The Battle of #Bakhmut has now raged since August 2022. The massive human and material resources expended by Russians on this objective may soon necessitate a Ukrainian withdrawal. 1/25 🧵
2/ Back in October last year, I examined how withdrawals are conducted and some of their considerations for the Russians in Kherson. I will apply a similar approach for the Ukrainian Armed Forces in #Bakhmut. washingtonpost.com/world/2023/03/…
3/ Withdrawals, which are considered a ‘retrograde operation’ in US Army doctrine, are designed to allow a force to disengage from the enemy and redeploy on a new mission or to a new location, while minimising casualties.
4/ This quote from Australian Army doctrine is also useful: “Withdrawal is a task employed regularly during mobile defence or the delay to accomplish the overall aim of resuming offensive action…it should be treated as a routine tactic rather than a harbinger of disaster.”
5/ For #Ukraine, holding onto Bakhmut would have had a political imperative. This battle has been invested with political value by both sides – although only one President (@ZelenskyyUa) has had the courage to visit his troops there.
6/ The battle for the town and area around it has also been the source of an open, vicious campaign of smears between the Russian Army and the Wagner Group. politico.com/newsletters/na…
7/ But the battle has also allowed #Ukraine to attrit the Russian forces in the east, forcing them to continue committing resources to the battle for a town with almost no strategic value. This has absorbed Russian units that might have been used elsewhere against the Ukrainians.
8/ It has blooded the Russians (Army and Wagner) in a way that they have not experienced since WW2. By some reports, their slow, methodical and frankly, unnecessary, campaign for Bakhmut has resulted in over ten thousand Russian casualties. english.elpais.com/international/…
9/ But at some point in the coming days, the Ukrainian Armed Forces may decide that they have achieved all they can by remaining in their defensive locations around #Bakhmut, and that force preservation for the battles that follow is more important.
10/ Once a decision is made to withdraw, what are the planning considerations?
11/ First, deception is vital. The reality is however that it is hard to conceal from the Russians an intention to withdraw. Some deception might be achieved by increased fire support, decoys, simulating normal activities and communications discipline.
12/ A second consideration is how to sequence the withdrawal. This includes when and how to evacuate logistic stocks, headquarters, recon elements and ground combat forces. It will depend on where and in what strength the enemy is pressing the force that is to withdraw.
13/ For the Ukrainians, it is likely some of this has already been done. But the Ukrainians will need enough forces in place – with their own mobility - to prevent a rout but not so much that they lose a large part of the force.
14/ A third consideration for the Ukrainians will be disrupting the Russians ability to interfere with the withdrawal. We should expect to see increased air defence, jamming & artillery used by the withdrawing Russians, as well as greater air support.
15/ A 4th consideration will be command & control. This isn’t just about who is in charge. It is about controlling an orderly withdrawal in the planned sequence. MPs are vital for road space control, route discipline, and ensuring units don’t ‘vacate’ defensive positions early.
16/ Achieving control is also about good battle discipline. Tactical leaders at all levels must hold their positions until their assigned withdrawal time. This can be very difficult when there is a strong inclination to move rearwards earlier than a plan directs.
17/ The Ukrainians will want to achieve a ‘clean break’. This is disengagement of the Russians in a way that avoids their ability to follow up & pursue the withdrawing force. A lot of artillery, attacking concentrations of Russian reinforcements & fire support will be required.
18/ Key to achieving a clean break is an effective rear guard. A rear-guard force can help provide a clean break for the withdrawing force and prevent enemy pursuit. I would expect that for the Ukrainians, the rear guard will consist of armoured and mounted infantry forces.
19/ Ultimately, a successful withdrawal requires excellent planning and coordination. But this is underpinned by good leadership at all levels. But concept for how the withdrawal will be sequenced and executed must be unified and led by a senior commander.
20/ This senior commander must have excellent tactical acumen, good understanding of the terrain and a good appreciation of the capabilities of the withdrawing force. He must understand that getting it wrong can result in the loss of the entire withdrawing force.
21/ The reality is that if the Russia captures #Bakhmut, they are seizing rubble. It is a town with little strategic importance & no infrastructure to support a force. That the Russians have invested so much in its capture speaks volumes about their poor #strategy in this war.
22/ For the Ukrainians, they will be withdrawing into defensive zones around #Kramatorsk that they have had eight years to prepare. Eight. Years. And it is on higher, more defensible ground than Bakhmut.
