If the fracturing of the oil market in 2022 played out in Moscow, Brussels, Washington, and Riyadh, all roads for oil markets in 2023 and beyond lead to Beijing.
How did China stumble into becoming the regulator of global oil markets? A thread 🧵
China has never fashioned itself, at least publicly, as a particularly willing regulator of global oil markets.
It has never had grandiose strategic aspirations of managing oil markets beyond its own energy security and diversification priorities
By circumstance more than by design, it has found itself in the driver seat.
It was the perfect alignment of the maturation and scale of China’s oil industry (long in the making) and the fracturing of the oil system in 22-23 (sudden). Right place, right time.
A story in 4-parts
1) Demand: China will be the largest source of global oil demand growth in 2023-2024.
This isn't breaking news, Chinese demand has defined the last 20 yrs. Post-reopening boost however, domestic demand may become the lesser source of China's oil influence for the first time.
2) Global supply: China (along with India) is now the swing buyer in a suddenly far deeper “gray” barrel market.
How much it buys will directly and indirectly drive how much suppliers of grey barrels (RU,IR and to a lesser extent VZ) are able to produce.
What sanctions and price caps have done by funneling Russian crude towards China and India is hand both buyers leverage on pricing and ultimately supply, with the ability to tighten the noose or loosen it.
3) Global refining: China is the swing refiner to a suddenly more supply-constrained product market.
With spare refining capacity and controlled exports via the quota system, policy decisions can fundamentally alter the relative tightness of the global product market.
4) Oil storage as a management mechanism:
Over much of 2010-2020, oil storage in China served largely the singular purpose of being filled, with the rate of fill the main uncertainty. But what was once a one-way street now runs two-way traffic.
China has since shown the willingness and ability to exert influence (direct and indirect) on its industry to lean on inventories when prices run hot or buy opportunistically when air pockets emerge, as they did in December 2022.
In practice this allows China to swing its crude imports wildly (as it did in 2022) in response to market conditions. For a market that prices at the margin, a month-on-month swing of 1-2 MMb/d is a balance wrecking ball.
The two key features that underpin all of these are scale and control.
Scale - it is large enough in all of these fields to drive global balance-altering changes.
Control - gov policymaking can & will directly and indirectly nudge in the direction of desired outcomes.
To recap in a sentence:
By remaining a driver of global demand, influencing supply via imports of gray barrels, using storage as a market intervention tool, and calibrating refined product exports, China has become the de facto regulator of global oil markets.
Key takeaway: if you're trying to figure out where oil markets are heading next, spend a bit more time on China. It's worth the effort.
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
For oil markets, it’s fair to say that 2022 has been one for the history books. Price/volume swings and government interventions at a scale and frequency we've never seen before.
Mega year-end thread of the 22 key oil numbers of 2022. #OOTT#oil#OPEC
This list could have been much longer (!) and some events have multiple key numbers that would have been worth highlighting, but wanted to keep a good mix across prices and paper markets, fundamentals (S/D), geopolitics, refining and trade flows.
So here goes...
#1 -- $64/bbl
The difference between ICE Brent’s intra-day high and low in 2022 as supply fears and uncertainty drove massive swings. Adrenaline.
The oil market has always searched for price "anchors" to help frame the #oil price band or price "regime". Prices at which something balance-altering happens.
We've never had as many anchors as we have now, let alone overlapping.
Pre-shale (Pre-2014) there were two anchors:
- The OPEC/Saudi "put" (floor): price at which OPEC is willing to cut production to support prices
- Demand destruction (ceiling): price at which demand forcefully adjusts
Broadly defined post-GFC this was thought of as $80-$120
During the shale era and perceived resource abundance, those anchors morphed into a single lower and narrower range that defined the shale supply function:
Shale Slows Fast (~$45/bbl) or Shale Grows Fast (~$65/bbl)
1- It may feel like oil has been in a frenzy forever but by oil investment standards, it has been an exceedingly short time to judge spending inertia by... The invisible hand of the oil market always works faster for demand than supply.
2- Most major oil companies rarely make strategic shifts mid-year unless their hands are forced, usually by a price collapse. Oil companies are creatures of the annual planning cycle. The test is coming soon with a different price environment and a new energy security mandate.
3- Short-term price volatility and long-term demand uncertainty are arguably more potent deterrents of investment than shareholders or green philanthropists when cash-rich (as they now are).
Short answer: it's not about the specifics of this proposal, which is trying to add a back door to a disruptive EU sanctions regime. It’s about what a price cap mechanism (even imperfect) would *mean*.
An effective price cap would provide large consumers (i.e. the West) with a functional and tested foreign policy tool that fundamentally changes the leverage balance that has defined oil markets for decades.
Longer answer below
1. Through modern oil market history, larger oil producers operated under the implicit framework that they had "energy security immunity" - in other words, there is such a thing as "too big to sanction".
Over the next four months, the market needs to re-route 2x more oil than what happened so far this year, without the relief valves that made the first salvo of the rewiring easier (SPR, China import drop, Gulf increases, looser tanker mkt, India headroom and no sanctions).
The extensive flow shifts of the past 7 months, bumpy but less disruptive than feared, have created a sense of fungibility but the scale of rewiring remains a tremendous ask.
When trying to price the dislocation risk, oil markets have to contend with two primary challenges: