Thread by @JohnLechner1

#CAR update: Some thoughts on the security agreement between the CAR government and #Sudan's Hemedti (a thread)

On December 29, the CAR government, represented by Hassan Bouba (former number two under Ali Darassa's UPC armed group), and Russian PMCs met with reps of Hemedti's paramilitary Rapid Support Forces in CAR's northeast town of Birao (1/n)

The purpose of the meeting was to discuss armed group mobilization on the CAR-Sudan border in Am Dafok. Who exactly was mobilizing we don't know for sure - UPC were there, FPRC, Chadian rebels, Sudanese militias, free agents and Coalition Siriri were all present (2/n)

Within days after the Bangui-RSF meeting in Birao, Hemedti declared the border closed off and his men tried to arrest several members of Coalition Siriri. This was a bit strange: Coalition Siriri is a new and relatively unknown alliance of armed groups? (3/n)

Coalition Siriri - led by Moustapha Saboun - this January announced plans to take Bangui. In 2021, it allied with the MNLC, an ex-Seleka armed group. Some UPC, MPC, and FPRC have joined. But many in the CPC claim Siriri employs many Sudanese fighters (4/n)

On the Sudan side, Hemedti’s agreement with Bangui is part of a larger media campaign to reframe his image as a peacemaker in Darfur while rooting out rivals in the region (5/n)

And in December, before the agreement with Bangui, a powerful Sudanese military commander, ret. Major General Ahmed Abdel-Rahim Shukort-Allah was arrested by Hemedti's men on charges of supporting a rebellion in CAR (6/n)

Shukort-Allah is allegedly close with Musa Hilal, Hemedti's main rival for leadership of the Rzeigat Arabs in Darfur and mining sites. Some sources have tied members of Coalition Siriri to forces of Shukort-Allah (7/n)

To what extent Siriri is receiving support, however, is difficult to determine. What is important, however, is that the support is perceived amidst a deteriorating security situation in Darfur in which Musa Hilal appears increasingly ready to assert his own power (8/n)

The potential return of thousands of Darfur rebels who were fighting in Libya is increasing tensions. Up to 15k of the fighters/mercenaries are affiliated with Hilal, and Himedti allegedly asked the Chadians to stop these men from crossing into Sudan. (9/n)

Coalition Siriri, it seems, got caught up in Darfur power politics. Security cooperation between FACA and RSF in the tri-border area could ensure Wagner’s safer exploitation of mining sites, though direct export to Sudan puts Bangui’s profits at risk. (10/n)

But the RSF’s crack down on Coalition Siriri, and failure to target other cross-border armed groups like the UPC, suggest Himedti has his own interests at heart. Deals struck is the tri-border area are very often ethereal (11/n)