Over the northern hemisphere winter, eastern Ukraine has been the scene of bitter and intense combat. The offensives around #Bakhmut & #Kreminna highlight the different strategic & cultural approaches that Ukraine and Russia have applied in this war. 1/23 🧵🇺🇦 
2/ Both offensives have featured trench and urban warfare, artillery duels, very short-range engagements between infantry and tanks, as well as long range strikes on supply and headquarters locations. But there are differences. abc.net.au/news/2023-01-1…
3/ One of the key differences is an asymmetry between Russian and Ukrainian operational thinking. For this Russian offensive, there has been a focus on securing towns like #Bakhmut & #Soledar that have limited strategic utility.
4/ In the main, the massive Russian losses suffered for these towns are not justified by the minor gains they present.
5/ The fight in the north waged by the Ukrainians is quite different. The Kreminna-Svatove-Starbil’s’k region is important for its transportation hubs. If Russia loses these cities, it loses its key supply routes into Luhansk and many of the northern routes into Donetsk.
6/ The ultimate outcome of Ukrainian success in this may see it recapture its Luhansk oblast and compromise the Russian scheme of defence in northern Donetsk. This would mean the Russians may have to redeploy forces intended for 2023 offensives to defend the region.
7/ Related to this dissimilar operational thinking is that the Russians have chosen to attack an area where the Ukrainians are strongest. The Donbas is where Ukraine has had eight years to prepare multiple, reinforcing defensive lines.
8/ Attacking areas where the enemy is strongest and best prepared is generally not recommended in war.
9/ The Ukrainians, on the other hand, conducted a rapid advance through #Kharkiv and into Luhansk at the end of 2023 because they had identified an area where Russia was weak. They then postured themselves for the current, more methodical operations.
10/ Another important difference highlighted by these two offensives is the kinds of forces being used. For Ukraine, this is an operation being conducted by professional and territorial military personnel and overseen by a unified command.
11/ The Russians have taken a different approach.
12/ The battles around Bakhmut, Soledar and surrounding areas are being fought by a mix of competing Russian army forces and mercenaries. This is exemplified by Wagner claims of victory in Soledar, and their whining about Russia failing to recognise it. politico.eu/article/parami…
13/ It also says much about the two nations approach to this war. For Ukraine, its Army is reinforced by steady flow of volunteers that understand their purpose and have demonstrated for nearly eleven months the willingness to sacrifice themselves in the defence of their nation.
14/ Russia, on the other hand, has had to resort to using mercenaries – many of them pardoned convicts encouraged by men behind them with machine guns – for its most important campaign in Ukraine.
15/ Prussian theorist Carl von Clausewitz wrote extensively on the topic of ‘will’ in conflict. These different approaches to their people highlight an asymmetry in motivation and national will in this war.
16/ Finally, these two offensives are indicative of the mindsets of the political leaders of Russia & Ukraine. Putin is desperate for a victory of any kind. His military has not been able to achieve Putin’s political objectives – securing the five oblasts annexed in 2022.
17/ Therefore, Putin needs something before the one-year anniversary of his Ukraine invasion that he can portray to the Russian people as worthy of its costs. Soledar and Bakhmut fit this bill.
18/ Zelensky has a different challenge. His forces ended 2022 in the ascendancy. They had achieved significant battlefield victories over the Russians in Kherson and Kharkiv. Coming into 2023, they have the momentum and morale that will underpin their 2023 offensives.
19/ Zelensky is not desperate for a victory at any cost. He can be more patient & allow his Commander in Chief the time to carefully plan 2023 military strategy. That said, he still needs many more battlefield victories – & western support – to recapture many regions of Ukraine.
20/ The approaches to these battles in the Donbas demonstrate the different national and military cultures and values of the two belligerents in this war. abc.net.au/news/2023-01-1…
21/ And while both battles may be important to each side at present, they may pale into insignificance given the offensives to be launched in 2023.
22/ And therein lies the danger. Neither side can afford to commit too much to these battles. They must husband their resources for military campaigns in the east and in the south in 2023. There are many bloody and costly months ahead. End.
23/ Thank you to the following whose images and links were used in this thread: @TDF_UA @Militarylandnet @DefMon3 @abcnews @POLITICOEurope @UAWeapons @DefenceU
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