The Governor of Kursk, Roman Starovoit, does report that the fire is the result of an #UAV attack, on airbase oil/fuel infrastructure specifically, and that the fire is localized.
Interestingly, reactions among the Russian public are what would be expected: exasperation.
Earlier suspected drone attacks at Engels and Diaghilev, as well as other long-range attacks, leave them expressing curiosity, disappointment, and rage.
s: translations only.
4/
Notably, the comments quickly turn to sourcing blame, with upper Russian political and military leadership aimed at first.
Note: this is a minimal sample of reactions, but among the first responding to the event.
s: translations only.
5/
Translation notes:
Zadolbali [Скучающий]: one who easily irritates you, gets on your nerves.
Observation on this event and its outcomes will continue.
Impacts of the attacks on airfield(s) are taken seriously. Specifically, diminishing returns from Russian missile strikes, and an increase in Ukraine's capacity to strike long-distance targets within Russia.
They also did not die in battle...not even during rear area operations. They were just vaporized in a building while partying.
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From what I've gathered the mobilized are called to revive (concretely) a failing operation. Embedded is hope (of/for Russians) that they serve some patriotic capacity (abstractly-speaking), but there is likely an implicit "limit" to that...it's just not clear where.
Regardless of the actual figure: 63 as "official" toll from Russian MoD, "600" from A. Shariy who has made unsubstantiated claims/figures before–the event is considerable because of who has died: the recently-mobilized.
The Russian MoD, and Kremlin at-large, has struggled to justify casualties among the mobilized, due in part to its reluctance to "officialize" many reasons for mobilization.
This has been a source of frustration among milbloggers, and the Russian public more generally.
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That extended PR failing has manifest widespread fear.
Local sources opened a hotline for families to check service rosters since the high-casualty claims have cemented in the discourse, and since no official source can effectively refute them.
The building is not especially old, nor is it small. This was a large three-story building primarily of standing poured columns with likely prestressed hollowcore slabs.
Meaning: a possible reason for such a high death toll (est. 100-150; (500 is exaggerated)) is the result of the GMLRS munitions creating multiple rapid failures in the entire structure, leading to floors pancaking thus crushing most inside.
2|2
+1
Final note: insofar as local sources claim, the building was struck at 00:01 UTC+2, most likely when the maximum number of soldiers were present in the building.
I do not yet fully understand what line B. Rozhin is towing; he oscillates between (measured) analysis and open reflections on economic/social factors.
If anything, he often comes across disappointed rather than incensed like the others.
One interesting quirk with МИГ channel is that he only allows two emoji responses: 😢or❤️
Before even reading a message or opening discussion, you can immediately pick up on the significance of the message, and even his tone, based on those indicators alone.
Wagner is engaged on multiple fronts, but its battlefield worth is in question—most recently in a seemingly unending & futile attempt at capturing #Bakhmut. But why would a famed outfit struggle so much?
It appears Wagner elements are aiming straight-west using low-density residential as an attack vector, but that likely halts when they reach the Bakhmutova River.
Unclear if toehold is a fixing action as forces N/S attempt encirclement, or a disjointed effort.