The seizure of #Bakhmut was originally intended to facilitate Russian offensives to encircle large Ukrainian forces in the east and specifically to take the large and fortified city of Slovyansk from multiple directions. isw.pub/Bakhmut052423
2/ Russian offensive operations in Severodonetsk and Lysychansk proved extremely costly and slow, forcing the Russian military command to deprioritize the wide encirclement in #Donetsk Oblast in order to complete the seizure of those two cities. isw.pub/Bakhmut052423
3/ #Russia reprioritized the Battle for #Bakhmut in July-August 2022, following the culmination of Russian attacks on the Severodonetsk-Lysychansk line. Wagner began assaults on settlements east and SE of Bakhmut, using Russian-occupied territories as springboards for the attack.
4/ The successful Ukrainian counteroffensives in Kharkiv Oblast in September 2022 that liberated Izyum ended the prospect of a wide encirclement of Ukrainian forces in the east, thus depriving the attacks on Bakhmut of operational significance.
5/ #Wagner mercenaries nevertheless intensified their offensives on #Bakhmut and fully committed to the Battle for Bakhmut in Fall 2022 likely to achieve informational and political rather than operational objectives. isw.pub/Bakhmut052423
6/ The Russian MoD began to prepare for its own winter offensive operation in December 2022 and likely began to deprioritize support for #Wagner forces at that time. Wagner’s highly attritional offensives began to show signs of culmination by late December 2022 and in Jan 2023.
7/ The #WagnerGroup began committing its remaining forces to #Bakhmut between February and March to threaten Ukrainian forces into withdrawing from the city so as to avoid having to fight through it.
8/ The Ukrainian military blocked the Russian efforts to envelop or encircle #Bakhmut in March, forcing Wagner forces to fight through the city and suffer significant losses for the next two months.
9/ ISW assessed that the Ukrainian defense of Bakhmut was a strategically sound decision as Ukrainians would benefit from exhausting Wagner forces if they were able to retain control over the two GLOCs west of Bakhmut. isw.pub/Bakhmut052423
10/ #Prigozhin has likely signaled the culmination of #Wagner forces in declaring victory in #Bakhmut on May 20 and announcing Wagner’s withdrawal from the city and plans to reconstitute on May 25, despite subsequent denials.
11/ The #Wagner Group’s announced two-month reconstitution period could have #Wagner forces sitting out key parts of the Ukrainian counteroffensive depending on when and how it begins. isw.pub/Bakhmut052423
12/ The Battle of Bakhmut exposed several key flaws in the Russian planning and conduct of operational maneuver. It is also not even clear that the Battle of Bakhmut is yet over. isw.pub/Bakhmut052423
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NEW: Sources close to the Japanese government assess that the PLAN and CCG likely conducted a joint maritime blockade drill in the Miyako Strait for the first time on December 22. The drill involved three PLAN vessels and three CCG vessels. (1/7)
2/ The PLAN ships circumnavigated the southern tip of Taiwan and Japan’s Sakishima islands before entering the strait, which is located between the islands of Okinawa and Miyako in Japan’s Ryukyu island chain.
3/ The ships then sailed through the Miyako Strait toward the East China Sea.[134] The CCG vessels turned off their transponders in the strait according to Automatic Identification System (AIS) data.
NEW: The US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) defended against Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) attempts to recapture SDF-held ground on the west bank of the Euphrates River near the Tishreen Dam and Qere Qozak Bridge.
Syria Key Takeaways 🧵(1/6):
2/ Unspecified sources reportedly told Syria-based al Khabour News that the YPG threatened to cut off bread supplies to Hasakah if the people did not demonstrate in support of the group.
3/ HTS leader Ahmed al Shara may face resistance to the current moderate approach to governance from Salafi-Jihadi factions within the HTS-led coalition.
Russia is evacuating elements of its force grouping in Syria while continuing negotiations with select Syrian groups about Russia's longer-term military presence in the country. 🧵(1/8)
2/ Kremlin newswire TASS reported on December 13 that an unspecified source familiar with the matter stated that Russia is currently negotiating with unspecified new Syrian "authorities" about maintaining Russia's military presence at Hmeimim Air Base and the Port of Tartus.
3/ Maxar satellite imagery from Dec. 13 shows two Russian An-124 military transport aircraft preparing to load cargo while a Ka-52 helicopter and elements of an S-400 air defense system are likely undergoing preparations for transport at Hmeimim Air Base.
NEW: The Iranian regime is still coming to terms with the fall of the Assad regime and reflecting on its former Syria policy.
Key Takeaways + Full Report ⬇️🧵(1/7)
2/ Blinken in the Middle East: US Secretary of State Antony Blinken discussed the situation in Syria with senior Turkish and Iraqi officials on December 12 and 13. Blinken met with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Foreign Affairs Minister Hakan Fidan in Ankara on December 12 and 13, respectively, to try to persuade Turkey “not to press [its] advantage” against the Kurdish-controlled, US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in northeastern Syria.
3/ Syrian Democratic Forces: The SDF is facing two perceived existential threats in the wake of the fall of the Assad regime, which almost certainly caused the SDF to deprioritize the counter-ISIS mission. SDF commander General Mazloum Abdi announced that the SDF plans to negotiate its role in a future Syrian government, likely to prevent further unrest within Arab populations and militias under the SDF.
.@Maxar collected new satellite imagery this morning (December 13th) of the two primary Russian military bases in Syria—Khmeimim airbase near Latakia and the port/naval base at Tartus. Details ⬇️🧵(1/4)
2/ At Khmeimim, @Maxar imagery shows two An-124 heavy transport aircraft at the airfield—both with their nose cones lifted and prepared to load equipment/cargo.
3/ Nearby, @Maxar has captured a Ka-52 attack helicopter being dismantled and likely prepared for transport while elements of an S-400 air defense unit similarly prepare to depart from its previous deployment site at the airbase.
NEW: Russian forces continue to make tactical gains south of Pokrovsk in Donetsk Oblast as they attack into Ukrainian weak points and attempt to conduct a turning maneuver to directly assault Pokrovsk from the south.🧵(1/X)
2/ Russian forces have advanced in western Novyi Trud and along the E50 highway south of Dachenske, narrowing the small pocket west of the E50 highway and south of the Novyi Trud-Dachenske line. This advance places Russian forces about 6km south of Pokrovsk.
3/ Russian forces will likely continue efforts to close the pocket between Novyi Trud and Dachenske in the coming days, as doing so will provide them a stronger position from which to assault Shevchenko (just northwest of Novyi Trud and southwest of Pokrovsk).