1/ A 🧵ON THE @federalreserve's precedent-setting 86-page @custodiabank order, released on Friday. Custodia just published a blog post highlighting the newly-articulated Fed policies + the procedural abnormalities it reveals. custodiabank.com/press/custodia…
2/ First, the policy items. Here are the first two:
3/ The third is new & raises lots of questions, esp since the Fed appears to have made a significant break from the President's Working Group's recommendation that #stablecoins only be issued by banks. There may be a new "catch 22" here:
4/ Related, there's increasing chatter about the Fed's own #CBDC project in the context of the Fed's actions regarding Custodia:🤔
5/ As I've said in recent interviews I've seen no evidence that the coordinated #crypto crackdown is about clearing the runway of private competitors to a #CBDC. But chatter about the topic is growing louder.
Speaking *personally* a U.S. retail CBDC is a hill worth dying on.
6/ The fourth gets into the role of States in the dual banking system, where both States & the federal govt (the OCC) have equal power to charter banks. The Fed just opened a new chapter in long tug-of-war re: Washington DC's efforts to federalize banking. States may take issue:
7/ The fifth is related--the Fed created a de facto new standard that all Fed member banks must be FDIC-insured (a "critical tool in preventing bank runs"). Hmmm...interesting in light of the bank runs at FDIC-insured banks that unfolded just weeks after the Fed wrote the order🤷♀️
8/ Next is a discussion of the procedural abnormalities--a few of which @custodiabank details in its post. (Here's a live link to the banking law expert's analysis referred to in the screenshot: bankregblog.substack.com/p/four-things-…)
9/ Banks especially may find these noteworthy:
10/ continuing...
11/ Per @custodiabank: "There are many other procedural abnormalities, but the above are likely the ones most relevant to other banks combing the Fed’s precedent-setting order for clues as to how the Fed will approach its future disclosure of confidential supervisory information"
12/ And on the topic of Fed disclosure of confidential supervisory information (CSI), here's what Fed vice chair Barr said just today (!)👇Compare his statement to the magnitude of CSI disclosure in the 86-page @custodiabank order. #WatchWhatIDoNotWhatISay federalreserve.gov/newsevents/tes…
13/ Here's the closing of @custodiabank's blog. "#digitalassets are not going away, and neither is Custodia." As always, thanks for all of your support! 💪
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1/ NEW FACTS REVEALED: 2 years ago today, the Fed quietly hammered 5 banks & thereby kicked off its industry-wide dragnet against banks serving the #crypto industry. @joerogan & @pmarca recently made discussions about #debanking go mainstream, which makes today’s anniv notable.
2/ On the Sunday after Thanksgiving 2022 (11/27/22), the Fed hit the first of these 5 banks w/ regulatory actions targeting their crypto activities, and its blitz carried into the following work week. Thus began what @nic__carter would later dub #OperationChokePoint2.0.
3/ How did I learn these facts? I pieced together public info + info from insiders who came forward & filled in puzzle pieces for me. I know the 5 banks’ names but won’t disclose them here. Publicly-available info confirms @custodiabank was one of them.
1/ HOW TO FIX THE U.S. DEBANKING PROBLEM, a 🧵by someone who set out to solve it but ended up repeatedly targeted by it (+ whose bank has a lawsuit against the Fed pertaining to it).
This is a #MeToo-type moment in banking, as stories are now pouring out.
How to fix it?
2/ As @pmarca alluded on @joerogan, the levers of power used/abused by federal bank regulators to effectuate #debanking are subtle & insidious. Multiple attempts have already been made to fix the problem. Why did they all fail? bc it's a multi-faceted problem that runs deep.
3/ Truly fixing the problem will require overhauling the federal bank examination process for operating banks. Why? a) subjective levers in federal bank exams have proven to be too easily politicized, b) confidentiality of supervisory info & c) no checks & balances in practice.
1/ CALLING OUT A DOUBLE STANDARD: I chewed on @CampbellJAustin's great🧵about selective enforcement against #crypto while protecting #tradfi, which prompted me to review the FTX fraud. Lo & behold, there seems to be ANOTHER pattern of selective enforcement
2/ The FDIC's Inspector General disclosed that 11 US banks "may have had involvement in alleged wire transfer fraud," & I tweeted the below screenshot of it on February 22, 2023:
1/ I'M STILL THINKING abt the bombshell Silvergate court filing. Here's the Warren crowd's #crypto bank scorecard:
❌Silvergate--suicided
❌Signature--suicided
❌Protego--OCC approval "expired"
〰️Paxos--ditto, but its non-bank is still going
✅ @custodiabank--survived & fighting
2/ Until the court filing, I didn't know the Fed "suicided" Silvergate by forcing it into an untenable choice👇: make #crypto <15% of its deposits (impossible in a short period of time) or throw in the towel. This touched off a bank panic the next day, costing the FDIC ~$40bn.🤦♀️
3/ @BarneyFrank et al made clear at the time that the FDIC "suicided" Signature, but we now know the Fed "suicided" Silvergate too. The timing lines up with the Fed blindsiding @custodiabank with a denial (w/ the White House). It was all coordinated--more than even I realized.
1/ I DUG INTO the Fed's latest master account list, released last night. The big news is what's happening with OCC-chartered trust companies--2 new ones applied for Fed master accounts. This is noteworthy for several reasons, explained below. Data here: federalreserve.gov/paymentsystems…
2/ But first, among the ~430 Fed master account holders that are not FDIC insured (or equivalent), 11 are trust companies chartered by the OCC:
3/ And 4 applicants for new Fed master accounts are OCC-chartered trust companies (of which two were crypto custodians whose applications went inactive amid #OperationChokePoint2.0👇--Paxos "withdrew" in Jan 2024; & Protego's charter approval "expired" in Feb 2023, per the OCC).
🚨 1/ BOMBSHELL REVELATION that Silvergate was liquid & solvent when the Fed forced it to close changes EVERYTHING when analyzing the March 2023 bank failures. Look at the dates:
* Mar 8: Silvergate voluntarily liquidates
* Mar 10: Silicon Valley fails
* Mar 12: Signature fails
2/ Stop & think about that timeline.
Think.
Would Silicon Valley Bank have failed had Silvergate not been forced by the Fed to close just 2 days earlier?
Recall the bank run at Silicon Valley really got started on Mar 9--the day after Silvergate announced it would liquidate.
3/ Reminder: Silvergate cost the FDIC's deposit insurance fund (DIF) nothing.
But the subsequent bank failures cost the FDIC's DIF dearly--Silicon Valley cost it ~$20bn, Signature cost it $2.4bn and First Republic (which failed weeks later, on May 1) cost it $15.6bn.