Problem with the Integrated Review section on 🇨🇳 isn’t the language (which has much to recommend it).
There’s some nice sounding stuff in there eg:
The problem is that there isn’t much we can elevate to what Robert Kennedy called the “dignity of policy”.
Let’s dig a bit.
The IR talks about ‘creation of dependencies’ (an explicit aim of the CCP). In 2020 @dominicraab commissioned Project Defend to address dependency. It was quietly dropped in 2022. Nobody knows why. The IR doesn’t reinstate it, doesn’t even hint towards it. export.org.uk/news/509100/Pr…
There are a few *very very small* announcements made in the China bit of IR2023 (2x China capabilities spend). V welcome, but will cost peanuts and shouldn’t be confused with serious policy change.
But, wait a minute! It says stuff like PRC impacts “nearly every aspect of national life” and that the CCP is trying to reshape the international order. This is strong language!
Yes, but what substantive change does this strong language indicate?
Answer: not much. On Taiwan, we hear that 🇬🇧 is against unilateral change in the status quo, but set out no plan to disincentivise PRC invasion. And there won’t be one.
On dependency, no plan.
But these things are all forgivable.
The Cardinal sin in the #IR2023 is the “business as usual” signifier buried behind an unconvincing caveat :
This tells Government Departments that they’re to continue to seek and encourage increased bilateral trade and investment (remember the IR’s purpose👇)
This is what I call the ‘feed the beast’ strategy deployed to devastating effect since WTO accession.
Genuinely devastating. Because it is economic strength which enables Xi’s China to behave the way it does. And continuing to trade and invest as if nothing is wrong endorses impunity, while rendering our commitment to rights and rules a laughing stock.
And that’s another massive gap in our China strategy: nothing on economic coercion. Little wonder tbh when the 🇬🇧 is reportedly opposing 🇯🇵 efforts to address it via the G7 on the grounds it might “anger Beijing” dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1…
As to whether or not 🇨🇳 should be called a threat, my answer is to ask a #Uyghur with a family member in a camp. Anyone arguing that Iran presents a more present threat than China shouldn’t be taken seriously.
All in all #IR2023 is an interesting technocratic exercise in trying to thread the needle between the desires of Beijing and the Tory backbenches. And some baby steps in the right direction. But the scale of the challenge will force review. The sooner the better.
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I have decided to make public the key information we sent to Congress and the UK Government on #Mandelson's links to China.
When this @ipacglobal work was leaked to media in Jan 2025, it was reported as a "dossier", which was flattering. It's all open source material available on the Chinese internet (credit to @chungchingkwong for her research).
TLDR: the firm Mandelson led had Chinese state owned companies as clients. Ergo: Mandelson was being paid by the CCP party-state.
This was known long before he took up the post in Feb 2025, and all information open sourced and readily available. It was also the case while he was President of the government-funded Great Britain China Centre (which I note has not made a statement about Mandelson).
MANDELSON AND CHINA - SUMMARY
🚩 Business Interests and State-Owned Enterprise Clients
Through his strategic consultancy, Global Counsel, Lord Mandelson has maintained close ties with PRC state-owned enterprises. In March 2014, Mandelson expressed his desire for Global Counsel to provide "quality services" to SOEs to improve their international competitiveness during a meeting with Huang Shuhe, Deputy Director of the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC). This commitment was reiterated in 2019 during meetings with the leadership of China International Capital Corporation (CICC).
Source: SASAC Official Archive: Deputy Director Huang Shuhe meets Lord Mandelson (2014) sasac.gov.cn/n2588025/n2588…
Evidence suggests Mandelson may have served as an advisor to the China International Capital Corporation (CICC) as early as 2013, a role that does not appear on his official House of Lords Register of Interests. In February 2013, he was explicitly identified as a "CICC advisor" during a meeting with the Chairman of China Railway Materials Corporation (CRMC).
Mandelson is a frequent participant in summits that align with Beijing’s economic narrative. He has consistently attended the China Development Summit (2021, 2023) and the Boao Forum for Asia (2012–2018), often meeting with high-ranking officials to discuss cooperation between European entrepreneurs and the Chinese government.
Source: China Development Forum Official Site: Mandelson at the 2023 Annual Meeting cdrf.org.cn/en/cdf/news/60…
Mandelson maintains regular contact with united front linked organisations and others that serve the Chinese state's strategic agenda, including:
Center for China and Globalization (CCG): A united front organisation putatively serving the "Belt and Road" initiative, but in reality doing much more than that. Mandelson has engaged in public dialogues with CCG Chairman Wang Huiyao.
