Thread by @WarintheFuture

In the past week, Ukrainian armed forces have come under a spotlight as analysts pore over reports to divine how the 2023 offensive is progressing. It is much too early for such strategic judgements. It is however timely to review the Russian response. 1/25 🧵

2/ Having culminated in their 2023 offensive, the Russians must now (largely) turn to the strategic defensive to defend against the Ukrainian campaign just commenced. What are the next moves for the overall Russian commander, General Valery Gerasimov?

3/ In an article published in May 2023, I characterised Gerasimov as a four-time loser. This is important context in considering his response to the developing Ukrainian 2023 offensive. A brief exploration of his recent failures are as follows. abc.net.au/news/2023-05-0…

4/ Failure one was the original plan for the invasion of Ukraine. As the Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, Gerasimov and Russian Defence Minister Shoigu would have played a key role in the planning and approval of this plan.

5/ Gerasimov’s second failure was the chaotic first few weeks of the Russian mobilisation after it was announced by President Putin in September 2022. Gerasimov should have anticipated such a move once it was clear the war was not going well; that is his job afterall.

6/ Failure three for Gerasimov was the decade of transformation overseen by he and Shoigu. As the Ukraine ‘special military operation’ has shown, the reforms have not built the type of modern, well-led military organisation essential to success in modern war.

7/ To round out his questionable record, General Gerasimov assumed command of the Russian forces in Ukraine in January, and with little delay launched a wide-scale offensive. The Russian military in Ukraine experienced very limited success with these ground offensives.

8/ As @KofmanMichael & @ralee write: "Gerasimov launched an ill-conceived & ill-timed offensive...The Russian military, still recovering, was in no position to conduct offensive operations given its deficits in force quality, equipment, and ammunition." foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/russia…

9/ By April, despite small gains around #Bakhmut, the Russian 2023 offensives had largely culminated. According to US intelligence sources, the Russians have lost over 100,000 soldiers since December 2022, including 20,000 killed. bbc.com/news/world-eur…

10/ Before considering Gerasimov’s options, what are some of the constraints he now has to work with?

11/ First, the ineffective offensives launched by Gerasimov this year will constrain, but not entirely inhibit, Gerasimov’s ability to effectively respond to Ukrainian attacks in the south and the east.

12/ And while the Russians have constructed a huge number of obstacles in depth across their front line (see a good, updated map of these obstacles by Brady Africk here), Gerasimov still has a massive amount of occupied territory to defend.

13/ 2nd, Gerasimov has several subordinate commanders that he needs to collaborate with and coordinate to build a cohesive overall defensive strategy. And then there are the Private Military Companies, including Wagner…

14/ 3rd, Gerasimov will be keeping an eye on force levels. His 2023 offensives have drained his force of the reinforcements it received after the 2022 partial mobilisation. He is sure to be thinking about another round of mobilisations to top up his force. foreignaffairs.com/articles/russi…

15/ 4th, his operational logistics framework will be essential to supporting the Russian defensive plan. #Gerasimov will need to focus on an integrated air and ground defence of his logistics.

16/ Finally, #Gerasimov remains the Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces & First Deputy Minister of Defence. As such, he also needs to keep an eye on the defence of Russia’s borders, particularly given the recent Belgorod incursions and drone strikes in Moscow.

17/ What are Gerasimov’s options now that the Ukrainian 2023 offensive has commenced?

18/ Option 1: Hang Tough. Gerasimov’s first option is to hang tough for the time being and watch how the Ukrainian offensive develops. We are only in the early days of the Ukrainian 2023 campaign, and the vast majority of its offensive combat power has yet to be committed.

19/ His preferred option is probably to retain all Ukrainian territory he currently occupies, absorb the Ukrainian offensives, hopefully demonstrate minimal Ukrainian success while preparing for Russian offensive operations later this year.

20/ Option 2: Hang Tough (plus). Gerasimov’s next option is a variation on Option 1, but with limited offensive jabs at Ukrainian weak spots if they open up. The Russians have not shown a flair for making major gains with their offensive operations this year.

21/ Option 3: Reorient the Defence. Perhaps the most politically difficult – but militarily effective – would be a reorientation of the Russian defence around Crimea and the Donbas.

22/ This may be a useful fallback position if things go badly for the Russians in the coming months but is unlikely to be favourably considered as an option in the current environment.

23/ In the short term, Gerasimov is unlikely to make significant changes to his plan for the defence of Ukrainian territory his forces occupy. It is simply too early for him to make major adjustments. Therefore, in the short term, Gerasimov is most likely to ‘hang tough’. End.

24/ You can read a more detailed exploration of this topic in my latest free post at Futura Doctrina. mickryan.substack.com/p/what-now-ger…

25/ Thank you to the following whose links and images were used in this post: @sentdefender @abcnews @bradyafr @BBCWorld @KofmanMichael @RALee85 @ForeignAffairs @TheStudyofWar @criticalthreats @MassDara @Forbes @IAPonomarenko