(1) Alignment worries: perhaps legit. But don't have much to say. (2) Job automation concerns: LLMs ≠ robots. Economic arguments for slowing down automation are much weaker for LLMs.
Economists have put forth two main arguments for slowing down technologies that automate jobs and displace workers. The first is based on redistributive considerations. The second is based on efficiency considerations.
In a nutshell, the redistributive rationale is as follows. If automation displaces workers who are relatively poor, then this increases inequality. Absent other tools to directly redistribute (e.g., transfers to workers) a government should curb automation to reduce inequality.
The redistributive argument is much weaker for LLMs than it was for robots.
Robots automate jobs intensive in routine tasks. These tend to be low-to-middle-wage jobs (think workers in a car manufacturing plant). So automation increases inequality.
From what we know so far, LLMs are likely to automate cognitive-intensive jobs. These tend to be middle-to high-wage jobs (think lawyers or software devs). So LLM-led automation would likely decrease inequality. The redistributive rationale for slowing down automation is gone.
The efficiency rationale is in my paper with @Nathan_Zorzi. See this thread for the argument:
In a nutshell, firms automate excessively because
there is a conflict between how firms and displaced workers value the gains from automation.
The efficiency rationale for slowing down automation relies on two assumptions. First, automated workers are financially vulnerable. They are unable to borrow or don't have enough savings to finance consumption while relocating to a new job. Second, worker reallocation is slow.
Both assumptions seem much less relevant for workers displaced by LLMs than by robots.
Again, LLMs will displace relatively richer workers in cognitive-intensive jobs. These workers are likely to have sufficient savings or able to borrow while relocating to a new job.
That is, in practice, lawyers and software devs are not the first that come to mind when thinking about "financially vulnerable workers." Workers displaced by a robot in a car manufacturing plant in Detroit, on the other hand, much more so.
Moreover, and this is more speculative, relocation is likely to be faster/easier for high-cognitive-skill workers than for high-manual-skill workers.
So, while relevant for robots, neither of the two assumptions that the efficiency rationale relies on seem that relevant for LLMs. The case for slowing down LLM-led automation due to inefficiencies is weak.
In all, neither redistributive nor efficiency arguments seem to support slowing down LLMs due to its impact on workers in a way that do support slowing down robot adoption
AI misalignment remains a valid concern, in principle.
But I’d like to see more formal economic arguments rather than armchair theorizing; to spell out assumptions and evaluate them. At this point, I don’t feel we have such arguments to so confidently call for an AI moratorium.
Taxi to JFK. Driver asks: where are you from? Argentina, I say. Driver turns around. Opens his jacket. He is wearing an Argentinean football jersey with the number 10 in it. I’m from Bangladesh, he says. We are big fans! You don’t believe me? Let me show you. Hilarity ensues…
First he shows me pictures of his house. Big Argentina flag is hanging from his balcony. Then pulls up Youtube. Shows me this video of hundreds of Bangladeshi on the street with the 🇦🇷 jersey.
He calls his brother next (i think). Who do you support in the World Cup? Some short back and forth in Bengali happens (had to look this up, I must confess. Didn’t know the language’s name). The brother starts chanting “Argentina! Argentina!”
Think about trying to identify one parameter: how "sticky" wages are. This is a key parameter in many DSGE models. All other parameters are known.
Imagine you have a strong prior that wages are very sticky when the "truth" is that they are rather flexible.
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Suppose we simulate data from a model with the "true" wage stickiness. We then try to estimate the model on this data, given our prior. How much does the posterior on wage stickiness move? That is, when do we get close to recovering the "true" wage stickiness parameter?
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