23/ While Ukraine may lose a town, the Russians have lost much more over the course of the battle. They have wasted military units, soldiers and resources that would have been valuable to them once the Ukrainians launch their offensives later in the Spring.
24/ The irony of this battle is that while Russia is desperate for a victory in the short term, Putin often talks of how patient Russia is and how it will outlast the West. There is little in Russian behaviour at present that supports Putin's view. End.
A good graphic from @detresfa_ showing where the totally unnecessary and unprofessional Chinese live fire off Sydney was planned. Why has China done this? A short thread. 1/9 🧵
2/ The most obvious reason is to point out that if Australia conducts freedom of navigation exercises off the Chinese coast, it can reciprocate. But unlike China, Australia doesn’t have a nine dot line beyond the 12m limit where it seeks to deny international maritime traffic.
3/ They have conducted other deployments into waters adjacent to Australia with governments have kept quiet about previously. However, like they have around Taiwan, the Chinese will probably now normalise these kinds of deployments around Australia. They will want to force us to keep our ships closer to home for political as well as military reasons, which means we can’t help out our allies further north.
The formation of corps for Ukrainian land forces and national guard formations (subject to official confirmation) will be interesting to watch. There will be a few challenges however, and how Ukraine addresses these will indicate just how effective these new corps might be. 1/7 🧵🇺🇦
2/ First, good Corps have Corps level units and formations that shape the battlespace, weight main efforts, reinforce success, and enable the various elements of the current fight. In the current environment, this includes EW, engineers, fires, info ops, logistics, ISR and drones. Will the new Corps have these?
3/ Second, Corps need the right staff to plan future ops, integrate and run current ops, sustain formations and coordinate up and down the chain of command. Corps level planning is not just ‘big brigade’ planning, it is a discreet and highly sought after skill set. Will the Corps HQ have these staffs and who will be training them?
In my latest piece, I conduct a quick assessment of the potential military implications of the release of DeepSeek-R1. There are a few. 1/7 🧵
2/ Implication 1: Every Military Will Want It. I expect that there will be a rush by military and intelligence agencies across the western world to download and testing it extensively.
3/ Implication 2: Lowering the Cost of AI to the Edge. Might AI LLM that use the same approach as DeekSeek-R1 mean military organisations can do everything they want to do with AI, at the levels they want to do it, in a much quicker timescale than imagined?
This is a useful assessment of the situation on the ground in eastern #Ukraine, from the Ukrainian perspective, by @pravda_eng. A number of issues, some specified & some implied, are apparent. 1/8 🧵🇺🇦 pravda.com.ua/eng/articles/2…
2/ First, the issues specified in the article. Shortfalls in infantry numbers and training, deficiencies in brigade C2, ammunition quality issues, and false reporting about the situation. None of these are particularly new issues. Any one would be concerning. The combination is alarming.
3/ Now to the implied problems, which are as concerning as those specifically covered in the article.
This week, I published a two-part article that reviewed the seven key elements of the war in #Ukraine that are likely to have the most influence on the trajectory of the war in 2025. 1/5 🧵🇺🇦 (Image: @DefenceU)
2/ The 7 key endeavours are:
- The Ground War.
- The Strategic Strike and Air Defence War.
- The Mobilization War.
- The Economic War.
- The Robot and Algorithm War.
- The War of Narratives.
- The Learning and Adaptation War.
3/ I also examined where the key asymmetries in the war are at the moment, such as manpower, air defence and innovation. Understanding these can help Ukraine target Russian critical vulnerabilities, build capacity to minimise its weaknesses, and inform the conduct of any ceasefire negotiations.
A useful update from @IAPonomarenko. In 2025, the West must not rush to force #Ukraine into an unjust peace with a brutal regime that began an unnecessary war, fought it poorly, used its military to rape, loot, torture and murder its way across a neighbour, and is unlikely to abide by any ceasefire agreement. 1/7 🧵
2/ 20th century politicians (eventually) came to understand that the rise of fascist, aggressive regimes like contemporary Russia (and Nazi Germany) had only one solution: defeat of their physical and ideological means of aggression against their neighbours.
3/ The big words from 21st century politicians, accompanied by tiny portions of national wealth dedicated to defence and support for countries like Ukraine and Taiwan, is not deterring Russian or Chinese aggression. It is actually helping their rise and increasing their power.