The seizure of #Bakhmut was originally intended to facilitate Russian offensives to encircle large Ukrainian forces in the east and specifically to take the large and fortified city of Slovyansk from multiple directions. isw.pub/Bakhmut052423
2/ Russian offensive operations in Severodonetsk and Lysychansk proved extremely costly and slow, forcing the Russian military command to deprioritize the wide encirclement in #Donetsk Oblast in order to complete the seizure of those two cities. isw.pub/Bakhmut052423
3/ #Russia reprioritized the Battle for #Bakhmut in July-August 2022, following the culmination of Russian attacks on the Severodonetsk-Lysychansk line. Wagner began assaults on settlements east and SE of Bakhmut, using Russian-occupied territories as springboards for the attack.
4/ The successful Ukrainian counteroffensives in Kharkiv Oblast in September 2022 that liberated Izyum ended the prospect of a wide encirclement of Ukrainian forces in the east, thus depriving the attacks on Bakhmut of operational significance.
5/ #Wagner mercenaries nevertheless intensified their offensives on #Bakhmut and fully committed to the Battle for Bakhmut in Fall 2022 likely to achieve informational and political rather than operational objectives. isw.pub/Bakhmut052423
6/ The Russian MoD began to prepare for its own winter offensive operation in December 2022 and likely began to deprioritize support for #Wagner forces at that time. Wagner’s highly attritional offensives began to show signs of culmination by late December 2022 and in Jan 2023.
7/ The #WagnerGroup began committing its remaining forces to #Bakhmut between February and March to threaten Ukrainian forces into withdrawing from the city so as to avoid having to fight through it.
8/ The Ukrainian military blocked the Russian efforts to envelop or encircle #Bakhmut in March, forcing Wagner forces to fight through the city and suffer significant losses for the next two months.
9/ ISW assessed that the Ukrainian defense of Bakhmut was a strategically sound decision as Ukrainians would benefit from exhausting Wagner forces if they were able to retain control over the two GLOCs west of Bakhmut. isw.pub/Bakhmut052423
10/ #Prigozhin has likely signaled the culmination of #Wagner forces in declaring victory in #Bakhmut on May 20 and announcing Wagner’s withdrawal from the city and plans to reconstitute on May 25, despite subsequent denials.
11/ The #Wagner Group’s announced two-month reconstitution period could have #Wagner forces sitting out key parts of the Ukrainian counteroffensive depending on when and how it begins. isw.pub/Bakhmut052423
12/ The Battle of Bakhmut exposed several key flaws in the Russian planning and conduct of operational maneuver. It is also not even clear that the Battle of Bakhmut is yet over. isw.pub/Bakhmut052423
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MORE 🧵(1/5) | US and Israeli Air Campaign: The combined force killed an IRGC Aerospace officer on April 1 as part of the decapitation campaign against Iranian military officials.
The combined force struck a likely IRGC Ground Forces munitions depot in Esfahan Province as part of its effort to degrade Iranian internal security institutions.
The combined force struck the Laser and Plasma Research Institute (LAPRI) on April 3, which is a specialized research center at Shahid Beheshti University in Tehran Province. The Shahid Beheshti University plays a role in Iranian nuclear weapons research and development, including researching centrifuge cascades, uranium separation, and neutron transport.
The combined force struck underground fuel storage tanks at two Artesh Tactical Air Bases (TAB), including the 8th TAB in Esfahan Province and the 10th TAB in Sistan and Baluchistan Province.
2/ Iranian Response: Iran has launched at least nine missiles targeting Israel since ISW-CTP’s last data cut off on April 2. This figure is estimated from IDF and Israeli media reports about IDF-issued missile detections and interceptions. Iran launched the missiles in eight waves of attacks, which suggests that most of the launches only contained one or two missiles. This rate is consistent with recent Iranian launch rates targeting Israel over the past few weeks, but Iran has fired slightly fewer barrages targeting Israel in the past three days.
3/ Iranian strikes and intercepted fragments damaged several Gulf energy facilities on April 3. Iran continues to target Gulf energy infrastructure, which is part of the Iranian effort to drive up global energy prices and coerce the Gulf states into pressuring the United States and Israel to end their campaign.
Iran fired slightly more projectiles targeting the UAE on April 3 than on any day within the last week. Iran fired 47 drones, 18 ballistic missiles, and four cruise missiles targeting the UAE and killed at least one person. The volume of Iranian missile and drone fire targeting the UAE this week is about less than half of the volumes that Iran fired during the first week of the war, however (see graph below). The drop in volume after the first week of the war is likely the result of combined force strikes targeting Iranian missile and drone assets.
NEW | Special Report: The war in Iran is currently in a phase in which the military trajectory is relatively positive: the United States is steadily destroying Iran’s ability to use its most essential tool in the war — drone and missile attacks — which in turn underpin the entire Iranian strategy.
Iran has still done some damage to US forces, and it is still firing drones and missiles, though the overall attack rate is slowly decreasing. These attacks still pale in comparison to the major attacks Iran sought to conduct in an existential war and have caused neither operationally significant damage nor widespread casualties.
The US-Israeli combined force will need time to achieve its military objectives and prevent Iran from inflicting further political and economic pain upon the United States and its allies in the region, but the campaign remains incomplete, and it is too soon to forecast its outcome. Declaring it an operational failure is unquestionably premature.
