Observation: in the past three weeks the reported use of #shahed136 has declined significantly.
Early estimates (September) suggested Russia had planned to obtain 1,800 - 2,400 aerial munitions from Iran, either directly, or through relicensed assembly; many are Shahed-136.
Interceptions have slowed, implying use of the drone has declined. Increasing failure rate of interception is highly unlikely.
A few possibilities:
1. Attrition 2. E/W countermeasures 3. Stock replenishment cycle 4. Fewer media reports 5. Supply interruption 6. Training cycles
An expansive look at the Shahed-136 can be found in an earlier thread.
One additional consideration informing the declining use of the Shahed-136: weatherproofing. The precipitous decline conforms roughly with increasing cloud cover + humidity in Ukraine beginning late November.
Bear in mind that the Shahed-136 was designed by a nation where long, very hot summers & cool dry winters preside, and for use in a region characterized by ultra-hot arid climates with extremely low dew points and minimal cloud cover.
They also did not die in battle...not even during rear area operations. They were just vaporized in a building while partying.
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From what I've gathered the mobilized are called to revive (concretely) a failing operation. Embedded is hope (of/for Russians) that they serve some patriotic capacity (abstractly-speaking), but there is likely an implicit "limit" to that...it's just not clear where.
Regardless of the actual figure: 63 as "official" toll from Russian MoD, "600" from A. Shariy who has made unsubstantiated claims/figures before–the event is considerable because of who has died: the recently-mobilized.
The Russian MoD, and Kremlin at-large, has struggled to justify casualties among the mobilized, due in part to its reluctance to "officialize" many reasons for mobilization.
This has been a source of frustration among milbloggers, and the Russian public more generally.
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That extended PR failing has manifest widespread fear.
Local sources opened a hotline for families to check service rosters since the high-casualty claims have cemented in the discourse, and since no official source can effectively refute them.
The building is not especially old, nor is it small. This was a large three-story building primarily of standing poured columns with likely prestressed hollowcore slabs.
Meaning: a possible reason for such a high death toll (est. 100-150; (500 is exaggerated)) is the result of the GMLRS munitions creating multiple rapid failures in the entire structure, leading to floors pancaking thus crushing most inside.
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+1
Final note: insofar as local sources claim, the building was struck at 00:01 UTC+2, most likely when the maximum number of soldiers were present in the building.
I do not yet fully understand what line B. Rozhin is towing; he oscillates between (measured) analysis and open reflections on economic/social factors.
If anything, he often comes across disappointed rather than incensed like the others.
One interesting quirk with МИГ channel is that he only allows two emoji responses: 😢or❤️
Before even reading a message or opening discussion, you can immediately pick up on the significance of the message, and even his tone, based on those indicators alone.
Wagner is engaged on multiple fronts, but its battlefield worth is in question—most recently in a seemingly unending & futile attempt at capturing #Bakhmut. But why would a famed outfit struggle so much?
It appears Wagner elements are aiming straight-west using low-density residential as an attack vector, but that likely halts when they reach the Bakhmutova River.
Unclear if toehold is a fixing action as forces N/S attempt encirclement, or a disjointed effort.