1. 2010s driver: China’s contribution to global growth in the 2010s was to internalize the deficit that previously was run by the rest of the world, notably the US household sector. As willing foreign borrowers dwindled, the #RMB appreciated and Chinese policymakers chose to
prop up growth by borrowing through the corporate sector, with the private sector following suit, most notably in the real estate sector. By around 2016, the corporate sector was saturated and households took over, blowing the final air into the bubble that is the Chinese
property market – the largest sector in the world. Those DMs that were integrated into the export machine or China’s domestic investment, especially in real estate, received a boost. This driver added an impulse to growth for export-oriented economies, notably the EA, primarily
through #Germany , without any inflationary impulse. So, in the 2010s, China’s role for many EMs and the EA was found in the third quadrant (positive growth impulse but negative inflation impulse). In the 2020s, the growth element of that is evaporating and China remains a
disinflationary force, meaning China gravity for these regions in the 2020s will shift to the second quadrant.
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Buy Defence Stocks. We first recommended them in July. The rearmament investment theme comfortably passes our three long-term validity tests: (1) it will be sustained by conflict dynamics (with Ukraine being the core case); (2) existential incentives will overcome fiscal
constraints; (3) the proven battlefield effectiveness of drones and some other relatively inexpensive equipment will not provide a cheap shortcut to attaining competitive military capabilities in a tech-intense superpower arms race including nuclear weapons. Liquid European
defence stocks offer attractive core exposure since the demand expansion comes off a lower base than in the US and South Korea, supporting the earnings growth needed to restrain valuation overshoots. The other main area to sift is the big Korean and Japanese defence firms which
2008 PTSD VS THE GHOSTS OF THE 1970S. @darioperkins writes: While #SVB and its peers were uniquely exposed to COVID bubbles, this latest calamity has highlighted a broader problem in global banking – duration risk. At the start of the year, #centralbanks...
wanted to keep monetary policy “tighter for longer”, with the aim of bringing inflation down in a controlled and gradual manner. Right now, they seem to be losing control of that process. As tensions build, banks – particularly the smaller ones – will restrict credit in a way...
that could have a devasting impact on #SMEs, with powerful knock-on effects to aggregate demand. This will help the authorities to defeat inflation, but in a way that is uncontrolled and intractable, risking unnecessary hardship. Central banks are in a difficult position...