An interesting tactical #adaptation by the Russians in #Ukraine. Packing an old tank full of explosives and remotely driving it at Ukrainian positions. Of course, nothing new here. 1/10 🧵
2/ The German Army developed and used mini-versions of these during WW2 called Goliath 'tracked mines'. Carrying 60kg of explosive, they had over 600m of cable for remote operation.
3/ The Germans used them at Normandy, however they were never a very successful capability. They were slow and too easy to target.
4/ It was an evolutionary dead end, at least until remotely operated tracked vehicles began to appear in the late 20th century as EOD robots. Thousands of them have been used in multiple combat zones, as well as by police forces around the world.
5/ This isn't the first instance of the Russians developing and deploying Uncrewed Ground Vehicles (UGV) in #Ukraine.
6/ My go-to expert on UAVs and UGVs, @sambendett, has previously provided updates on this issue. This includes the deployment by Russian sappers of an uncrewed defining vehicle.
8/ So it is interesting that the Russians, having flooded the battlefield in Ukraine with thousands of autonomous aerial vehicles, are finally deploying ground based uncrewed combat vehicles.
9/ And even if they are slow and easy to target, with that much explosive they do not have to get very close to the Ukrainian military forces to cause death or destruction. The Russians are sure to continue trialling this approach, and learning.
10/ This use of UGVs on the battlefield in #Ukraine is another aspect of tactical #adaptation that we should watch. The use of uncrewed vehicles, particularly in high risk ground missions, is sure to expand. End. (Thanks @CalibreObscura for the original tweet).
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My latest article is now available at the Sydney Morning Herald (@smh). In this article, I included some advice for those observing the Ukrainian 2023 offensives from afar… 1/11 🧵
2/ First, understand that in military operations first reports are almost always wrong. smh.com.au/world/europe/w…
3/ There have been many initial reports about success or failure in this offensive. We should remain wary of these in the short term and not rush to judgment about the overall success or otherwise of the Ukrainian offensives.
In the past week, Ukrainian armed forces have come under a spotlight as analysts pore over reports to divine how the 2023 offensive is progressing. It is much too early for such strategic judgements. It is however timely to review the Russian response. 1/25 🧵
2/ Having culminated in their 2023 offensive, the Russians must now (largely) turn to the strategic defensive to defend against the Ukrainian campaign just commenced. What are the next moves for the overall Russian commander, General Valery Gerasimov?
3/ In an article published in May 2023, I characterised Gerasimov as a four-time loser. This is important context in considering his response to the developing Ukrainian 2023 offensive. A brief exploration of his recent failures are as follows. abc.net.au/news/2023-05-0…
In his 9 June speech, President Zelensky noted that “for our soldiers, for all those who are in particularly tough battles these days. We see your heroism.” Now the Ukrainian 2023 offensive has begun, some initial thoughts & analysis (based on my longer substack piece). 1/24 🧵
2/ While many describe this as a counteroffensive, I will be describing it as the 2023 offensive or 2023 campaign. This will be a campaign, consisting of multiple operations and offensives across a 1000km frontline.
3/ So far, the Ukrainian campaign has consisted of three key elements. In the preliminary phase, political strikes were conducted against Moscow and Belgorod to confuse the Russian leadership and prod it into making changes in force dispositions (including air defence).
President Zelensky has noted that “for our soldiers, for all those who are in particularly tough battles these days. We see your heroism.” Now the Ukrainian 2023 offensive has begun, some initial thoughts and analysis (a short version of my latest Futura Doctrina post). 1/24 🧵
2/ While many describe this as a counteroffensive, I will be describing it as the 2023 offensives or 2023 campaign. This will be a campaign, consisting of multiple operations and offensives across a 1000km frontline.
3/ So far, the Ukrainian campaign has consisted of three key elements. In the preliminary phase, political strikes were conducted against Moscow and Belgorod to confuse the Russian leadership and prod it into making changes in force dispositions (including air defence).
As the Allies launched their 1944 invasion of France, General Eisenhower told his troops that "the eyes of the world are upon you". This is true today as we witness a potential Ukrainian offensive. 1/24 🧵
2/ Back in January, I explored important considerations for the Ukrainian offensives in 2023. As we watch the prelim activities of a possible Ukrainian campaign develop, I thought I would re-examine these considerations. mickryan.substack.com/p/the-campaign…
3/ Back then, I used the following seven considerations: purpose; design; timing; location; resources; adaptation; and politics. These are all still relevant. I have now added an eighth - training.
As Ukrainian President Zelenskyy has noted over the weekend, #Ukraine is ready for its coming offensives. H-Hour (the time set for a planned attack) for the forthcoming Ukrainian offensives will have been set and is drawing near. 1/24 🧵
2/ Preliminary actions have been taking place for months. Since late 2022, Ukrainian planners, diplomats and strategic leaders have been reviewing different plans, working with allies and wargaming options for their 2023 offensives against the Russians.
3/ Ukrainian training institutions have been preparing soldiers and leaders, which has been supplemented by tactical and technical training being undertaken in NATO countries. Brigades and battalions have been conducting collective training and rehearsals.