collapse, the river was narrow downstream of the dam, and Russian forces contended with crossing attempts by UA forces on a daily basis. They had occupied the middle islands, and with a powerful base of Kherson city itself right up to the bank, made a powerful force projection
across the bank. RU had to maintain relatively strong forces in this area. Above the dam, the river was much wider (Lake Kakhovka) and Russia thus maintained lesser positions. A look at a very rough deployment map (militaryland) shows us what I mean.
The destruction of the dam
reverses this situation. The river downstream became wide (flooding Russian positions in the lower Russian held bank), and the water level upstream dropped (and continues dropping). It makes sense that this was part of the great long awaited UA counteroffensive. Otherwise, the
timing is quite peculiar. As UA forces broke through either or both fronts in the east (around Orikhiv and Velyka Novosilka), they could race down towards Tokmak while an additional pincer or pincers could cross from the Kherson and Nikopol areas, where the lower water level now
permitted it. A chaotic and flooded Russian western Kherson front would be disorganized and unable to redeploy. If the pincer reached the Crimean edge, this whole force could have been trapped. The crossing also would allow getting behind the coveted Enerhodar nuclear ZPP.
A variety of smaller and larger pincers and envelopments could be imagined. Throwing the Kherson western line off balance with flooding would be quite helpful as you reverse the water level realities above and below the dam. Of course, as the counteroffensives had not achieved
much (will update on them next) by June 6th, one can imagine the UA command choosing to go ahead with the thoroughly planned dam destruction anyway. And in fact, the seemingly well planned (or surpassingly quick) boat evacuations of UA troops on the islands, and the attempted
but failed crossings around Zolota Balka by UA forces would be further indication of this intent. Finally, it would further explain why so many of the new Western trained brigades have remained behind (west of) the Dnieper around Nikopol. While they look like they are tucked away
safely, but can quickly cross at Zaporizhzhia or Dnipro if needed in the front, an alternative option would be that they are poised to push through a successful cross-Dnieper operation. Not much of this plan has thus panned out of course, whatever it was, but the dam is in large
destroyed. Have been waiting for Sentinel 2 images which finally are available for the 8th of June but unfortunately the area is rather cloudy. But between Sentinel 2 and 3, we an see that indeed downstream is greatly flooded on the Russian side, & upstream the level is dropping
dangerously. Above we see Sentinel 2 images for June 5th vs 8th (after the collapse). Clearly the dam is badly damaged and the lower delta is heavily flooded, as are large parts of the southern (RU held) bank. By using Sentinel 3 images (lower res) , we can see just how wide the
Dnieper expanded, into the Russian held side. When we look further north, upstream from the dam, we can see clearly, by comparing June 5th and June 8th, that the water level dropped significantly (note the expanded dry areas around the banks). If we look to the nuclear power
plant in Zaporizhzhia, we can see that the width of the land around the cooling pond at one point expanded from around 418 meters to 554 meters. Though Russian officials are doing what they can to maintain the safety of the plant, the combination of constant shelling and now
dropping water levels is certainly not a laughing matter. UA command can do any of this with impunity due to mainstream coverage as we have discussed. In fact, one can add to the benefits in a pros and cons list for the UA command regarding the destruction of the dam, that
mainstream media will blame Russia for the act and all of its consequences regardless of any facts. Just another cherry on top (the other side of the coin of why false flag operations by RU to blame UA of anything are absurd since the media will not hear of it). We have discussed
both of these issues previously. The additional thread about the dam collapse, and its potential connection to the UA offensive done, let us move on to update regarding the counteroffensive itself.
Police Sergeant Bradley T. McClure committing an unlawful arrest and subverting the US constitution on film. He can do that because he did against a white man who was expressing conservative and/or Christian beliefs.
If it wasn't on video, the small sergeant's actions would go
unnoticed and be successful. Because it is on video, (full version for those interested: ), then if enough citizens in America still care about their freedom and the rule of law, then perhaps it won't be.
Anyone who watches the full video will clearly see
that the officer lied in his Affidavit of Probable Cause.
Note that the "proud" Americans expressing opposing viewpoints (reportedly out-of-towners as is often the case) cheer at the illegal arrest of a fellow American who disagrees with them. Liberty and the health of the
Big news, massive flooding along the Dnieper in the Kherson region. Kakhovskaya HPP is severely damaged. We have discussed the strategic importance of the water level previously. Together with the much anticipated UA counteroffensive we now have this development. Some of the
earliest footage was from daybreak today. The flooding started in early dawn. Goes without saying that the mainstream media and the EU quickly blamed Russia for intentionally blowing up the damn (and called it a war crime). That the dam is Russian controlled, and that the
southern (Russian-held) bank is lower than the northern (UA-held) bank and so will suffer worse flooding does not enter in their calculations. Neither does the repeated UA strikes against the damn (which helped convince RU forces to withdraw from Kherson) in the past. Russia
advantage to Russia in the balance of forces. It is to UA's advantage to make Russia have to defend the long international border as much as any part of the front (within UA). Ironically, UA's obsessions with winning a PR war (rather than the real war on hand) limited the
strategic value of the operation in this important sense. And that is what there is to add to the discussion. UA command could not possibly have simply ordered an attack into Russia. That would have been too straightforward and honorable for them. Had they admitted to doing so,
), which was the last part of the Citadel that was left in UA hands, we can expect faster movement than has been usual for the last weeks.
This is why I commented earlier that the successful UA push by UA forces in the northern flank retaking positions along the O-0506, were not going to be significant in terms of helping the UA garrison in Bakhmut. That road was largely no longer usable, and
Now onto Bakhmut. First, a couple of days ago Wagner's head Prigozhin released an interesting video. He shows off large stocks of captured weapons (complains that the higher ups haven't been interested in it), and complains about the artillery munition supply. He jokes that
they can sell or trade these online in exchange for munitions. All sorts of theories on this, since it seems quite insubordinate, especially against the bureaucrats and Minister of Defense Shoigu. The leaked Pentagon documents mention this issue, and have been wanting to comment
on it, but no time yet. Here let us focus more on Bakhmut for now. On May 2nd-3rd all hell broke loose. While previously UA forces were barely shelling RU positions back, this changed drastically. UA forces initiated fierce counterattacks on the flanks and in NW Bakhmut to keep
Recently released footage from #Russian sources show that #Marinka, heavily fortified over the last decade, seemingly impregnable to Russian advance, is finally near falling.
The work of the "flamethrower" TOS-1 indicates that only around 15% of the town remains in UA hands.
The TOS1A Solntsepyok, which cannot be too far behind (short range), is targeting UA positions in the western edge of the town. Little is left of the once lovely Donetsk suburb, famously captured from Russian separatists by the Azov battalion.
Earlier in the war its capture would have been very strategic (as we have discussed earlier) as it distances UA artillery & observers from Donetsk city and opens up the way for additional RU advances in key directions. Today, less so as the UA forces have learned to dig in and