#Gerasimov's apparent need to negotiate with subordinate commanders and those commanders’ ability to force his hand suggests that chain of command problems are significantly impacting the Russian military’s ability to conduct coherent theater-wide operations.
2/ ISW has assessed that the RU military command had likely recently decided to reprioritize efforts & resource allocation to prepare to receive potential UKR counteroffensive operations but did not set conditions to appease Prigozhin/offset Wagner’s likely degradation in Bakhmut
3/ The subsequent upheaval over the de-prioritization of Bakhmut and the Russian military command's reversal on supplying Wagner is likely to undermine this theater-wide effort.
4/ These events raise questions about RU’s ability to coordinate a coherent theater-wide defensive campaign. The RU military command appears to be increasingly delegating responsibilities for different sectors of the front in Ukraine to various commanders while the power of the… twitter.com/i/web/status/1…
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
2/ Prigozhin announced on May 7 that he had obtained a document from the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) that promised to supply Wagner forces with the ammunition and weapons necessary to maintain offensive operations in Bakhmut.
3/ Prigozhin has not published the official document and ISW cannot verify Prigozhin’s claims at this time. The Russian MoD likely has not fundamentally changed its intention of deprioritizing offensive operations & conserving munitions across the theater, a we recently assessed.
Russian forces continued to make marginal gains within #Bakhmut and Ukrainian forces likely conducted a successful limited counterattack southwest of #Avdiivka. isw.pub/UkrWar050623
3/ Geolocated footage published on April 30 indicates that Ukrainian forces likely conducted a limited counterattack north of Vodyane (7km southwest of #Avdiivka) and made marginal gains in the area. isw.pub/UkrWar050623
Russian forces made additional gains within #Bakhmut as of May 5.
Geolocated footage published on May 5 shows that Russian forces have advanced in northwestern Bakhmut towards #Khromove (directly west of Bakhmut). isw.pub/UkrWar050523
2/ Additional geolocated imagery posted on May 4 shows a destroyed Ukrainian bridge over the Siverskyi Donets Donbas Canal west of #Bakhmut near Chasiv Yar.
3/ Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces blew up the bridge, but the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces struck an unspecified bridge near Chasiv Yar.
Russian occupation authorities announced the forced removal of 70,000 civilians in occupied #Zaporizhia Oblast to areas deeper in the Russian-occupied rear under the guise of evacuations. isw.pub/UkrWar050523
2/ Zaporizhia Oblast occupation officials said on May 5 that RU authorities will conduct a partial evacuation of 70K UKR civilians from 18 settlements along the southern bank of the Kakhovka Reservoir and along Russian ground lines of communications ~20-40 km from the front line.
3/ The officials claimed that authorities have already begun evacuating civilians from the Polohy Raion to Berdyansk.
It is not immediately clear whether #Prigozhin actually intends to withdraw #Wagner forces from #Bakhmut on May 10 or whether he made the announcement in a last-ditch attempt to secure the support of the Russian MoD. isw.pub/UkrWar050523
2/ If #Wagner does withdraw, then it will likely need Russian MoD equipment to protect and facilitate the retrograde. The Russian military lacks the reserves needed to man positions Wagner might abandon in #Bakhmut, moreover.
3/ The massive losses suffered by Wagner in #Bakhmut for the sake of tactical gains + #Russia's shift towards a more cautious posture preparing for defensive operations appears to be offering Ukrainian forces opportunities for fruitful counterattacks in various areas of the front
#Wagner’s ongoing persistence within #Bakhmut is incompatible with the overall slow-down in the pace of RU offensive operations elsewhere in #Ukraine as conventional RU forces appear to be largely shifting focus to prepare to receive a much-anticipated UKR counteroffensive. (1/5)
2/ Aside from very limited and localized attacks in the #Kreminna area and near #Donetsk City, Russian forces have largely ceased offensive operations throughout the theater, likely signifying a transition to the defensive.
3/ It would be an operationally sound decision for the Russian MoD to begin withholding and stockpiling ammunition and supplies in order to prepare for any Ukrainian counteroffensive actions, and #Prigozhin’s desperate statements indicate that the Russian MoD is likely doing so.