Institute of European Studies (CASS): A national research institute specialising in "great power strategy."
Chinese People’s Institute of Foreign Affairs (CPIFA): An entity dedicated to "making friends for the sake of the country" and promoting the CCP's narrative.
Source: CCG Official Dialogue Record: Wang Huiyao’s Dialogue with Peter Mandelson (2021) en.ccg.org.cn/archives/64860
Source: CPIFA Official Site: Vice President Shi Ling Meets with Lord Mandelson (June 2023) cpifa.org/en/article/2462
Source: Great Britain-China Centre: Lord Mandelson and the China Law Society (July 2016) gbcc.org.uk/2016/09/09/vis…
🚩 Engagements with CCP Officials
Mandelson has met with many high-ranking CCP figures, some of whom are linked to controversial state activities:
Liu Jianchao: Head of the International Liaison Department and former leader of "Operation Fox Hunt" and "Skynet," programs associated with transnational repression.
Luo Dongchuan: Deputy Secretary of the Fujian Provincial Party Committee (October 2023).
Zheng Xiyuan: The former Consul General in Manchester, who left the UK after assaulting a Hong Kong protestor. Mandelson invited Zheng to a university reception shortly prior to this incident.
Source: International Liaison Department (IDCPC): Liu Jianchao Meets with Peter Mandelson (June 2023) idcpc.org.cn/english2023/bz…
Important to be clear about this (and I take no pleasure in emphasising the UK’s failings on the international stage):
1. Starmer made major concessions to get this visit. Mega-embassy etc 2. He returns *without a single signed deal*. Not one. Extraordinary. Even Carney came back with some MOUs. 3. Starmer went on a tour of the Forbidden City. The place had not been cleared of people. He was accompanied by just a tour guide. Does anyone at the @FCDOGovUK know how much of a slight this was? The Chinese put a huge amount of effort into signalling importance through protocol. This was not an accident. It was intended to communicate something. 4. Then there’s the below, which is worth translating if you can. In their report on the Xi/Starmer readout, Chinese state media is laden with soft condescension of the UK. Xi uses the peer-to-peer version of “you”, but Starmer uses the version “you” intended for an inferior to a superior. An insult.
I've kept a 5-year silence about 🇬🇧 scientific establishment and COVID-19 origins.
I now find the conclusion unavoidable that, with @WHO and others, there was a concerted effort to suppress the lab-leak theory to deflect attention from Beijing.
1. Sir Jeremy Farrar, key figure in the scientific community's response to C-19, was worried about China being blamed for the virus. Discussions about the geopolitical implications of C-19 origins were ongoing between scientists at the time.
In his own words:
2. Sir Jeremy was initially 50:50 on the lab explanation. But was worried about this feeding into "anti-China rhetoric"
As the Chancellor @RachelReevesMP touches down in Beijing, two lines are being used:
1️⃣ We need the money
2️⃣ We need China to defeat climate change
I can’t believe how little scrutiny these lines have received.
So, first: is China going to rescue the UK economy? 🧵
Let’s look at the evidence. The UK consistently runs a trade deficit with China (around 30-40 bn). We run a very slight (much smaller) surplus in services. @GovUK figures:

Whereas some other countries did derive major economic benefit from China’s rise, Britain didn’t, not even in the so-called “Golden Era” of 🇨🇳🇬🇧 relations. Despite all the concessions, the pot of gold never materialised. Old but good primer here: carnegieendowment.org/china-financia…
Musk is on a collision course with the 🇺🇸 Legislative Branch, and much of the incoming Trump admin over China.
Musk on Taiwan:
“…like Haiwaii, an integral part of China which is arbitrarily not a part of China”
The Hill just reported allegations from Democrats that Musk killed a bipartisan effort to screen US investments into China. thehill.com/business/50517…
Why might Musk say/ do stuff like this?
Could it be to do with his Tesla Shanghai gigafactory, upon which his car business depends, loaned to him by the PRC state, which allows a CCP controlled committee to shut it down, arbitrarily?
This is an extremely serious case - a major escalation in Beijing’s overseas influence operations. There are obviously questions to answer, and a full public inquiry should follow, together with major improvement in security offered to MPs who have bravely confronted Beijing.
Worth noting: this is a man who consistently briefed against @ipacglobal and its members, and who I believe subverted free parliamentary debate by downplaying the behaviour of the CCP. He worked to divide the movement - a typical CCP tactic - and he had success.