Thread by @jakluge

What are the effects of #sanctions on the opinions of Russians about the West and the war? There is a naïve pro-sanctions view: Sanctions lead to economic hardship which is then attributed to the war and leads to anti-war sentiment. This is certainly not happening. 1/

There is also a naïve anti-sanctions view: Sanctions lead to economic hardship, which is attributed to the West's hostility and leads to a "rally-round-the-flag" effect and stronger support for Putin. This is also not happening. 2/

From my experience, there are two groups: The "enlightened group" of educated Russians, a minority, and the "loyal group" of Russians, the majority, who rather believe in Putin and the official line on foreign policy. Interestingly, the sanctions effects on both is complex. 3/

The "enlightened group" understands the economics behind sanctions, how they create economic hardship. They see that sanctions are often unfair, because they mostly affect Russians with closer ties to the West (sanctions target these ties) who are often against the war. 4/

The no.1 case study of these Russians is their own case. BUT the "enlightened group" also understands a second thing: That Russia started the war, that the war is horrible, and that sanctions are necessary in principle, and that the sanctions are a consequence of Russia's war. 5/

The result is a complex, sometimes contradictory position. The "enlightened group" will argue that sanctions don't work because of the "rally-round-the-flag" (see tweet 2), or that they should be done differently, so that they are fairer and more effective. 6/

Side note: Sanctions are already designed having "fairness" in mind, e.g. they don't target medical goods. The problem is: If you need to sanction really hard, there is no way to do it without unintended side effects. There is simply no more effective, fairer alternative... 7/

Now to the "loyal group": They are inclined to believe the official line on foreign policy (domestic policy is another story). According to this line, the West sanctions Russia because it wants to weaken or destroy it and achieve regime change. 8/

Most importantly, the official line does not connect sanctions to the war! Instead, Putin claims that sanctions will be introduced no matter what, have always been introduced and are not related to Russia's behaviour (insiders know this as "Jackson-Vanik blablabla"). 9/

So sanctions are "an attempt of the West to keep Russia down". BUT there is also a second element in Russian propaganda, which is different from other heavily sanctioned countries: Putin claims that sanctions are laughable, don't work, and only make Russia's economy stronger. 10/

Putin needs to project strength, and that is why he can't admit that Russia is in fact very vulnerable to sanctions. After all, under Putin Russia "stood up from its knees", as the official narrative goes. While the West is blamed for sanctions, their effectiveness is denied. 11/

Essentially, Putin tells Russians that there is no economic problem. And here it gets complicated for the "loyal group": If they experience economic hardship, who is to blame? Of course, it is difficult for the "loyal group" to see HOW sanctions lead to falling real incomes. 12/

They will see that their utility fees are rising. Who will they be mad at? They will see that their pensions are inadequate. Who will they blame? There is a good chance that they blame some Russian official, some firm, or some other Russian who is making their lives hard. 13/

While they experience economic hardship, the state propaganda tells them that the economy is fine: the often-cited "conflict between the TV and the fridge", a cognitive dissonance that can lead to frustration and anger, but that anger will rarely be targeted against the West. 14/

This is how the official line of "invincible Russia" undermines the "rally-round-the-flag effect". Of course the West is blamed for sanctions, but the link between concrete hardship and sanctions is weak. It creates unspecified frustration with the overall state of things. 15/

This frustration also does not lead to immediate political problems for Putin, but if a policy is introduced that is unpopular (say, a pension reform like in 2018), or if the state makes a mistake (does not manage a natural disaster adequately), the response is amplified. 16/

Of course, the war means that many unpopular policies are necessary, and that many mistakes can be made. For now, the patriotic mood connected to the "ongoing external conflict" is stronger. But chances are that it will wear off like after 2014, while frustration accumulates. 17/

I still see other war-related problems creating more frustration than sanction-induced economic hardship, especially the high number of dead and wounded soldiers. Economic hardship for Russians is also not a primary goal of sanctions. 18/

It is also completely unclear what frustration in Russian society will lead to or if it will play a role at all, given the level of repressions. The first goal sanctions is still to deprive the Russian state of resources, limit its options, making it harder to fight the war.19/19