Wenn 71 % der Österreicher:innen für die Neutralität sind, kann eine Ministerin nur deren identitätsstiftende Natur beschwören. Eine offene Diskussion zu dem Thema würde 2 militärische Tatsachen anerkennen:
1: Die NATO verteidigt uns.
2: Österreich ist nicht verteidigungsfähig.
Die Antwort der österreichischen Regierungen seit Jahrzehnten zu dem Thema:
1. Uns wird eh nix passieren, wir san Brückenbauer. 2. Wenns die NATO net hilft, dann schützt uns die Geographie 3. Wir wissen eh, dass ma eigentlich net neutral sind, aber wissens eh die FPÖ & so...
Keiner der Unterzeichner:innen des offenen Briefes fordert einen NATO Beitritt, sondern vielmehr eine ehrliche, ergebnisoffene Diskussion über die außen-, sicherheits- und verteidigungspolitische Zukunft Österreichs. h/t @ArminWolf@k_edtstadler #zib2 orf.at/#/stories/3306…
Wir gehen in eine gute Richtung was das Heeresbudget betrifft. Warum können wir (d.h. die Bundesregierung) auch nicht an der sicherheitspolitischen Front mutiger sein? Z.b. ein klares Bekenntnis, dass wir andere EU-Mitgliedern im Ernstfall militärisch helfen würden.
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Putin "has three advisers,” Lavrov replied, according to the oligarch. “Ivan the Terrible. Peter the Great. And Catherine the Great.” ft.com/content/800025…
One Putin confidant: “Stalin was a villain, but a good manager, because he couldn’t be lied to. But nobody can tell Putin the truth.”
“If Medvedchuk says it’s raining, you need to look out of the window — it’ll be sunny,” says another former senior Russian official. “You have polls, you have the secret services — how can you do anything serious based on what Medvedchuk says?”
My latest for @ForeignPolicy: Conscription will not be the solution to help Europe’s leading militaries regenerate combat power in a future state-on-state war. Rather, reforming and expanding the reserve system could be militarily more effective. foreignpolicy.com/2023/02/14/eur…
First, the size of reserve forces across European NATO militaries will need to undergo structural reorganization to be able to increase in size.
Reserves should no longer primarily be used as piecemeal to plug gaps and fill troop shortages in active-duty forces but be more actively integrated and more uniformly trained to support high-intensity combat operations.
6th generation “contact-less” warfare built around a single integrated system that includes precision strike, reconnaissance, electronic & information warfare that have strategic, operational and tactical effect remains aspirational for the Russian Armed Forces to say the least.
Enjoyed reading this chapter by @tcgerman on Russian views of the changing character of conflict including a discussion on "contact-less" warfare (heavily influenced by burgeoning U.S. precision-strike capabilities & tech determinism.) ndc.nato.int/news/news.php?…
"The war in Ukraine has challenged the enduring belief that technology remains the central
determinant of how war is fought, demonstrating that technological aspects are not
necessarily the only critical element of a war. The human element remains fundamental."
Army Commander 1st Class Timoshenko's offensive tasked the Soviet 100th Rifle Division with taking Summa while 123rd Division was tasked with seized the 'Millionaire' & 'Poppius' bunkers of the Mannerheim Line.
The Soviet suffered heavy losses, but eventually managed to break through forcing the Finns to abandon the Mannerheim Line. Good 🧵👇
„Ukrainian officials say they require coordinates provided or confirmed by the United States and its allies for the vast majority of strikes using its advanced U.S.-provided rocket systems.“ washingtonpost.com/world/2023/02/…
„One senior Ukrainian official said Ukrainian forces almost never launch the advanced weapons without specific coordinates provided by U.S. military personnel from a base elsewhere in Europe.“
According to our maps and software, a point will have one set of coordinates,”Malinovsky said. “But when we give this target to partners for analysis, the coordinates are different. Why? Because the Americans and NATO countries have access to military satellites.”
Within 25 days in January 1940, the Red Army not only was able to reconstitute and reorganize its forces and revise its campaign strategy but also develop rudimentary skills to execute complex combined arms operations with which the Mannerheim Line could finally be breached.
Looking for potential lessons from the Winter War for Ukraine today, a major takeaway is that a relatively untrained, tactically badly led, and ill-equipped conscript force can indeed strategically, organizationally, and tactically adapt under the right leadership.