Thread by @JanR210

1/
#Russian (rather chaotic) assessment of 🇷🇺 Air Defence.
Source: 🇷🇺. (my notes in brackets)
- 🇷🇺 AD can intercept 🇺🇦 SS-21 (but not Tu-141/143)
- 🇷🇺 decreased 🇺🇦 Air Force activity (but 🇷🇺 don’t fly into 🇺🇦 aware of HARMs, & FAB bombs are useless)

2/
- 🇺🇦 Bayraktar TB2 are out of game (reality: 🇷🇺 HVTs keep away from TB2s)
- SA-15 Tor adapted to 🇷🇺 Navy (makeshift projects)
- S-300 effective against 🇺🇦 ground targets (can employ salvo strikes saturating 🇺🇦 AD)
- BUK-M3 as counterbattery radar (zooparks are too "blind")

3/
- only Pantsir-SM-TBM with doubled (24) missile load are considered combatworthy. These TBMs have no guns, no radar, missiles only
- a significant number of 🇷🇺 combat fixed & rotor wing aircraft (Su-30/34/35 & Ka-52) during the 1st phase of war was hit by 🇷🇺 AD friendly fire.

4/
- friendly fire due to inadequate 🇷🇺 Air Force/Army coordination (in Feb-Sep 2022 #Surovikin was not an overall commander)
- no automated command systems (several 🇷🇺 AD weapon stations can fire at the same target)
- no rear area AD

5/
- 🇷🇺 aware of its energy infrastructure vulnerabilities
- limited 🇷🇺 live sat/AD connection
- #Moscow within the range of 🇺🇦 modified drones
- 🇷🇺 territory too large to defend against drones
- no 🇷🇺 centrix-type intel/feedback system (no capabilities to create in 2023)

6/
A. (🇷🇺 faces shortage of SHORAD ammo)
B. (jointness or centrix-type warfare capabilities not to be built soon)
C. (#EngelsAirBase & other rear are HVTs)
D. (🇷🇺 problems will cumulate in 2023)

cc @STRATPOINTS_EU @DefenceHQ @TheStudyofWar @NATOJFCBS