BREAKING: The combined US-Israeli force appears to be increasing its targeting of the Iranian internal security apparatus after killing Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei on February 28. The targeting of internal security institutions is consistent with the United States and Israel’s stated objective of toppling the Iranian regime. (1/3)
2/ The Israel Defense Forces struck the Sarallah Headquarters in Tehran, which is responsible for security in Tehran and plays a significant role in suppressing internal dissent.
The combined force also struck the Law Enforcement Command (LEC) Headquarters in Tehran. The LEC is the regime's first line of defense against protests.
3/ The combined force reportedly struck Basij bases in Kermanshah and Tehran, including a base that was reportedly involved in the suppression of the December 2025-January 2026 protests.
The targeting of Iranian internal security institutions could degrade Iranian security forces’ ability and willingness to quell potential internal unrest against the regime.
NEW: The Kremlin accused Ukraine of conducting a long-range drone strike targeting Russian President Vladimir Putin’s residence in Novgorod Oblast on December 29. 🧵(1/3)
The circumstances of this alleged strike do not conform to the pattern of observed evidence when Ukrainian forces conduct strikes into Russia.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky refuted the alleged strike against Putin’s residence in Novgorod Oblast and warned that Russia will use this claim to justify strikes against Kyiv City and Ukrainian government buildings.
The Kremlin may intend to use this claimed strike to justify its rejection of any peace proposals that come out of recent bilateral US-Ukrainian and multilateral US-Ukrainian-European talks.
Other Key Takeaways ⬇️
2/ Russian President Vladimir Putin and high-ranking Russian military commanders held another meeting to aggrandize tactical details and create the false impression that the front lines across Ukraine are on the verge of collapse.
Pro-war Russian ultranationalist milbloggers are publicly acknowledging that the Russian military command’s claims are exaggerated.
Russian forces continue to commit war crimes in the Hulyaipole and Pokrovsk directions.
Several dozen Belarusian smuggling balloons illegally entered Polish airspace, and Polish aircraft intercepted a Russian reconnaissance aircraft near the international border overnight on December 24 to December 25.
3/ Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Siversk, Oleksandrivka, and Hulyaipole. Russian forces recently advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast, in the Dobropillya tactical area, and near Pokrovsk.
NEW: US President Donald Trump met with Russian President Vladimir Putin at Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson in Anchorage, Alaska, on August 15. In a joint press conference, Putin addressed the crowd first and spoke in Russian, reiterating several long-standing Kremlin information operations about the war in Ukraine, Russian history, and the US-Russia relationship.
Putin said nothing to indicate that he has moderated either his war aims or his willingness to compromise on them and reiterated language he has used since 2021 to justify Russia's aggression against Ukraine.
Trump stated that the United States and Russia did not come to a firm agreement about the war in Ukraine.
Russia conducted drone and missile strikes in Ukraine in the hours before the August 15 Alaska summit, causing civilian casualties and damage to civilian infrastructure.
Other Key Takeaways ⬇️
2/ Ukrainian officials continue to indicate that Ukrainian counterattacks are stabilizing the situation east and northeast of Dobropillya (northwest of Pokrovsk).
The Russian military command is reportedly trying to redeploy forces and means to reinforce and exploit the penetration near Dobropillya but has so far been unsuccessful.
ISW continues to assess that Russia's use of drone strikes to generate battlefield air interdiction (BAI) effects in the Ukrainian near rear is severely hindering Ukrainian evacuation efforts in the Pokrovsk-Dobropillya area.
3/ Ukraine continued its long-range drone strike campaign against Russian military and energy infrastructure overnight on August 14 to 15.
Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk and Velykomykhailivka.
NEW: Russian and US officials further clarified the details of the upcoming August 15 Alaska summit. 🧵(1/4)
Other Key Takeaways:
The Kremlin is likely to use the Alaska summit to try to deflect attention away from peace negotiations with Ukraine and towards the Russia-US relationship in order to court the Trump administration into offering Moscow sorely needed economic rapprochement.
The Kremlin is coming to Alaska with a severely weakened domestic economy, which affords the Trump administration significant leverage during the summit.
US President Donald Trump expressed concerns about the success of a potential secondary meeting between Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Russian President Vladimir Putin.
The Kremlin is also likely to try to distract from the war in Ukraine by pressuring the Trump administration to engage in bilateral arms control talks at the Alaska summit.
2/ Russian forces have yet to reinforce and consolidate positions east and northeast of Dobropillya, and Ukrainian and Russian sources reported that Ukrainian reinforcements are stabilizing the situation.
ISW continues to assess that Russian forces do not control the territory east and northeast of Dobropillya where Russian forces recently infiltrated.
3/ The United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (UN OHCHR) reported that the July 2025 civilian casualties from Russia's war against Ukraine were the highest on record since May 2022.
Ukraine's European partners continue to provide military aid to Ukraine, including through the purchase of US weapons.
Ukraine and Russia conducted their 67th prisoner exchange of the war on August 14.
Ukrainian forces struck a large oil refinery in Volgograd Oblast on the night of August 13 to 14.
Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Sumy Oblast and near Lyman, and Russian forces recently advanced near Velykomykhailivka.