If Sinwar had returned to Gaza in 2011 and decided to build institutions such as universities, and work toward making the area prosperous and successful, and worked toward peace; do you think all of those people who admire him "dying as a martyr" would admire him today?
The strange thing is that if Sinwar had actually advanced Palestinian statehood and institution building, the whole weird crowd that thinks his war was a "success" to bring ruin on Gaza and die in a ruined house throwing a stick at a small drone...would have been displeased.
What does it say about people who admire a man who brought ruin on Gaza and set back the Palestinian quest for a state...unless of course the goal of this crowd has never been a peaceful Palestinian state...
The pro-Hamas crowd is trying to portray Sinwar’s death above ground as some kind of heroic last stand. The fact is he strayed outside with several of his men when he believed the IDF was focused on Hezbollah. He ordered the massacre of a 1,000 people, most of them civilians and the hostage taking of children and the elderly.
Sinwar brought ruin and devastation on Gaza. He ordered the Oct 7 knowing it would lead to a massive war. He knew he would bring death and suffering to civilians. This was all he ever did in Gaza. He had a chance to make Gaza peaceful. He only brought ruin.
Sinwar didn’t lead men in battle and die on the frontline. He was hiding most of the war. His men held children hostage. That fact he died in a clash with regular IDF soldiers was not him leading his men into battle. He was on the run like Escobar. His death is that of a cartel figure.
If the Sinwar details are confirmed, imagine Doha today, their prized asset of Hamas and its genocidal leadership may be in question. They've been stringing along the US and others for a year of "talks" over a hostage deal, representing Sinwar and talking on his behalf to slow down the deal and sabotage it.
If Sinwar is gone then how will Doha play this, how will they be able to pretend that it is the Gaza-based Hamas leadership slowing down the talks, when it's obviously been Doha all along that wanted to drag out the talks and pressure the US to pressure Israel into a ceasefire for no hostages
The goal of Doha has always been to get endless "thank you" from western diplomats, while hostages were left in Gaza. Its goal was always to keep the hostages there forever and get a ceasefire for Hamas to bring Hamas to power in the West Bank.
The assessment that it has been “unable” would need to be based on knowledge that the IDF wanted to take vast areas in the first week. However, there is no evidence that was the IDF plan. Let’s take a look 🧵
There’s no reason to conclude the IDF wanted a war of rapid maneuver yet. This isn’t the IDF plans of 1978 or 2006, this is the kind of slow grinding fighting of removing “terrorist infrastructure” that was done in Khan Younis. It took five months of fighting in Khan Younis.
Now, what’s interesting to me is that the IDF had trained under the Momentum doctrine for a war of faster maneuver using all its power knitted together via new tech to close circles faster and rapidly defeat enemies. When it came to fighting these wars a lot of speed of these tactical assumptions changed
Increasingly the pro-Palestinian narrative of October 7 mostly boils down to "October 7 is the beginning of a genocide in Gaza."
This take never wrestles with the fact that Hamas started this massive war that led to devastation in Gaza. Their response is only "it didn't begin on October 7"
This inability to hold Hamas accountable basically posits that any attack on Israel, including massacring 1,000 civilians, is acceptable because the "conflict" began a long time ago and any "resistance" to "occupation" is acceptable.
What the pro-Palestinian voices set-up with this process is one that involves endless war. For them all attacks on Israel are acceptable. Massacring children, elderly people, kidnapping children, massacring youth at a music festival is all acceptable parts of the end goal.
There are two competing narratives about Hamas in Gaza; one posits that it is mostly defeated, most of its fighters have been eliminated and almost all its brigade and company commanders and even Sinwar is barely able to communicate
The second narrative portrays it as mostly controlling Gaza and its leadership in touch with Doha and able to make clear decisions and control all the hostages and thus the only way to free them is via a deal
These two images of Hamas are contradictory. If Hamas has been mostly defeated and lost its command structure it should be possible to free the hostages in raids since local Hamas commanders aren’t in touch with eachother and they are on the run