Thread by @paulhaenle

1/ SecState Blinken will soon embark on a trip to #Beijing, where he will meet w/ senior 🇨🇳officials, possibly even Xi Jinping. The visit is unlikely to lead to breakthroughs, but it can help open channels of communication important for reducing risk of miscalculation & building… twitter.com/i/web/status/1…

2/ This trip (June 16-19) will be #Blinken’s first high-level visit to China since the #Biden Administration entered office and he became SecState. Blinken’s original trip in February was postponed in response to the incursion of a Chinese spy balloon into US sovereign airspace.

3/ Blinken's upcoming visit follows recent instances of heightened US-China tension: May 26, a Chinese J-16 cut in front of a USAF RC-135 in international airspace; June 3, a Chinese Luyang III disrupted an exercise between US destroyer and Canadian frigate in the #TaiwanStrait.

4/ During the #IISS-hosted Shangri-La Dialogue here in Singapore (June 2-4), China declined a meeting b/w US SecDef Lloyd Austin & Chinese Defense Minister Li Shangfu, citing US sanctions on Li Shangfu put on by the Trump Administration in 2018.

5/ Then, on June 11, an anonymous Biden administration official confirmed existence of a Chinese spy facility on #Cuba since at least 2019. Given current state of relations, any number of sensitive security/other difficult issues could easily disrupt the effort by both sides to… twitter.com/i/web/status/1…

6/ Blinken’s diplomatic efforts will contribute to US goal to reduce risk of miscalculation, shift away from stop-and-go diplomacy, signal US interests and concerns in the relp, and also address problems and explore potential areas of cooperation, esp on transnational challenges.

7/ For #China, senior leaders may: see heightened risk of inadvertent crises; want to create a favorable environment ahead of Xi’s potential APEC visit, signal to 3rd parties (Eur/Global South) that China is being responsible/constructive; and send positive signals to int'l… twitter.com/i/web/status/1…

8/ Specific areas of US concern include: Chinese harassment of US military assets; covert spying activities; potential lethal aid for Moscow; continued exporting of fentanyl to US; detainments/exit bans on US citizens; canceling mil-mil dialogues; journalist access, among others.

9/ Specific areas of Chinese concerns include: US support for #Taiwan; US alliances and coalition efforts to pressure China; US sanctions on Chinese officials; and technology restrictions (export controls/outbound investment screening), among others.

10/ The meeting won't be productive if Chinese officials use it simply to blame the US for the entirety of the downturn in relations. A meaningful dialogue requires both sides to reflect on actions that have brought the relationship to the current point. carnegieendowment.org/2022/02/21/why…

11/ While it is good 🇺🇸🇨🇳are talking, we should have realistic expectations. Neither side expects major breakthroughs. But within narrow window of opportunity before 2024 US election, high-level official dialogue (if sustained) can help reduce risk of miscalculation & create… twitter.com/i/web/status/1…

12/ Other opportunities for more sustained and systematic 🇺🇸🇨🇳dialogue include potential visits to China from SecTreas Janet Yellen, SecCommerce Gina Raimondo, Climate Envoy John Kerry, and a possible Xi-Biden meeting at APEC in the US in Nov. END//