3/ Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty noted that Ukrainian forces advanced up to 1,400m in unspecified areas of the #Bakhmut front, and Russian milbloggers reported Ukrainian advances northwest and northeast of Bakhmut. isw.pub/UkrWar061023
4/ The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and other Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian troops conducted localized attacks in the #Donetsk-#Zaporizhia Oblast border area, particularly in the Velyka Novosilka area. isw.pub/UkrWar061023
5/ Geolocated footage posted on June 10 indicates that Ukrainian forces in western #Zaporizhia Obl. made localized gains during counterattacks SW & SE of #Orikhiv, & RU milbloggers continued to claim that RU forces in this area are successfully defending. isw.pub/UkrWar061023
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NEW: The Russian MoD likely attempted to cover up the recent removal of the acting commander of the Southern Military District (SMD) Colonel General Gennady Anashkin following widespread accusations within the Russian information space that Anashkin's subordinates submitted false frontline progress reports to superiors. (1/4)
2/ Ukrainian military officials denied claims of North Korean personnel's presence in Kharkiv Oblast amid new unconfirmed reports that North Korean "technical advisers" are operating in occupied Mariupol.
3/ Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Velyka Novosilka.
NEW: Iran is activating a “substantial number” of advanced centrifuges, increasing the rate of Iranian uranium enrichment. (🧵1/7)
2/ Iran is responding to the IAEA Board of Governors passing a censure resolution submitted by the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) on November 21. The resolution condemns Iran for failing to fully cooperate with the IAEA.
3/ The Atomic Energy Organization of Iran said on November 22 that Iran will “significantly increase” its uranium enrichment capacity in response.
NEW: The Houthis have become a major strategic threat with ties to multiple US adversaries. The US has sought to “avoid escalation” in response to Houthi actions since Oct 2023 with half-measures that have failed to materially degrade Houthi military capabilities. (🧵1/8)
2/ The Houthis are undeterred and have collected significant insight into US defenses against their attack systems of all varieties. The Houthis will almost certainly exploit this insight to improve the efficacy of their own attacks and provide it to other US adversaries.
3/ The US failure to disrupt or deter Houthi escalation in the Red Sea has forced US policymakers to prioritize the Red Sea over the Western Pacific. This prioritization of the Middle East in this way is unsustainable, especially in the event of a Taiwan Strait scenario.
NEW: Russian President Vladimir Putin intensified his reflexive control campaign aimed at Ukraine and its Western partners by conducting an ostentatious ballistic missile strike against Ukraine that used multiple reentry vehicles on November 21. 🧵(1/4)
2/ Putin explicitly threatened that Russia may attack Western countries that support Ukrainian deep strikes in Russia and rhetorically connected the November 21 ballistic missile strike to Russian nuclear capabilities — a marked intensification of an existing Russian information operation that aims to use explicit threats and nuclear saber-rattling to discourage continued Western military support for Ukraine.
3/ Putin’s November 21 statement demonstrates that Moscow’s constant saber-rattling largely remains rhetorical. Putin's recent threats against the West have centered on Western states allowing Ukraine to conduct long-range strikes into “Russian territory,” but Ukrainian forces have been striking what the Kremlin illegally defines as “Russian territory” for a long time.
Lebanon: Documents seized by the IDF in the Gaza Strip highlight Iranian efforts to promote interoperability between Hamas and Lebanese Hezbollah. The documents depict Iran-Hamas discussions to send thousands of Hamas fighters to Lebanon to integrate into Hezbollah SOF units. These units are trained to conduct ground attacks into Israel.
2/ Iran: The United States and E3 submitted a censure resolution against Iran to the IAEA Board of Governors in response to Iran's refusal to cooperate fully with the IAEA. Iran is trying to prevent the censure resolution from passing by threatening unspecified retaliation.
3/ Iraq: The Iraqi federal government is trying to prevent Iranian-backed Iraqi militia attacks on Israel in order to prevent Israeli strikes on Iraq. Iranian-backed Iraqi attacks on Israel increased by almost 150 percent between September and October 2024.
NEW: Ukrainian drone operations continue to play a critical role in constraining Russian mechanized maneuver and preventing Russian forces from fully exploiting Ukraine's ongoing manpower constraints.
Special Report: The Ukrainian Defense of Pokrovsk Has Compelled Russia to Change Its Approach in Eastern Ukraine 🧵(1/6)
2/ Russian forces launched offensive operations intended to seize Pokrovsk in Donetsk Oblast during Spring 2024 at the moment of greatest constraints on Ukraine's manpower and materiel following the suspension of US assistance in Fall 2023.
3/ Russian forces have not taken Pokrovsk after eight months of grinding but consistent advances in western Donetsk Oblast.