Thread by @WarintheFuture

We are seeing more frequent references to the potential for Chinese action to seize Taiwan from current and former government and military leaders. It appears the clock may be running down on deterring a conflict over Taiwan. 1/23 🧵
smh.com.au/world/asia/rud…

2/ Recently, former Australian PM Kevin Rudd described how the next five years will shape the long-term stability of the Indo-Pacific region & determine the success of U.S. efforts to deter China from taking military action against Taiwan.

3/ In June, Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida warned that the Russian invasion of #Ukraine could be repeated in #Taiwan by China in the absence of unified deterrence by the U.S. and its allies. business-standard.com/article/intern…

4/ In October, the U.S. Chief of Naval Operations warned that China could undertake operations to seize Taiwan as early as 2023. US Secretary of State, Anthony Blinken described how Chinese plans for Taiwan are on a “much faster timeline”. thehill.com/policy/interna…

5/ In his address to the 20th Party Congress in October, President Xi described how “resolving the Taiwan question is a matter for the Chinese, a matter that must be resolved by the Chinese.”

6/ Reports from the American Enterprise Institute and the Center for Strategic and International Studies highlight the catastrophic clash of arms that would result, and the need to invest in military, economic and diplomatic deterrence measures. defendingtaiwan.com

7/ There is a much smaller literature on the topic in Australia. Partly this is because Australia does not possess the ‘think tank’ culture of the United States, with dozens of reports on Taiwan each year.

8/ Our country eschews the ‘net assessment’ capability, possessed by the British and Americans, that explores the implications of strategic competition. And, Australian governments have historically deferred to allies when it comes to deep thinking on big strategic issues.

9/ It is clear our principal allies are concerned Xi might act in the short term to reincorporate Taiwan into China. It's in our interests to have thought about military, diplomatic, informational & economic measures, in partnership with allies, for deterring such an outcome.

10/ What should be the focus of the Australian government to deter or respond such a conflict in the next 12 months?

11/ First, we must assume a war over #Taiwan is possible. There are sufficient signs from the Chinese and from the intelligence services of our allies that there is an increasing likelihood of this occurring. It is something that can no longer be wished away.

12/ Second, we also need to appreciate that despite the possibility of a war over #Taiwan, not all future conflict will involve #Taiwan. The Cold War focussed on military preparations for nuclear war, and an air-land conflict in central Europe.

13/ Neither occurred but many other conflicts did that featured both the protagonists in main, or supporting, roles. We must ensure we are prepared for conflicts beyond #Taiwan, including closer to home.

14/ Third, we desperately need a national security strategy. This would make government’s national security objectives transparent, while describing priorities and resourcing for domestic and international threats. There is nothing that does this currently.

15/ Consequently, there is limited auditability of government decisions about major expenditures (& whether there are alternatives) and there is no competition of ideas about our best national security model. smh.com.au/politics/feder…

16/ And, lacking such an overt strategy, the government has no narrative to build societal consensus about important national security issues.

17/ Fourth, the government needs to explain how Australia will deter Chinese aggression against our people, our industries, our economy and our neighbours.

18/ In essence, what is required is a ‘theory of deterrence for a conventionally-armed middle power’ that thinks beyond the US extended nuclear deterrence umbrella. We need it to prioritise scarce resources, and build the military / non-military elements of deterrence.

19/ Finally, we must get the Defence Strategic Review right. The selective leaking of the review indicates that the government is pursuing a tech-centric, air-sea construct that assumes all future conflict will be fought at sea and in the air.

20/ There is no future war that won’t require a lethal, networked & deployable Army. Wars are fought in the air & sea but are only won on land. This won’t be possible if soldiers are denied core capabilities like tanks, long range strike, air defence & loitering munition swarms.

21/ Despite a Taiwan focus, history shows we cannot accurately predict the next war. The air-sea Defence of Australia doctrine, formalized in the 1987 and 1994 White Papers, saw us poorly prepared for East Timor, Iraq & Afghanistan. We mustn't repeat this. aph.gov.au/About_Parliame…

22/ We need a high-tech, lethal and balanced military that can adapt to the one thing inevitable in our strategic future: surprise.

23/ Deterring a war over Taiwan, and other conflicts with China, must be a high priority for the Australian government. While conflict is most likely to result from Chinese miscalculation, we must do everything in our power to prevent such an outcome. End. smh.com.au/world/asia/rud…