As US alleges China is providing 'non-lethal support' for Russia, China's MFA fires back and blames US for giving weapons to Ukraine.
This is in line with longstanding Chinese view. PSA: Back in Sept 2022, China effectively said that Russia's war against Ukraine is a #JustWar./1
2/ The closest thing to a direct official Chinese judgment of the nature of that war so far (AFAIK) comes from China's #3 leader, National People's Congress Speaker Li Zhanshu.
3/ When Li Zhanshu visited Russia in Sept 2022, he told Russian Duma's speaker that "China understands and supports matters concerning Russia's core interests."
("在涉及俄罗斯核心利益和一些重大关键问题上,中方对俄罗斯表示充分的理解和支持。")
4/ What threatened Russia's core interests? And were Russian response appropriate, proportional, and worthy of Chinese support?
Short answer is yes, it's all US' & NATO's fault, Russian action is right, and China will help.
5/ In Li Zhanshu's own words: "As US & NATO crept up onto Russia's doorstep, Russia undertook actions it deemed appropriate. China understands this and has provided concrete #support in various ways".
6/ Sounds a lot like promising China's "non-lethal support" for Russia, right there?
7/ Conundrum is per this Chinese narrative, China is doing the right thing in helping the victim as they see it (Russia), with 'non-lethal support' and/or 'lethal support' if necessary, much like the West is helping out the victim as they see it (Ukraine) with loans & weapons.
8/ Wildly out of sync with the international community this view of Russia-Ukraine war may be, if China continues to stick its fingers into its ears, at most other countries can blame it for being dumb, but not being evil. That gives BJ plausible deniability as it helps Russia.
9/ Play dumb pays. Narrative justifies behaviors. The challenge for the West then is figuring out what tools can delegitimate that narrative, get China to change its official story about Russia-Ukraine War, thereby compelling change in its behavior? #定性問題. /end
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2/ But Beijing wants to 'soften' without appearing 'soft'. So it chooses a particular timing for extending olive branches towards Taiwan (like partially lifting some trade sanctions).
Taiwan's opposition party KMT is currently touring across China.
3/ So Beijing is very publicly announcing quite a few good news on Taiwan just before as well as during the (Beijing-friendlier) Taiwanese opposition's visit, to let the latter take the credit for bringing a thaw to cross-Strait relations.
At China's CCP Party School annual high-level cadet training, Xi Jinping unveils a new term '#ChineseModernization', & juxtaposes it w. 'Western modernization'.
Underlying message: Chinese exp isn't a bad mutation of standard (Western) modernization, but an equally valid variant
2/ This certainly sounds like a new ideological doctrine in the making. A natural question to ask is: does this entail a new, more aggressive international messaging campaign will follow?
3/ Probably not. Because this new term actually carries a clearly more limited international ambition and an obvious inward-facing domestic orientation.
'Chinese modernization' narrative is explicitly not designed for export.
#Taiwan's opposition KMT Vice Chairman meets with #China's new Taiwan Affairs Director Song Tao in Beijing.
KMT faces the 'Dove's Dilemma': playing the role of peacemaker without being seen as kowtowing to an adversary. Beijing tries to help, though within limits./1
2/ In the 2 weeks leading up to KMT's visit, 1) Beijing's Customs approved 63 Taiwanese companies previously banned from exporting to China; 2) BJ's TAO & Civil Aviation Association twice called on Taiwan to restore direct flights with 16 Chinese cities.
3/ By lowering cross-strait tension & creating more positive atmosphere, Beijing's announcements made Taiwan's opposition party's '#negotiating for peace' with Beijing looked more politically palatable in Taiwan. (without these it might have seen more like 'begging for peace').
How does Taiwan read the Australia-France 2+2 ministerial consultations joint statement?
Taiwan's official Central News Agency published a long analysis comparing 2021 and 2023 AUS-FRA joint statements. It notes 3 significant changes. A thread🧵
China has been promoting its Europe and Australia experts to its foreign affairs top ranks since #20thPC, seeking to aver Europe's Indo-Pacific tilt.
It's clear Europe & Australia are gonna be at the center of Chinese diplomacy. And Taiwan is responding. /1🧵
Personnel appts alone tell you a lot. China's new foreign minister, Qin Gang, served in China's embassy to the UK, and was Deputy FM responsible for Europe (2019-21) -- i.e. when EU-China relations was still good (CAI anyone?), and before EU's Indo-Pacific Strategy. /2
China's first deputy foreign minister Ma Zhaoxu was China's permanent representative to the UN in Geneva (2016-18), and China's ambassador to Australia (2013-16) -- i.e. when 🇦🇺🇨🇳relations was still good (even signed AUS-China FTA in 2015). /3