Wen-Ti Sung Profile picture
Feb 13 6 tweets 2 min read
At China's CCP Party School annual high-level cadet training, Xi Jinping unveils a new term '#ChineseModernization', & juxtaposes it w. 'Western modernization'.

Underlying message: Chinese exp isn't a bad mutation of standard (Western) modernization, but an equally valid variant
2/ This certainly sounds like a new ideological doctrine in the making. A natural question to ask is: does this entail a new, more aggressive international messaging campaign will follow?
3/ Probably not. Because this new term actually carries a clearly more limited international ambition and an obvious inward-facing domestic orientation.

'Chinese modernization' narrative is explicitly not designed for export.
4/ CM is a step up from CCP's existing jargons 'Chinese path' and 'Chinese experience'. But it's not quite the 'China Model' that many have been apprehensive about since the late 2000s.
5/ Here is an English translation of Xi's keynote speech on CM.

Key passage:
"Noting that Party leadership is vital to the fundamental direction, future and success of Chinese modernization, and defines the fundamental nature of Chinese modernization"

english.news.cn/20230207/07996…
6/ If CCP leadership is the most fundamental component of CM, then other countries that not have CCP -- which is everybody else -- cannot have CM, at least cannot emulate it & do it successfully.

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More from @wentisung

Feb 13
Sometimes it's just amusing to see how govts and politicians time public diplomacy to shape perception of who gets credit.

#China is trying to soften down a bit towards #Taiwan ('coz it's got too many problems foreign & domestic on its plate already). /1

udn.com/news/story/733…
2/ But Beijing wants to 'soften' without appearing 'soft'. So it chooses a particular timing for extending olive branches towards Taiwan (like partially lifting some trade sanctions).

Taiwan's opposition party KMT is currently touring across China.
3/ So Beijing is very publicly announcing quite a few good news on Taiwan just before as well as during the (Beijing-friendlier) Taiwanese opposition's visit, to let the latter take the credit for bringing a thaw to cross-Strait relations.
Read 12 tweets
Feb 10
#Taiwan's opposition KMT Vice Chairman meets with #China's new Taiwan Affairs Director Song Tao in Beijing.

KMT faces the 'Dove's Dilemma': playing the role of peacemaker without being seen as kowtowing to an adversary. Beijing tries to help, though within limits./1
2/ In the 2 weeks leading up to KMT's visit, 1) Beijing's Customs approved 63 Taiwanese companies previously banned from exporting to China; 2) BJ's TAO & Civil Aviation Association twice called on Taiwan to restore direct flights with 16 Chinese cities.

en.rti.org.tw/news/view/id/2…
3/ By lowering cross-strait tension & creating more positive atmosphere, Beijing's announcements made Taiwan's opposition party's '#negotiating for peace' with Beijing looked more politically palatable in Taiwan. (without these it might have seen more like 'begging for peace').
Read 13 tweets
Feb 6
China's MFA's Feb 5 statement on US shooting down the balloon is Beijing building an off-ramp for itself.

It tries to a) project rhetorical toughness, and b) deescalate at the same time. And this is not as self-contradictory as it sounds. /1🧵
2/ There's a Chinese saying, 打左灯向右转, "signal left in order to turn right". i.e. talk tough to get political cover for a safe retreat/soften-down.

With tough rhetoric, 'retreats' don't have to be retreats, but 'strategic redirections'.
3/ It’s in damage control mode. The most obvious sign is how it frames the victim of US shooting down the balloons.

MFA: "China will resolutely defend the legitimate rights of the relevant company". (中方将坚决维护有关企业的正当权益).
Read 16 tweets
Feb 2
How does Taiwan read the Australia-France 2+2 ministerial consultations joint statement?

Taiwan's official Central News Agency published a long analysis comparing 2021 and 2023 AUS-FRA joint statements. It notes 3 significant changes. A thread🧵

cna.com.tw/news/aopl/2023…
2/ The 2021 and 2023 texts' Taiwan portion:
3/ CNA notes the latest 2023 version makes three significant changes:

1. 2023 version uses a more forceful tone, and contains a prescription -- that it specifically says threat or use of force or coercion is not ok.
Read 18 tweets
Jan 31
China has been promoting its Europe and Australia experts to its foreign affairs top ranks since #20thPC, seeking to aver Europe's Indo-Pacific tilt.

It's clear Europe & Australia are gonna be at the center of Chinese diplomacy. And Taiwan is responding. /1🧵
Personnel appts alone tell you a lot. China's new foreign minister, Qin Gang, served in China's embassy to the UK, and was Deputy FM responsible for Europe (2019-21) -- i.e. when EU-China relations was still good (CAI anyone?), and before EU's Indo-Pacific Strategy. /2
China's first deputy foreign minister Ma Zhaoxu was China's permanent representative to the UN in Geneva (2016-18), and China's ambassador to Australia (2013-16) -- i.e. when 🇦🇺🇨🇳relations was still good (even signed AUS-China FTA in 2015). /3
Read 8 tweets
Jan 30
Taiwan unveils its new cabinet line-up today. One take-away is President Tsai Ing-Wen is holding firm to her China policy, undaunted by recent election losses. 'coz the 3 main relevant ministers are all staying on (MOFA, Defense, Mainland Affairs).

If we're splitting hairs... /1
we may even say Prez Tsai appears to be picking up pace to prep VP Lai Ching-Te's China staffers, so that if Lai can win and succeed her as president in 2024, Lai's China policy will be consistent with Tsai's. /2
That's a sign of Tsai:
1) protecting her legacy; but also
2) helping minimize policy turbulence during their power transition (and avoid confusing TW's international friends).

One sign is the new personnel changes in the mainland affairs portfolio. But it's a long story... /3
Read 9 tweets

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