Thread by @sheshapatangi1

China had no air force on the Tibetan plateau and even lacked the necessary fuel supply.

"Had India employed its Air Force in 1962, there would have been fewer casualties".

Claude Arpi is an authority when it comes for Bharat, Tibet and China...

He wrote for The Week Magazine

and I'm producing some of the paragraphs here....

India needs to tell the world about the valour of its soldiers who fought China".

It is necessary to first point out that the Sino-Indian border war was not a debacle as depicted by Beijing and some foreign commentators.

India fought extremely well during the battles of Walong or Rezang La and in several other areas on the front, where hundreds of PLA troops were killed by Indian soldiers. Has Xi, the chairman of the Central Military Commission, heard of these battles? This part of the story

was never told to the Chinese people. Similarly, what happened in 1967 when the PLA was forced to back out after having intruded into Indian territory in Sikkim, remains a state secret in the Middle Kingdom.

The history of 1962 needs to be rewritten, and India should not be

ashamed of its Army during those fateful months. On the contrary, it is time to do more research into those battles, build more memorials and museums and let the general public (and China) know about the outstanding valour of Indian soldiers.

Undoubtedly, with better political

management & the use of the Indian Air Force in particular, the war could have had a different ending. But let us look at what went wrong. First and foremost, the political leadership erred by not using the IAF.

Wing Commander Jag Mohan Nath (retd), 1st officer to have been

decorated with the Maha Vir Chakra twice, had been on regular missions over Tibet for more than 2 years from 1960 to reconnoitre the Chinese build-up on the Tibetan plateau. He concluded that China had no air force on the Tibetan plateau. Unfortunately, the political leadership

refused to believe the hard evidence gathered during his sorties.

Had the IAF been used, one can imagine that the casualties would have been less on the Indian side and more on the Chinese side; the LAC would have remained where it was in September 1959 and the border dispute

with China would not be so acute today; the Shaksgam valley would not have been offered to China by Pakistan in 1963; Mao would have lost his job and Sino-Indian relations would have been completely different.

Today after the induction of the 36 Rafale fighter aircraft, the IAF

is ready to take on China and even has an edge due to the terrain as well as the preparedness, professionalism and experience of Indian pilots.

India has also far better knowledge of the border; let us not forget that the 7 Brigade was fighting in the Namkha Chu (river)

sector, north of Tawang, without maps; weaponry was antediluvian and the arrogant political leadership (During Nehru Era) would not allow local commanders to move to better strategic positions to defend their territory.

More recently, as the Doklam and the eastern Ladakh

confrontations have demonstrated, the commanders have far greater autonomy.

With its in-depth knowledge of the terrain, the Indian Army has been able not only to hold onto its positions (though China still refuses to fully disengage from some places), but also could establish

a far better synergy with the ministry of external affairs & other stakeholders; something totally lacking in 1962.

Now, the political leadership is far more aware of the situation on the ground.

On their part, after 16 rounds of talks, the PLA have probably realised that

India in 2022 is not the same as in 1962.

Further, senior generals in the Indian Army, Air and Naval headquarters are more professional and are ready to make their voices heard. It was certainly not the case in 1962, when a chief of air staff did not even dare to try to

convince his political masters to use the IAF, despite the full knowledge that China had no air force on the plateau and even lacked the necessary fuel supply.

60 years later, the infrastructure on the Indian side has tremendously improved (on the Chinese side, too); there was

a time when an argument was heard on the borders, particularly in Arunachal Pradesh: “It is better not to build roads on our side, otherwise they can be used by the Chinese invading troops once again”.

During the last few years, though the PLA has always kept a superior edge in

infrastructure (the terrain is also easier on the plateau), Delhi has been working hard to reach each and every corner of the LAC.

One important factor in the ‘defeat’ in 1962 was the failure of the Indian intelligence. The intelligence inputs were probably there

(through Wing Commander Nath’s secret flights or regular reports of Indian consul general in Lhasa, the Indian trade agents in Yatung, Gyantse and Gartok, and also the Tibetan refugees in India), but they were not properly analysed by the intelligence bosses, who were too busy

obeying the ‘ideological’ orders of their masters; this was particularly true for the IB Director who had been in office for too long.

Another important factor which may force China to think twice before embarking on a new 1962 is the Tibetan population living in India &

particularly on the border.

They are emotionally & physically supporting India. The role of the Special Frontier Force, composed of Tibetan commandos during Aug 2020 on the Kailash range, south of the Pangong Tso, is a case in point. The Tibetan populations on the plateau are

also aware that their countrymen in India are allowed to practise their own faith and freely follow their leader, the Dalai Lama; it is not the case north of the McMahon Line. In case of a long conflict, it could be a determining factor.

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