Problem with the Integrated Review section on 🇨🇳 isn’t the language (which has much to recommend it).
There’s some nice sounding stuff in there eg:
The problem is that there isn’t much we can elevate to what Robert Kennedy called the “dignity of policy”.
Let’s dig a bit.
The IR talks about ‘creation of dependencies’ (an explicit aim of the CCP). In 2020 @dominicraab commissioned Project Defend to address dependency. It was quietly dropped in 2022. Nobody knows why. The IR doesn’t reinstate it, doesn’t even hint towards it. export.org.uk/news/509100/Pr…
There are a few *very very small* announcements made in the China bit of IR2023 (2x China capabilities spend). V welcome, but will cost peanuts and shouldn’t be confused with serious policy change.
But, wait a minute! It says stuff like PRC impacts “nearly every aspect of national life” and that the CCP is trying to reshape the international order. This is strong language!
Yes, but what substantive change does this strong language indicate?
Answer: not much. On Taiwan, we hear that 🇬🇧 is against unilateral change in the status quo, but set out no plan to disincentivise PRC invasion. And there won’t be one.
On dependency, no plan.
But these things are all forgivable.
The Cardinal sin in the #IR2023 is the “business as usual” signifier buried behind an unconvincing caveat :
This tells Government Departments that they’re to continue to seek and encourage increased bilateral trade and investment (remember the IR’s purpose👇)
This is what I call the ‘feed the beast’ strategy deployed to devastating effect since WTO accession.
Genuinely devastating. Because it is economic strength which enables Xi’s China to behave the way it does. And continuing to trade and invest as if nothing is wrong endorses impunity, while rendering our commitment to rights and rules a laughing stock.
And that’s another massive gap in our China strategy: nothing on economic coercion. Little wonder tbh when the 🇬🇧 is reportedly opposing 🇯🇵 efforts to address it via the G7 on the grounds it might “anger Beijing” dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1…
As to whether or not 🇨🇳 should be called a threat, my answer is to ask a #Uyghur with a family member in a camp. Anyone arguing that Iran presents a more present threat than China shouldn’t be taken seriously.
All in all #IR2023 is an interesting technocratic exercise in trying to thread the needle between the desires of Beijing and the Tory backbenches. And some baby steps in the right direction. But the scale of the challenge will force review. The sooner the better.
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This is an extremely serious case - a major escalation in Beijing’s overseas influence operations. There are obviously questions to answer, and a full public inquiry should follow, together with major improvement in security offered to MPs who have bravely confronted Beijing.
Worth noting: this is a man who consistently briefed against @ipacglobal and its members, and who I believe subverted free parliamentary debate by downplaying the behaviour of the CCP. He worked to divide the movement - a typical CCP tactic - and he had success.
This is the right outcome but the wrong route to it. It ought to have been the UK taking action by labelling these thugs persona non grata, not merely asking China to act.
They assaulted someone in broad daylight and dragged them into the Consulate! 🤬
#BREAKING Human Rights chief @mbachelet “unable” to assess #Uyghur human rights abuses, frames them in the context of “anti-terrorism” and “de radicalisation” measures (which they aren’t).
Wow. It’s very clear which questions have been provided to @mbachelet in advance. She is reading from a script in response to PRC state media questions. Shocking.
In his introduction, Sir Geoffrey Nice reveals that two advisory lawyers and one witness withdrew from the Tribunal as a result of sanctions placed upon the Tribunal by the PRC.
-8000 hours of analysis already undertaken.
-Tribunal only considering crimes against humanity and genocide.
-PRC and many other governments invited to provide evidence. All declined, except UK which merely pointed the Tribunal to evidence in the public domain.