The ability to defeat a PLA invasion of #Taiwan is key for deterrence, but what happens after the PLA tries and fails? In a new @INSSatNDU Strategic Forum, I discuss four scenarios. A short thread (1/n) digitalcommons.ndu.edu/strategic-foru… In no scenario does #China simply give up and go home, or sue for peace. The fighting will continue on in some form, but how intense and in what form varies. They key variables are severity of damage suffered by China and the level of political vulnerability to the regime. (2/n)

It’s long been assumed that #China’s leaders believe the US will intervene in a Taiwan conflict. But will this be true as the PLA builds its “strong system of strategic deterrence,” as Xi calls it? I address in a new @ForeignAffairs essay
foreignaffairs.com/united-states/…
Thread (1/8) Most US analysts think that China believes the US will get involved, according to a recent CSIS survey. This echoes PLA doctrinal writings that reference the need to defeat the “strong enemy” in any major use of force against Taiwan
chinapower.csis.org/survey-experts…
(2/8)

What role would South Korea play in a future U.S.-#China conflict? In a joint study, @INSSatNDU and the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses examine 3 scenarios. Initial findings in the latest Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, available here:
kida.re.kr/index.do
(1/5) Two articles detail how Washington and Seoul would interpret the ROK alliance’s function in a 2020s SCS scenario. China has used force against Filipino marines at Second Thomas Shoal, repeating previous incidents, most recently in November 2021.
amti.csis.org/the-second-tho…
(2/5)

#Xi Jinping picked a new slate of top military leaders at the 20th Party Congress in October. Can this selection tell us anything about his plans for #Taiwan? In a new China Leadership Monitor article, I offer some thoughts.
Short thread (1/7)
prcleader.org Media reports focused on appt of new Vice Chairman He Weidong (former Eastern TC cdr) as a sign of Xi focus on TW. Probably true if unsurprising, but I don’t see the new CMC as a war cabinet – hard to infer much about his intent re use of force. (2/7)
scmp.com/news/china/mil…

The 2022 @DeptofDefense #China Military Power Report has been released. A thread on notable developments in this year’s report. (1/16)
defense.gov/CMPR/ Once again, a prodigious effort by DOD team – report began by Congressional mandate in 2000 and the current edition is the second led by DASD-China @Michael_S_Chase, offering valuable insights into PLA activities and developments updated mostly through the end of 2021. (2/16)

What should we make of #China’s new Central Military Commission? A short thread (1/n) amp.scmp.com/news/china/mil… Overall, I see more consistency than change. Same size, composition, and three of the same members (50%) plus Xi returning for another tour. (2/n)

There was also a reference in 2022 to the need to "strengthen the study of military history" (加强军史学习教育). Can't move into the future without grasping the past. Also, recent military history (Russia) likely demands attention and reflection. 9/n There is also a stronger sense of confidence. The 2022 report mentions that the PLA now "has confidence, has capabilities" (有信心, 有能力) three times. This is supplied by a formidable new structure and new weapons rolled out over the last 5 years. 10/n

What's new for #China's armed forces in the 20th Party Congress Work Report? Several items offer clues on #Xi Jinping's priorities & direction for the PLA over the next 5 years. Thread 1/n Xi references the need to "build a strong strategic deterrent force system" (打造强大战略威慑力量体系). Absent from previous speeches. Evokes China's ongoing nuclear expansion and diversification.

How prepared is #China to respond to a domestic emergency? What is the role of the People’s Armed Police? How in control of the internal security forces is #Xi Jinping? I address in a new @chinaquarterly article

cambridge.org/core/journals/…

Short Thread 1/8 In 2018, the PAP (China’s primary internal security force) was moved fully into the military chain of command under Xi, reducing ability of local officials to mobilize PAP during emergencies. For overview, see an earlier @NDU_EDU publication

inss.ndu.edu/Media/News/Art…

#Xi Jinping commands the PLA, but who advises him on military matters? What kinds of officers sit atop the pyramid? How do their careers unfold? What leadership challenges would they face in a war? I address in a new @NDU_EDU monograph
ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/New…
Thread 1/11 Immediate relevance is the upcoming 20th Party Congress, which will select a new Central Military Commission. Picks will indicate types of expertise Xi values. But new CMC will be drawn from a larger pool of senior leaders. This project characterizes that pool.
2/11

New @INSSatNDU paper: What is #China’s military taking away from Russia’s war with Ukraine? And how could this influence PLA operations against #Taiwan?
Thread (1/10)
ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/New… First, a note of caution. Analysts need to make assumptions about how PLA learning happens. There’s uncertainty about the process and how lessons translate into actions. New post-20th Party Congress CMC could think differently. (2/10)

What is #China’s military strategy for Taiwan? What problems are the #PLA still facing? What can #Taiwan do?
Just as another CODEL visits Taipei, @ndu_press releases “Crossing the Strait: China’s Military Prepares for War with Taiwan”
Short thread (1/16)
ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Doc… The book is the latest product of an annual conference on the PLA sponsored by @RANDCorporation, @NDU_EDU, and Taiwan’s Council on Advanced Policy Studies. Contributors are top PLA scholars from the U.S, Taiwan, and Europe (2/16)

How has #China’s military strategy changed under #Xi Jinping? In a new @jststs article, @fravel and I take a look at the latest (ca. 2019) military strategic guidelines. Short thread. 1/8
tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.10… The MSGs provide answers to key strategy questions and were updated nine times between 1949 and 2014. For a comprehensive analysis, see Taylor’s 2019 @PrincetonUPress book 2/8
press.princeton.edu/books/hardcove…

What role would PLA special forces play in an amphibious invasion of #Taiwan? @SOSi_CIRA’s John Chen and I address in a new @ChinaMaritime #China Maritime Report. Short thread. (1/6) digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cmsi-maritime-… Drawing inspiration from British SOF in the Falklands, other campaigns, PLA theorists see 3 roles for SOF in Taiwan: recon/targeting, strikes/raids (incl. political targets), and info ops. SOF is integral to the basic command structure for the island landing, not distinct. (2/6)

In August 2020, the PLA released an updated version of its core strategy textbook for senior officers – the Science of Military Strategy. What’s new in this book? I took a look and offer some findings in @CHinaBriefJT

jamestown.org/program/what-i…

THREAD (1/7) Compared to the last (2017) version, the book has some new content. It has an interesting new section on “wartime political work” that underscores the importance of defensive psychological operations – PLA troops need to be loyal. (2/7)

THREAD: How much of a threat does China’s #PLA pose to Taiwan? We mostly focus on the military balance and challenges for U.S. intervention, but another angle needs more exploring—competing demands on PLA attention and resources. 1/9 inss.ndu.edu/Media/News/Art… The PLA has to prepare for a war with #Taiwan while also handling a growing array of other missions, with finite resources. The #Ladakh crisis is an example. Worries about conflicts in the west tie up a quarter of China’s ground forces. 2/9