Thread by @jwuthnow

#Xi Jinping picked a new slate of top military leaders at the 20th Party Congress in October. Can this selection tell us anything about his plans for #Taiwan? In a new China Leadership Monitor article, I offer some thoughts.
Short thread (1/7)
prcleader.org

Media reports focused on appt of new Vice Chairman He Weidong (former Eastern TC cdr) as a sign of Xi focus on TW. Probably true if unsurprising, but I don’t see the new CMC as a war cabinet – hard to infer much about his intent re use of force. (2/7)
scmp.com/news/china/mil…

First reason is there is more consistency than change in the CMC’s structure & lineup. Same offices represented. Half the same people, including surprising return of 72-year old Zhang Youxia. Like the PBSC, Xi values deliberations in small groups of people he knows well. (3/7)

Second, despite He’s appointment, there isn’t much TW expertise here. Xu Qiliang’s departure meant no one left with op experience in Nanjing MR. He was a logical choice to fill a gap, esp if China has a 2027 goal to be ready for conflict with TW. (4/7)
news.usni.org/2021/06/23/mil…

Rather, Xi revealed that he wants varied expertise – service in multiple theaters, mix of operators and political commissars, those with combat, those with adv degrees. This speaks to a need for advice him on big strategic issues, not narrow operational ones. (5/7)

Third, the new lineup wouldn’t work effectively as a war high command bc all are Army officers by background (a couple moved to other services as political commissars) and bc of the serious lack of joint expertise. New JSD chief Liu Zhenli has never held a joint position. (6/7)

This may not be the right group to direct a war, but could become one if Xi blunders into a conflict in the next 5 years. Most worrisome is if Xi’s dominance precludes candid advice – reverse of the PLA talking late Jiang Zemin out of unrealistic Taiwan goals years ago. (7/7)