The Battle of #Bakhmut has now raged since August 2022. The massive human and material resources expended by Russians on this objective may soon necessitate a Ukrainian withdrawal. 1/25 🧵
2/ Back in October last year, I examined how withdrawals are conducted and some of their considerations for the Russians in Kherson. I will apply a similar approach for the Ukrainian Armed Forces in #Bakhmut. washingtonpost.com/world/2023/03/…
3/ Withdrawals, which are considered a ‘retrograde operation’ in US Army doctrine, are designed to allow a force to disengage from the enemy and redeploy on a new mission or to a new location, while minimising casualties.
4/ This quote from Australian Army doctrine is also useful: “Withdrawal is a task employed regularly during mobile defence or the delay to accomplish the overall aim of resuming offensive action…it should be treated as a routine tactic rather than a harbinger of disaster.”
5/ For #Ukraine, holding onto Bakhmut would have had a political imperative. This battle has been invested with political value by both sides – although only one President (@ZelenskyyUa) has had the courage to visit his troops there.
6/ The battle for the town and area around it has also been the source of an open, vicious campaign of smears between the Russian Army and the Wagner Group. politico.com/newsletters/na…
7/ But the battle has also allowed #Ukraine to attrit the Russian forces in the east, forcing them to continue committing resources to the battle for a town with almost no strategic value. This has absorbed Russian units that might have been used elsewhere against the Ukrainians.
8/ It has blooded the Russians (Army and Wagner) in a way that they have not experienced since WW2. By some reports, their slow, methodical and frankly, unnecessary, campaign for Bakhmut has resulted in over ten thousand Russian casualties. english.elpais.com/international/…
9/ But at some point in the coming days, the Ukrainian Armed Forces may decide that they have achieved all they can by remaining in their defensive locations around #Bakhmut, and that force preservation for the battles that follow is more important.
10/ Once a decision is made to withdraw, what are the planning considerations?
11/ First, deception is vital. The reality is however that it is hard to conceal from the Russians an intention to withdraw. Some deception might be achieved by increased fire support, decoys, simulating normal activities and communications discipline.
12/ A second consideration is how to sequence the withdrawal. This includes when and how to evacuate logistic stocks, headquarters, recon elements and ground combat forces. It will depend on where and in what strength the enemy is pressing the force that is to withdraw.
13/ For the Ukrainians, it is likely some of this has already been done. But the Ukrainians will need enough forces in place – with their own mobility - to prevent a rout but not so much that they lose a large part of the force.
14/ A third consideration for the Ukrainians will be disrupting the Russians ability to interfere with the withdrawal. We should expect to see increased air defence, jamming & artillery used by the withdrawing Russians, as well as greater air support.
15/ A 4th consideration will be command & control. This isn’t just about who is in charge. It is about controlling an orderly withdrawal in the planned sequence. MPs are vital for road space control, route discipline, and ensuring units don’t ‘vacate’ defensive positions early.
16/ Achieving control is also about good battle discipline. Tactical leaders at all levels must hold their positions until their assigned withdrawal time. This can be very difficult when there is a strong inclination to move rearwards earlier than a plan directs.
17/ The Ukrainians will want to achieve a ‘clean break’. This is disengagement of the Russians in a way that avoids their ability to follow up & pursue the withdrawing force. A lot of artillery, attacking concentrations of Russian reinforcements & fire support will be required.
18/ Key to achieving a clean break is an effective rear guard. A rear-guard force can help provide a clean break for the withdrawing force and prevent enemy pursuit. I would expect that for the Ukrainians, the rear guard will consist of armoured and mounted infantry forces.
19/ Ultimately, a successful withdrawal requires excellent planning and coordination. But this is underpinned by good leadership at all levels. But concept for how the withdrawal will be sequenced and executed must be unified and led by a senior commander.
20/ This senior commander must have excellent tactical acumen, good understanding of the terrain and a good appreciation of the capabilities of the withdrawing force. He must understand that getting it wrong can result in the loss of the entire withdrawing force.
21/ The reality is that if the Russia captures #Bakhmut, they are seizing rubble. It is a town with little strategic importance & no infrastructure to support a force. That the Russians have invested so much in its capture speaks volumes about their poor #strategy in this war.
22/ For the Ukrainians, they will be withdrawing into defensive zones around #Kramatorsk that they have had eight years to prepare. Eight. Years. And it is on higher, more defensible ground than Bakhmut.
23/ While Ukraine may lose a town, the Russians have lost much more over the course of the battle. They have wasted military units, soldiers and resources that would have been valuable to them once the Ukrainians launch their offensives later in the Spring.
