The Battle of #Bakhmut has now raged since August 2022. The massive human and material resources expended by Russians on this objective may soon necessitate a Ukrainian withdrawal. 1/25 🧵
2/ Back in October last year, I examined how withdrawals are conducted and some of their considerations for the Russians in Kherson. I will apply a similar approach for the Ukrainian Armed Forces in #Bakhmut. washingtonpost.com/world/2023/03/…
3/ Withdrawals, which are considered a ‘retrograde operation’ in US Army doctrine, are designed to allow a force to disengage from the enemy and redeploy on a new mission or to a new location, while minimising casualties.
4/ This quote from Australian Army doctrine is also useful: “Withdrawal is a task employed regularly during mobile defence or the delay to accomplish the overall aim of resuming offensive action…it should be treated as a routine tactic rather than a harbinger of disaster.”
5/ For #Ukraine, holding onto Bakhmut would have had a political imperative. This battle has been invested with political value by both sides – although only one President (@ZelenskyyUa) has had the courage to visit his troops there.
6/ The battle for the town and area around it has also been the source of an open, vicious campaign of smears between the Russian Army and the Wagner Group. politico.com/newsletters/na…
7/ But the battle has also allowed #Ukraine to attrit the Russian forces in the east, forcing them to continue committing resources to the battle for a town with almost no strategic value. This has absorbed Russian units that might have been used elsewhere against the Ukrainians.
8/ It has blooded the Russians (Army and Wagner) in a way that they have not experienced since WW2. By some reports, their slow, methodical and frankly, unnecessary, campaign for Bakhmut has resulted in over ten thousand Russian casualties. english.elpais.com/international/…
9/ But at some point in the coming days, the Ukrainian Armed Forces may decide that they have achieved all they can by remaining in their defensive locations around #Bakhmut, and that force preservation for the battles that follow is more important.
10/ Once a decision is made to withdraw, what are the planning considerations?
11/ First, deception is vital. The reality is however that it is hard to conceal from the Russians an intention to withdraw. Some deception might be achieved by increased fire support, decoys, simulating normal activities and communications discipline.
12/ A second consideration is how to sequence the withdrawal. This includes when and how to evacuate logistic stocks, headquarters, recon elements and ground combat forces. It will depend on where and in what strength the enemy is pressing the force that is to withdraw.
13/ For the Ukrainians, it is likely some of this has already been done. But the Ukrainians will need enough forces in place – with their own mobility - to prevent a rout but not so much that they lose a large part of the force.
14/ A third consideration for the Ukrainians will be disrupting the Russians ability to interfere with the withdrawal. We should expect to see increased air defence, jamming & artillery used by the withdrawing Russians, as well as greater air support.
15/ A 4th consideration will be command & control. This isn’t just about who is in charge. It is about controlling an orderly withdrawal in the planned sequence. MPs are vital for road space control, route discipline, and ensuring units don’t ‘vacate’ defensive positions early.
16/ Achieving control is also about good battle discipline. Tactical leaders at all levels must hold their positions until their assigned withdrawal time. This can be very difficult when there is a strong inclination to move rearwards earlier than a plan directs.
17/ The Ukrainians will want to achieve a ‘clean break’. This is disengagement of the Russians in a way that avoids their ability to follow up & pursue the withdrawing force. A lot of artillery, attacking concentrations of Russian reinforcements & fire support will be required.
18/ Key to achieving a clean break is an effective rear guard. A rear-guard force can help provide a clean break for the withdrawing force and prevent enemy pursuit. I would expect that for the Ukrainians, the rear guard will consist of armoured and mounted infantry forces.
19/ Ultimately, a successful withdrawal requires excellent planning and coordination. But this is underpinned by good leadership at all levels. But concept for how the withdrawal will be sequenced and executed must be unified and led by a senior commander.
20/ This senior commander must have excellent tactical acumen, good understanding of the terrain and a good appreciation of the capabilities of the withdrawing force. He must understand that getting it wrong can result in the loss of the entire withdrawing force.
21/ The reality is that if the Russia captures #Bakhmut, they are seizing rubble. It is a town with little strategic importance & no infrastructure to support a force. That the Russians have invested so much in its capture speaks volumes about their poor #strategy in this war.
22/ For the Ukrainians, they will be withdrawing into defensive zones around #Kramatorsk that they have had eight years to prepare. Eight. Years. And it is on higher, more defensible ground than Bakhmut.
