For oil markets, it’s fair to say that 2022 has been one for the history books. Price/volume swings and government interventions at a scale and frequency we've never seen before.
Mega year-end thread of the 22 key oil numbers of 2022. #OOTT #oil #OPEC
Mega year-end thread of the 22 key oil numbers of 2022. #OOTT #oil #OPEC
This list could have been much longer (!) and some events have multiple key numbers that would have been worth highlighting, but wanted to keep a good mix across prices and paper markets, fundamentals (S/D), geopolitics, refining and trade flows.
So here goes...
So here goes...
#1 -- $64/bbl
The difference between ICE Brent’s intra-day high and low in 2022 as supply fears and uncertainty drove massive swings. Adrenaline.
The difference between ICE Brent’s intra-day high and low in 2022 as supply fears and uncertainty drove massive swings. Adrenaline.
#2 -- 186 days
The number of trading days this year that saw intra-day ranges in excess of 3% - 3 of every 4 trading days. Volatility.
The number of trading days this year that saw intra-day ranges in excess of 3% - 3 of every 4 trading days. Volatility.
#3 -- 1 Million contracts
The average decline in open interest in major crude futures contracts (WTI, Brent) in 2022 relative to 2021. Liquidity.
The average decline in open interest in major crude futures contracts (WTI, Brent) in 2022 relative to 2021. Liquidity.
#4 -- $70/bbl
The new anchor long-term price as reflected in long-dated Brent futures - decisively breaking out of the 2015-2020 "lower for longer" range. Reflation.
The new anchor long-term price as reflected in long-dated Brent futures - decisively breaking out of the 2015-2020 "lower for longer" range. Reflation.
#5 -- 281 MMbbl
The combined (reported so far) oil releases from SPR inventories in OECD countries in 2022. The equivalent of a supply injection of nearly 0.8 mb/d over the full year. Intervention.
The combined (reported so far) oil releases from SPR inventories in OECD countries in 2022. The equivalent of a supply injection of nearly 0.8 mb/d over the full year. Intervention.
#6 -- ~70 MMbbl
The net increase in observed (non-China) commercial inventories this year in large part thanks to strategic stock releases. Balance transfer.
The net increase in observed (non-China) commercial inventories this year in large part thanks to strategic stock releases. Balance transfer.
#7 -- ~ $70/bbl
(technically $67-$72) Intended range of US SPR refill – the first attempt to use strategic stocks as mechanism to provide a price floor. The SPR bid.
(technically $67-$72) Intended range of US SPR refill – the first attempt to use strategic stocks as mechanism to provide a price floor. The SPR bid.
#8 -- $60/bbl
Love it or hate it, the G-7/EU oil price cap adds a new tool to the government intervention toolkit and changes how oil markets think of sanctions. Cap and trade.
Love it or hate it, the G-7/EU oil price cap adds a new tool to the government intervention toolkit and changes how oil markets think of sanctions. Cap and trade.
#9 -- 0.1 mb/d
The increase (or lack thereof) in Iranian supply to the market in 2022 as negotiations to revive the JCPOA hit the rocks. What was expected to be the largest supply injection of 2022. No deal.
The increase (or lack thereof) in Iranian supply to the market in 2022 as negotiations to revive the JCPOA hit the rocks. What was expected to be the largest supply injection of 2022. No deal.
#10 -- 1 mb/d
OPEC spare capacity in 3Q2022 fell to multi-decade lows as capacity constraints hobbled most members and Gulf producers pushed higher. Fumes.
OPEC spare capacity in 3Q2022 fell to multi-decade lows as capacity constraints hobbled most members and Gulf producers pushed higher. Fumes.
#11 -- -1.5 mb/d
The net decline in European (ex-Turkey) imports of Russian crude this year as the continent severed one of the oil market's major trunk lines. Messy divorce
The net decline in European (ex-Turkey) imports of Russian crude this year as the continent severed one of the oil market's major trunk lines. Messy divorce
#12 -- +1.3 mb/d
The increase in Russian crude exports to India, China and Turkey as the West started to shun Russian barrels, and more to come. Rebound.
The increase in Russian crude exports to India, China and Turkey as the West started to shun Russian barrels, and more to come. Rebound.
#13 -- Zero
The net decline in Russian crude exports this year. From self-sanctioning to sanctions and Europe's shift, fears of disruptions failed to materialize (could change with recent data). Fungible.
The net decline in Russian crude exports this year. From self-sanctioning to sanctions and Europe's shift, fears of disruptions failed to materialize (could change with recent data). Fungible.
#14 -- 100 million barrels
The estimated increase in Russian oil at sea/in transit as exports shifted East and supply chain expanded, more than doubling pre-invasion levels. Working inventory.
The estimated increase in Russian oil at sea/in transit as exports shifted East and supply chain expanded, more than doubling pre-invasion levels. Working inventory.
#15 -- Up to 250 ships
The estimated number of tankers Russia will need to shift all crude exports east of the Suez, more than 2.5x levels pre-invasion. Flotilla.
The estimated number of tankers Russia will need to shift all crude exports east of the Suez, more than 2.5x levels pre-invasion. Flotilla.
#16 -- 3.7 mb/d
The cumulative under-production by OPEC+ to target levels in September 2022 amid outages and capacity struggles. Near-miss.
The cumulative under-production by OPEC+ to target levels in September 2022 amid outages and capacity struggles. Near-miss.
#17 -- 0.5 mb/d
The estimated annual average decline in Chinese domestic oil demand as mobility restrictions and economic slowdown cripple consumption. Lockdown.
The estimated annual average decline in Chinese domestic oil demand as mobility restrictions and economic slowdown cripple consumption. Lockdown.
#18 -- 2.1 mb/d
The decline in Chinese crude imports between May and June/July amid soft demand and no export quotas affording global markets critical breathing room through the summer. Swing buyer.
The decline in Chinese crude imports between May and June/July amid soft demand and no export quotas affording global markets critical breathing room through the summer. Swing buyer.
#19 -- $43/bbl
The average global (NYMEX, ICE, Singapore) diesel crack in 2022 as the global middle distillate crisis unfolded. Refining renaissance.
The average global (NYMEX, ICE, Singapore) diesel crack in 2022 as the global middle distillate crisis unfolded. Refining renaissance.
#20 -- 50 million barrels
The deficit in global middle distillate inventories relative to historical (2015-2019) averages heading into year-end and the EU ban on Russian refined products. Squeeze.
The deficit in global middle distillate inventories relative to historical (2015-2019) averages heading into year-end and the EU ban on Russian refined products. Squeeze.
#21 -- $158 billion
The estimated free cash flow generated by the US oil and gas onshore system amid soaring prices. Tsunami.
The estimated free cash flow generated by the US oil and gas onshore system amid soaring prices. Tsunami.
#22 - $500 billion
Estimated upstream capex in 2022. Despite rumors of its demise, global upstream capex rises to highest level since the 2014 collapse and posts the largest y-o-y $ increase in history. Cyclical.
Estimated upstream capex in 2022. Despite rumors of its demise, global upstream capex rises to highest level since the 2014 collapse and posts the largest y-o-y $ increase in history. Cyclical.
Most of these numbers would have been a top-3 highlight in any normal year in oil markets (if such a thing even exists) and I'm sure I missed some other good ones in the process (feel free to tack on). Historic. #OOTT #oil
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