24/ The irony of this battle is that while Russia is desperate for a victory in the short term, Putin often talks of how patient Russia is and how it will outlast the West. There is little in Russian behaviour at present that supports Putin's view. End.
An Easter truce has been declared by Putin. Not only is this a cynical act of someone who has sustained his aim to subjugate #Ukraine, it has huge practical challenges. So why has Putin done this and what does it mean for the war? 1/10 🧵 politico.eu/article/putin-…
2/ The truce is a short one - about a day. It is a truce that Putin has called unilaterally, so it is not binding on the Ukrainians in any way. That Putin has done this shows that he still believes that he has the upper hand in the war, and can dictate its tempo.
3/ But war is an interactive endeavour, and does not work like that. The Ukrainians and Russians are engaged along a nearly 1000 kilometre front line. The Russians have recently stepped up the tempo of attacks, and this momentum can’t just be turned off like a spigot.
Over the past three years, both sides in the #Ukraine war have learned and adapted. Battlefield, strategic and international collaboration and adaptation are accelerating and intensifying, resulting in a global Adaptation War. 1/7 🧵🇺🇦
2/ In my latest piece, I examine how Ukraine and Russia have both 'learned to learn better' since the Russian full-scale invasion in 2022. I also look at their key battlefield and strategic adaptations.
3/ I also explore the emerging collaboration and adaptation between authoritarians. Russia's war in Ukraine and the war in the Middle East have spawned a rapid expansion in the sharing of insights between Russia, Iran, China and North Korea.
In short, the ‘leader of the free world’ is considering siding fully with a brutal authoritarian, endorsing its invasion of a democracy, and agreeing with forced territorial expansion. 1/7 🧵 🇺🇦 reuters.com/world/trump-en…
2/ This will legitimise and encourage the same behaviour elsewhere in Europe by Putin, who is already conducting subversion and sabotage across the continent, and preparing his military for future aggression against other nations in Eastern Europe. The current posture and signalling from the Trump administration makes future war elsewhere in Europe almost certain.
3/ The leaders in Iran, North Korea and China are watching closely. Each have aggressive designs against democratic neighbours. Each will be highly encouraged by this clownish, amateur negotiating style and demonstrated lack of interest in defending democratic nations and values.
China admits its latest aggression around #Taiwan is a rehearsal for a blockade. This latest exercise is described as "stern warning and forceful deterrence" by an Eastern Theater Commander spokesman. A quick examination of the exercise and its purpose. 1/9 🧵 channelnewsasia.com/east-asia/chin…
2/ The spokesman also described the latest exercise as focusing on "sea-air combat-readiness patrols, joint seizure of comprehensive superiority, assault on maritime and ground targets, and blockade on key areas and sea lanes." Besides the obvious messaging and the application of military power to bully and coerce Taiwan, as well as other regional countries, into accepting Chinese pre-eminence over the Western Pacific region, why is China doing this now?
3/ First, these increasingly larger joint exercises normalise large-scale activity around Taiwan. This normalisation of military activity, at increasing scale and frequency over the past couple of years, complicates the ability of the U.S. to respond. It has to make a choice about when does the increasing scale become dangerous and worthy of an intervention.
From the nation that brought us the Marshall Plan, we now have this proposal for the “Trump Plan” for #Ukraine. Where the Marshall Plan embraced enlightened self-interest by America, the Trump plan is predatory, and basically an extortion bid against the people of Ukraine. 1/7
2/ Where the Marshall Plan was extended in scope to push back on Communism and Soviet influence and Europe, the Trump Plan basically employs Russian & Chinese economic coercion measures, and will negatively impact U.S. reputation in Europe.
3/ Where the Marshall Plan rebuilt infrastructure in Germany, France and even the UK, and ensured those nations had functioning, sovereign manufacturing and transport sectors, the Trump Plan aims seize Ukrainian assets.
“This is going to be great television…I will say that.” This is how the American president summed up the conclusion of the most fractious meeting to have occurred in front of journalists between an American president and his foreign counterpart in the modern era. An assessment of the Oval Office ambush of President Zelenskyy. 1/10🧵(Image: C-Span)
2/ The signs earlier in the week had pointed to a more productive meeting. President Trump had rolled back his narrative about Zelenskyy being a dictator, and the minerals agreement may have seen America having an enduring interest in the security of Ukraine. All that disintegrated in an explosive, unseemly exchange between Zelenskyy, Trump and Vance.
3/ What are the immediate implications of the Oval Office brawl that will be studied for years to come?