23/ While Ukraine may lose a town, the Russians have lost much more over the course of the battle. They have wasted military units, soldiers and resources that would have been valuable to them once the Ukrainians launch their offensives later in the Spring.
24/ The irony of this battle is that while Russia is desperate for a victory in the short term, Putin often talks of how patient Russia is and how it will outlast the West. There is little in Russian behaviour at present that supports Putin's view. End.
This is an another excellent thread from @Tatarigami_UA that explores Russian tactical adaptation in eastern #Ukraine. In particular, the shift to infiltration tactics is interesting. A thread on tactical innovation and why it needs to be nested within operational plans. 1/22 🧵
2/ These types of infiltration tactics are something that also emerged as a solution to a stalemate on the Western front in WW1. While generally the Germans are given credit for this (known as Stormtrooper tactics), this approach originated elsewhere.
3/ French officer, Captain Andre Laffargue, was wounded in 1915 and during his convalescence wrote a pamphlet called "The Attack in Trench Warfare". You can read it here: gutenberg.org/files/60197/60…
One year ago today, the forces of darkness crashed across the Ukrainian frontier to begin what they hoped was a ten-day offensive to destroy the Ukrainian nation and subjugate its people. But the people of Ukraine roared back. A thread on a year of war. 1/25 🧵🇺🇦
2/ If one examines the many observations from this war, there is a big focus on new forms of war that emerge from the Russo-Ukraine War. The reality is that this cruel & vicious Russian invasion has seen more continuity than change in warfare.
3/ This war, like all before it, is an aggregation of ideas, organisations, and technologies from previous conflicts. The continuities of this war are easily identified.
There are many continuities in war. Every new war is an aggregation of the ideas, institutions, technologies, and techniques that have preceded it. A thread on historical continuities after a year of war in #Ukraine. 1/25 🧵mickryan.substack.com/p/a-year-of-wa…
2/ If we peer close enough, we can see the different historical layers that inform, shape, and strangle military effectiveness.
3/ In the Russo-Ukraine War, there are continuities from previous wars that carry through into the strategy, diplomacy, & military operations. There are five important continuities: war as a human endeavor; surprise; alliances; the need for good strategy; and leadership.
As the one-year anniversary of Russia’s 2022 invasion of #Ukraine approaches, the Russian Army has commenced the preliminary phase of its 2023 offensives. A thread on what is occurring, and why the Russians have chosen now to commence them. 1/22 🧵 abc.net.au/news/2023-02-1…
2/ Over the past week, Russia has conducted attacks at Svatove, Soledar, Bakhmut, Dvorichne, Vuhledar and other locations. These are unlikely to be the main campaign that Russian military bloggers hoped for, & that Ukrainian intelligence officials have warned about.
3/ Assuming there is a larger Russian campaign plan at work, these recent attacks are likely to have been probes and ‘reconnaissance in force’ missions to ascertain or test the Ukrainian strengths, dispositions, and reactions.
There is so much to learn from the war in #Ukraine. But, as we approach 1 year since the Russian invasion, we should also be thinking about how our potential adversaries might learn from the conflict. 1/17 🧵 smh.com.au/world/europe/h…
2/ Xi Jinping, and his Central Military Commission, have been paying close attention to the war in #Ukraine. Indeed, the Chinese military have become fast followers of new technologies and techniques in war fighting since their examination of the US in the 1991 Gulf War.
3/ While caution is required to ensure we are not mirror-imaging our Western perspectives, it behoves a clever national security establishment to explore how Ukraine might evolve Xi’s thinking about reunification with Taiwan and other potential military adventures.
Recently there has been more speculation about the timing & size of 2023 Russian offensives in #Ukraine. That the Russians will attempt them is almost a given. Russia has been assembling the pieces of their 2023 offensives since late last year. 1/21 🧵 mickryan.substack.com/p/divining-rus…
2/ Russia has provided a political rationale through Putin’s annexation declaration, the personnel and industrial resources with the mobilisation decree in late 2022, and the changes in command that resulted in General Gerasimov being appointed as unified commander.
3/ The east is the most likely location for Russian attacks, although attacks in the south are also possible. Russian forces might use attacks in the south as feints or demonstrations to draw away Ukrainian forces in the east before launching their main effort in the Donbas.