Thread by @WarintheFuture

As Ukrainian President Zelenskyy has noted over the weekend, #Ukraine is ready for its coming offensives. H-Hour (the time set for a planned attack) for the forthcoming Ukrainian offensives will have been set and is drawing near. 1/24 🧵

2/ Preliminary actions have been taking place for months. Since late 2022, Ukrainian planners, diplomats and strategic leaders have been reviewing different plans, working with allies and wargaming options for their 2023 offensives against the Russians.

3/ Ukrainian training institutions have been preparing soldiers and leaders, which has been supplemented by tactical and technical training being undertaken in NATO countries. Brigades and battalions have been conducting collective training and rehearsals.

4/ For months, a reconnaissance battle will have been taking place across the front. This will have seen Ukrainian and Russian forces fighting for information while also fighting to deny information to the enemy.

5/ This reconnaissance battle takes place with dismounted & mounted troops, UAVs, electronic warfare & strategic intelligence support from satellites and other sources. These preliminary activities will be vital to Ukraine achieving surprise in the time and place of its attacks.

6/ Logistics stockpiling will have been taking place for some time. Food, fuel, water, spare tires and vehicle parts and ammunition are all part of this grand hording of materiel and supplies to support an army on the advance.

7/ At the same time, masses of new equipment have been accepted, absorbed into the Ukrainian military and issued to units.

8/ In the past few weeks, there has also been an increase in longer range strikes on Russian targets well behind the lines. These have been of two types: operational and political.

9/ Operational strikes. These are targets that support the coordination of many tactical activities, and include Russian headquarters, supply locations, transportation hubs and locations were reserves of soldiers are billeted.

10/ The Ukrainian strikes, including the use of Storm Shadow missiles and naval drones, aim to break down the higher level cohesion of Russian defences and their ability to respond to Ukrainian thrusts once the offensive begins.

11/ Political strikes. These have included the Moscow strikes as well as the incursions in the Belgorod region and Zelensky’s visit to Moldova. These are aimed at distracting strategic leaders in Moscow and influencing the Russian public’s view of the conflict.

12/ But the coming offensives will be different from what we have seen from the Ukrainians so far in this war.The first reason for this is that the Ukrainians are facing a different Russian Army now than compared to 2022. mickryan.substack.com/p/the-coming-f…

13/ Not only does it have a different commander (General Gerasimov), but there is also a different balance of professional, private and mobilised troops. And, the Russians have constructed multiple defensive zones in the east and south which Ukraine must fight through and around.

14/ Good armies try to avoid being committed to breaching through such areas. However, if they lie in the path of an important operational objective, there are times when breaching and fighting through such obstacle zones cannot be avoided.

15/ If Russian can conduct a more competent mobile defence in the coming months, it will be a different enemy than the one the Ukrainians have fought in the past 16 months. Breaking down this capacity in the Russians is a key aim of recent operational level strikes.

16/ Another difference with the coming offensives will be Ukrainian force structure. Over the past few months, they have been raising, equipping, manning, and training three new formations for the coming offensives.

17/ These new formations, which resemble reinforced combined arms divisions, have been the beneficiaries of the large amounts of armoured and motorised equipment, masses of UAVs, artillery, engineer & logistics equipment, provided by the US and Europe since the end of 2022.

18/ A final reason the coming offensives will be different is because of the strategic stakes involved. The Russians seek to draw out the conflict. The Ukrainians will want to show significant progress in 2023, and probably will want to do so by the July NATO summit.

19/ The Ukrainians also know that the strategic clock is possibly ticking in Washington DC. With an election year in 2024 likely to distract the war principal aid provided, this year will be decisive for Ukrainian battlefield operations.

20/ So, timing the Ukrainian offensives right has both political and military imperatives. From a military perspective, the Ukrainians want to have the Russian 2023 offensive run out of momentum, and be satisfied that as many Russian units have been degraded as possible.

21/ Another military imperative has been the formation of new units or re-equipping of new ones, and ensuring they have time to plan, train, rehearse and conduct preliminary deployments for the coming offensives.

22/ From a political perspective, the Ukrainian government knows 2023 is a key year to demonstrate progress. Notwithstanding statements from foreign governments about long term support, there is an imperative to demonstrate success in the short term. kyivindependent.com/zelensky-we-ar…

23/ There is no perfect time to launch the Ukrainian offensives, but there will be a time that is optimum for Ukrainian force preparations and where they are most able to exploit Russian weaknesses. That time is close. H-Hour approaches. End.

24/ Thank you to the following whose links and images were used in this thread: @KyivIndependent @combined2forces @GeneralStaffUA @yurasov_vitaliy @DefenceU @bradyafr @Tatarigami_UA @EuromaidanPress