On or around this date in 536, the Roman army of Belisarius stormed the city of Naples and put many to the sword, ending a 21 day siege and opening up the road to the Eternal City. Why such a bloody resolution to this siege? Read on. #Roman#Byzantine#History#Italy 🇮🇹
When Belisarius and the Roman army arrived before Naples, they were riding a string of successes. Cities across Sicily and southern Italy had submitted immediately and willingly to the Roman force, as I described in the quoted tweet below.
In fact, it is hard to escape the conclusion that Belisarius' march from the toe of Italy to Naples must have taken on the character of a victory parade. And yet, here at Naples, the Roman army would encounter its first real resistance.
According to the historian Procopius, the resistance was due to a group of Neapolitans who argued against submitting to Belisarius in a public debate on the subject.
Two orators in particular argued that, should the Goths retake Naples later in the war, they would punish the city for submitting to the Romans at this time. Therefore better to resist the Romans now, they reasoned.
However, it seems that Naples also had a stalwart garrison of Gothic soldiers, and I believe that had as much to do with the decision of the citizens to resist the Romans as any oratory. Imagine what the Goths might do to citizens who suggested submission to the Romans!
So for three weeks, Belisarius and the Roman army encircled Naples, holding it under siege. As part of the siege, the aqueduct which carried water to the city was cut. One Roman soldier climbed into the aqueduct to see how it worked.
In doing so, he discovered that the aqueduct channel was nearly wide enough for a man to squeeze through. With a little chiseling, it could be widened. This was the way into the city. Belisarius ordered the widening of the aqueduct channel.
Then, Procopius informs us, Belisarius gave the Neapolotians one more opportunity to surrender, warning them of dire consequences if they did not. They refused, probably again egged on by the Gothic garrison.
So Beliarius sent 400 soldiers through the aqueduct into Naples. Once inside, they killed the Gothic guards in two towers of the northern side of the city's wall. The rest of the Roman army then scaled that stretch of wall with ladders, and stormed the city.
Procopius says that the Roman soldiers killed men of all ages everywhere they found them, and seized women and children as captives. But the Liber Pontificalis suggests the violence might have been even worse.
The anonymous author of the Liber Pontificalis describes the violence: "he killed both the Goths and all the Neapolitan citizens, and embarked on a sack from which he did not even spare the churches... no one was spared, not priests, not God's servants, not virgin nuns."
Only with difficulty was Belisarius able to restrain his soldiers and bring about peace to the conquered city. Why had they engaged in such an orgy of violence and bloodletting? One general and one specific answer to that question:
First, in general, when an army had conducted a long siege and then taken the besieged city by storm, it was common that this storming would be a bloody affair. Soldiers got more enraged the longer a siege lasted, and when the target was stormed, that rage flowed out.
Second, more specifically to this case, I wonder if the Roman army was particularly enraged because the campaign in Italy had been quite a cakewalk up to this point. Naples was such an aberration that it must have been confounding.
This is especially the case if we place ourselves in the shoes of the Roman army for a moment. They were told, and perhaps believed, that they were conducting a campaign of liberation and restoration. The easy conduct of the campaign so far had probably reinforced that.
If so, the resistance at Naples must have provoked a certain amount of cognitive dissonance. Was this really a campaign of liberation and restoration, or a difficult and drawn out war against a determined foe? In this, Naples was a harbinger: the Roman-Gothic war would be both.
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To celebrate my book's first birthday (released July 4 last year), I offer up a meditation on a curious little episode: the Vandal King Gelimer quoting the great refrain of Ecclesiastes: "Vanity of vanities, all is vanity." #Roman #Byzantine 🧵
Some background: At the command of Justinian (r. 527-565), the general Belisarius led a Roman army to crush the Vandals and restore North Africa and most of its surrounding islands to Roman control in a lightning campaign that lasted just six months (September 533-March 534).
(This is probably underselling the shocking rapidity of this victory, because all major combat operations were complete by December 533 [3 months], and everything after that was claiming far-flung outposts and forcing the besieged Vandal King Gelimer into submission.)
The Count of the Stable (Comes Stabuli, from which we derive "constable") was a late antique officer of the Roman imperial court responsible for levying horses and pack animals for government use. Although it sounds like a humble post, it was held by a number of famous Romans. 🧵
I have been writing on the Comes Stabuli recently and was astonished to learn that occupants of the office included the future emperor Valens (r. 364-378) and the famous generals Stilicho (d. 408) and Aetius (d. 454).
This is of particular interest to me since in the sixth century Belisarius held the title of ἄρχον τῶν βασιλικῶν ἱπποκόμων (Commander of the Imperial Grooms), which was presumably a variant form of the same office.
Over the past few months I engaged in a variety of media (podcasts, blogs, book sites, etc) to get word out about my new book. This thread summarizes all that activity, both to keep it in one place and to give ideas to other academics with new books!
I started with places that would let me write a few words about my book to catch the interest of other bibliophiles. The first was on a humble blog called "The Page 99 Test":
Just how large was the Roman army during the reign of Justinian in the sixth century? Direct contemporary evidence is scarce. Modern estimates range from 150,000 to 326,000. Let's dive into the controversy. 🧵 #Roman #Byzantine #History
Let's start with the number all modern historians must reckon with. The Roman historian Agathias complains about the army during Justinian's reign: "there should have been a total effective fighting force of 645,000 men, but the number dropped to barely 150,000."
First thing to note is that this total (150,000) is meant to make Justinian's army look small. In other words, it is offered in a polemical spirit, not simply as a factual report. Nevertheless, it's the evidence we have, so we try to do something with it.
I recently listened to @byzantiumcast's interview with Adrian Goldsworthy (episode 273). In the discussion, Dr. Goldsworthy repeats the old canard that Justinian's armies in the West were "tiny." This is not accurate. 🧵 #Roman #Byzantine #History
First, let's establish a baseline for typical campaign army sizes in the reign of Justinian in the East. For the Battle of Dara in 530, Belisarius commanded 25,000 soldiers. At Satala in 530, Sittas had 15,000. At Callinicum in 531, Belisarius had 20,000.
We don't have firm numbers of soldiers for the eastern campaign of Belisarius in 541, or the defense of the East against the great invasion of Khusro in 540. But the earlier data points we have suggest a typical campaign army averaged around 20,000.
Yesterday we looked at evidence that Belisarius loved Antonina. Today, the reverse side of the coin. Do we have evidence that Antonina loved Belisarius? It’s less substantial and obvious than the evidence for Belisarius’ love, but yes, we have some! 🧵 #Roman #Byzantine #History
While in the Secret History Procopius is very direct about Belisarius’ infatuation with Antonina, he is more reticent about her feelings toward him. Instead, he focuses on Antonina’s supposed power to control Belisarius with spells, suggesting she ensorcelled him into loving her.
In the History of the Wars, however, Procopius lets slip an anecdote that might demonstrate the care Antonina had for Belisarius. After a long and dangerous day for the general during the siege of Rome, his wife came to him and compelled him to “taste a little bread.”