Thread by @wentisung

#Taiwan's opposition KMT Vice Chairman meets with #China's new Taiwan Affairs Director Song Tao in Beijing.

KMT faces the 'Dove's Dilemma': playing the role of peacemaker without being seen as kowtowing to an adversary. Beijing tries to help, though within limits./1

2/ In the 2 weeks leading up to KMT's visit, 1) Beijing's Customs approved 63 Taiwanese companies previously banned from exporting to China; 2) BJ's TAO & Civil Aviation Association twice called on Taiwan to restore direct flights with 16 Chinese cities.

en.rti.org.tw/news/view/id/2…

3/ By lowering cross-strait tension & creating more positive atmosphere, Beijing's announcements made Taiwan's opposition party's '#negotiating for peace' with Beijing looked more politically palatable in Taiwan. (without these it might have seen more like 'begging for peace').

4/ Even at the actual meeting with KMT, Beijing continues to try tone down its rhetoric somewhat to make life easier for KMT.

E.g. There's a gap that both sides try to paper over. That gap is over what constitutes their "Common Political Foundations" (共同政治基礎).

5/ In Beijing parlance, reaching a shared CPF is basically a) precondition for having political dialogue. And b) prolonged absence or mismatch of CPF will cause unfortunate developments including military instability.

www3.nhk.or.jp/nhkworld/en/ne…

6/ At this meeting with KMT on Feb 9,

Beijing defines CPF as:
1992 Consensus + Oppose Taiwan independence.

KMT's defines it as:
1992 Consensus, 'One China, respective interpretations' + Oppose Taiwan independence.

7/ Difference is KMT tries to define what 1992 Consensus is (OCRI), and Beijing doesn't.

It's how Beijing shows more constructive ambiguity, in hope of making life easier for KMT. But KMT still feels need to spell out 92 Consensus, to minimize voter backlash back home in Taiwan

8/ KMT affixing 'One China, respective interpretations' next to 1992 Consensus is how it signals KMT doesn't entirely agree with Beijing's understanding of One China or Taiwan's status.

9/ Indeed Beijing already went so far as to minimize frontal mentioning of 'one China' in front of the KMT delegation, opting instead to use the softer wording 'one family'.

10/ Two tentative implications from the meeting:

1. Calmer Chinese rhetoric towards Taiwan throughout 2023 is likely. 2023 is Taiwan's presidential campaign year, and Beijing would rather see the Beijing-friendlier KMT remain electorally viable.

11/ 2. Xi seems to back this softer approach, too. 'coz

Newly appointed Chinese officials tend to act hawkish earlier on, to establish political cover, before they gradually moderate and pivot back to the center...

12/ But this new Taiwan Affairs Office Director Song Tao doesn't feel that is politically necessary for him.

Either Song got a clear directive from Xi (all the political cover he needs)... or his personal connection with Xi going back to the 1980s helped.

13/ Either way, it seems it's becoming politically safer for Chinese officials to speak more softly towards Taiwan (while still carrying a big stick). /end