Regulators & researchers seek to balance privacy & the data economy. The EU’s #GDPR is a landmark & influential regulation that defines personal data expansively. GDPR establishes:
-rules for data processing,
-rights for EU residents,
-responsibilities for firms, &
-BIG fines. 2/
#GDPR is hard to study:
A) Finding a suitable control group is hard because the GDPR had global spillovers. E.g., it affects EU firms & non-EU firms serving EU residents.
B) GDPR can screw with personal data: e.g., you may only see data from consenting users. 3/
C) Firm compliance & regulator enforcement is (ahem) variable, because it is legitimately difficult for both sides.
In data-intensive industries, we may then expect low compliance in equilibrium. But, if data thus show little impact, what have we actually learn about GDPR? 4/
On the firm side, the #GDPR literature is mostly bleak.
Research documents harms to profits, revenue, investment, market exit, & entry.
Research also shows harms to competition, the web, & marketing, though more mixed evidence for innovation. 5/
On the consumer side, economists struggle to convincingly measure welfare gains from privacy (it's hard!), but illuminate this with survey, structural, & theory evidence.
Empirical research also shows objective privacy gains through post-GDPR decrease in data processing. 6/
Research illuminates the gap between #GDPR on paper vs. on the ground & the (unintended) consequences of the GDPR’s many elements.
I end by suggesting opportunities for future research on the GDPR as well as privacy regulation & privacy-related innovation more broadly. 7/7
PS: You can also download on SSRN if you prefer.
"Economic research on privacy regulation: Lessons from the GDPR and beyond" ssrn.com/abstract=42908….
🇮🇹Journeyed to Milan for a marketing conference hosted by @Unibocconi 🇮🇹
A 🧵…
First up, Sonja Gensler documents welfare harms of German regulations capping days for AirBnB hosts. This restricts supply, but the good news 😂 is that non-compliance blunts the welfare harm. Marginal effect on long-term rental prices: the intended benefit of the policy…
@michielvancromb introduces a new research agenda on the “Spotify-ification” of the video game industry: consumers increasingly subscribe to a bundle of games, with profound consequences for the market. (And 3 papers!!!)
What is the impact of strict #privacy regulation on content supply and demand?
In Sept 2019, YouTube paid a record $170M to settle charges it violated children’s privacy law (#COPPA). We use this to study the "privacy-for-content" tradeoff. 1/11
Beginning Jan 2020, YouTube identified kids content and eliminated all related personalization including: personalized ads, search, content recommendations, & commenting.
This matches FTC's proposed rules to strengthen COPPA announced yesterday: 2/ bit.ly/3RMARdf
YouTube creators worried these changes amounted to the "COPPAcalypse."
We study 5,066 top U.S. YouTube channels by comparing child-directed content creators to their non-child-directed counterparts using a difference-in-differences design. 3/
We study the "privacy-for-content" tradeoff using the 2019 YouTube COPPA settlement.
"COPPAcalypse? The YouTube settlement’s impact on kids content” w/ @TesaryLin, James Cooper, & Liang Zhong
➡️ ssrn.com/abstract=44303… 1/9
Data sharing increases ad revenue, which pays for free content, & helps personalize websites to better find the content we want. On the other hand, people want more privacy online: especially for kids.
The YouTube settlement shows the consequences of strict privacy regulation. 2/
In Sept. 2019, YouTube paid a record $170M to settle charges it violated children’s privacy law (COPPA). Beginning Jan. 2020, YouTube identified kids content and eliminated all related personalization including: personalized ads, search, content recommendations, & commenting. 3/
🧵Explainer for the Topics API 🧵
Google announced the Topics API for Privacy Sandbox🏖️. Topics is basically FLoC v2.0. Google is deftly replacing FLoC v1 with a more anodyne technology and name...
Details: developer.chrome.com/docs/privacy-s… 1/8
Topics allows for interest-based ads without 3rd party cookies. Most research, including our own, shows ad prices are 2-3X higher with cookies.
Put concretely: Interest-based ads help fund content that is socially valuable, but uninteresting to advertisers. 2/
In Topics, the browser classifies begins by classifying the sites that users visit into topics from a list of ~350 readable & benign topics like cats🐈 or hockey🏒.
To do so, sites must opt in and users can opt out. 3/
Thread explaining FLEDGE (formerly TURTLEDOVE).
Online advertising generates value for publishers, advertisers, & users. Now, Google & others are proposing alternatives that preserve this value while better protecting user privacy under the "Privacy Sandbox" proposals. 1/12
The public discussion of #PrivacySandbox is dominated by #FLoC, but many tech solutions are required to satisfy advertising use cases while protecting privacy. In particular, #FLEDGE propose more fundamental & interesting changes to the status quo. 2/
The key to FLEDGE is to move user targeting information onto the *browser*, rather than broadcasting a cookie ID to the adtech ecosystem so advertisers can bid on ad opportunities based on what they know about that cookie ID. The prototypical FLEDGE use-case is retargeting. 3/
🧵We recently released a big update to our working paper examining how the #GDPR affected the site traffic💻 & ecommerce revenue💶 of EU users. (w/ @samgarvingold & Scott Shriver) 1/11 ssrn.com/abstract=34217… (image: Digiday)
We partnered with @Adobe to study the GDPR’s impact on EU users across 1,084 firm site analytics dashboards. Our data contain 77 of the top 1K sites & >700 long tail sites below the top 100K. We see >$0.75 billion in EU spending and 4.4 billion EU pageviews in total per week. 2/
We observe rich site outcomes in Adobe data. But, after the GDPR, we stop observing data from non-consenting users. If recorded site traffic falls post-GDPR, we want to know:
A) how much did GDPR hurt real outcomes of websites?
B) how much did consent limit data recording? 3/