Some more news about the #Bakura faction and its malcontents... Following the killing of Sahalaba by Bakura, a group of #JASDJ#BokoHaram went their own way... a mini-thread...
So it really was the case that Bakura had a beef with Sahalaba, who had taken over as imam of JASDJ after Shekau's death in May 2021. Sahalaba was a well established religious scholar, who used to be a qadi. His religious legitimacy was key to his ascension to the imamate.
But Bakura, who used to be the top military commander (amir ul fiya) of pro-Shekau jihadis on Lake Chad , was not happy to be supplanted as top dog because of his insufficient religious knowledge.
He had Sahalaba killed around mid-2022 and took over the imamate.
But the move did not go down too well with a jihadi subgroup based near Gazwa, Bama LGA (at some distance from the northern part of Lake Chad where Bakura's core is). Three commanders, Abu Suleiman, Ikrima and Ba Issa, have refused to submit to Bakura and have gone their own way.
It makes sense factionalism affects JASDJ, in part because of political economy: each subgroup fends for itself, through plunder and ransoming... so why should they follow orders? And in JASDJ, unlike ISWAP, there is no external higher authority to arbitrate internal tensions...
What's amazing is that the powerful JASDJ subgroup in the Mandara mountains (Ali Ngulde, Gobara & Umate) stays loyal to Bakura. Maybe shared hatred and fear of ISWAP unite them? Or Bakura is in a position to provide them with gear (he did send stuff to Shekau in the days)?
Or maybe political economy is not the whole story. Maybe there is a shared sense that Shekau was in the right, that this is the way of the good Muslims? Several defectors I talked to still seem to think Shekau was right over ISWAP, after all.
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This area looks like the jihadi could find a way in. Just like they did in the Gwoza hills, where they used pre-existing tensions within communities (and indeed, sometimes within families) over religion.
There is, of course, a dramatic self-fulfilling dimension to this, as James notes: obsession with jihad by the police and others can create incidents that will then create opportunities for the jihadi...
The report is amply sourced (a remarkable job by Reuters, given the sensitivity of the topic). And it is convincing. And things we know otherwise add to the plausibility.
As is clear in the extracts from several military and civilians involved in the programme, there was a combination of worry and suspicion about the children being born from women who had an association, voluntary or else, with Boko Haram.
Some notes about #ISWAP, #JASDJ#BokoHaram. Mamman Nur & Habib Yusuf broke away from Abubakar Shekau in 2016 with a strong reform agenda. I think it can be summed up as a rationalisation / bureaucratisation of jihad. Just one example of this: penal reform. A thread...
Shekau was famous for the spectacular violence he visited upon people he deemed criminals (adulterers, thieves, drugs dealers and users). Executions, chopping hands and feet, brutal flogging… He and his men made shows of this, for the education of the masses.
There, we are squarely in the realm of the spectacle of extreme violence: brutal, but intermittent. The ruthless affirmation of sovereignty and quest for purity.
I want to add to the praise showered upon @ankaboy for his @BBC documentary on banditry in the NW of #Nigeria. And maybe I can do it by highlighting the takeaways.... a thread.
It is a topic whose coverage is in inverse relation to its importance, because it is a dangerous place to report about... & also because the conversation is filled with all sorts of communal biases and political sensitivities.
Anka does a remarkable job to give a fair, balanced account. To those who are obsessed by the supposed grand battle between Christians and Muslims in Nigeria, he documents how Muslim-on-Muslim violence is massive.
First of all, if I am correct, the conflict was opposing certain Fulani bandits and a Muslim farming community from another ethnic group... Highlighting this for those who seem to only notice Muslim on Christian violence...
Second, the insistence (apparently correct) that the Fulani in question are locals, autochthons, reveals that indeed autochthony and the rights attached to it are at stake here.
Hearing about #JASDJ#BokoHaram used to designate not only Islamic courts to implement sharia law, but also a level down, mediators who would try to resolve local conflicts before they were taken to the courts...
As @AdamBaczko and others have shown, part of the edge that territorialised jihadi organisations can have is their capacity to provide cheap and relatively efficient and credible governance.
Yes, #JASDJ and other jihadi structures have not shied from implementing and demonstrating gruesome and gory huddud punishments... But under that, there has been a lot more going on, an attempt to address discrete daily conflicts.