to the organisation of ground forces, the allocation of key enablers and the principal commanders of the invasion force.

8/ Winter is also an opportunity for Surovikin to plan the campaigns that will be conducted in 2023. He was not placed in command by Putin to defend ground. He is there to secure the rest the territory not already seized in the 5 Ukrainian oblasts annexed by Putin in September.

9/ He will be thinking through his priorities for these offensives, their sequencing, where to use experienced units as well as mobilised troops, and the shaping activities that will be needed in advance of 2023 offensives. And he will be stockpiling ammunition.

10/ Finally, Surovikin will want to continue his strategic bombing campaign against civilian targets in Ukraine. There is no ethical or professional basis to this targeting.

11/ But, the Russians clearly believe this campaign is placing pressure on the Ukrainians - and those inclined to appeasement beyond Ukraine - to come to the negotiating table, thus giving Russia breathing space.

12/ A final element that will be important over winter, which Surovikin won’t have a lot of control over, is Russia’s strategic influence campaign. foreignpolicy.com/2022/08/22/inf…

13/ While it is unlikely these strategic activities will result in too much sanction busting in support of Moscow, Russia will be mainly seeking to ensure that those who are on the fence about the war stay there.

14/ The Ukrainians. The armed forces of Ukraine seized the initiative in this war some time ago. With the Kharkiv & Kherson offensives, they have momentum. There is no way that they will want to waste that momentum over the colder months. president.gov.ua/en/news/nide-n…

15/ So we might expect the Ukrainians to conduct opportunistic attacks where they find weaknesses in Russian defences, while continuing to seek out and destroy logistics nodes and Russian command and control facilities.

16/ Like the Russians, we should expect the Ukrainians to plan for 2023 and make adaptations to their leadership, organisation and other aspects of their force structure where required.

17/ I have written elsewhere that the Ukrainians have proven to be better than the Russians at tactical and institutional adaptation in this war. They will be using this adaptive, learning culture to ensure they are prepared for 2023. engelsbergideas.com/essays/how-ukr…

18/ We should expect Ukraine to continue and evolve its superb strategic influence campaign. This has been an integral part of Ukraine’s approach to telling its stories, gaining western support and degrading enemy morale from the start of the war.

19/ Politically, President Zelensky will be seeking to retain western support for his nation. He will be fighting Russian information operations which will be seeking to convince Europeans, and others, that their high winter heating bills are due to their support for Ukraine.

20/ At the same time, he will continue to consult western leaders about his plan for war termination, presented at the G20. He has laid down clear markers for the conditions that the Ukrainian government believe are the foundations for the end of this war. president.gov.ua/en/news/ukrayi…

21/ As if his job isn’t hard enough, President Zelensky will also be trying over winter to head off nascent initiatives to commence negotiations soon with the Russians. Given the momentum of his military forces, there is no reason for Zelensky to agree to negotiations now.

22/ If nothing else, we should expect more surprises in the coming months. A central element of war is the continuous effort to generate advantage over the enemy. Both sides will be looking for ways to gain territory, attrit the capacity of the other side & degrade their morale.

23/ The coming winter will feature more fighting, but at a different pace and probably at a smaller scale. It will see continued long range strikes from both sides and an ongoing information war.

24/ And it will demand both sides attend to the protection of their soldiers (and equipment) from the elements, to preserve as much of their combat power as possible to exploit opportunities during winter, and conduct larger offensive campaigns in 2023. End.

25/ Thank you to the following, whose images have been used in this thread: @KyivIndependent @washingtonpost @TheEconomist @RFERL @EngelsbergIdeas @ZelenskyyUa