Mick Ryan, AM Profile picture
Jun 28 25 tweets 5 min read Twitter logo Read on Twitter
The ripples from the Wagner mutiny in Russia over the weekend continue to propagate across the Russian systems. A quick assessment of the impact on Russia’s ‘fighting power’. 1/25 🧵
2/ The leader of the mutiny, Yevgeny #Prigozhin, has been transported into exile in Belarus. Reportedly staying in the only hotel in the capital of Belarus without opening windows, it is unlikely he will remain quiet or inactive for long.
3/ In Moscow, Putin has made several television appearances. He has denounced those who participated in the mutiny as ‘traitors’ and has heralded to courageous Russian soldiers and airmen who resisted the mutiny as it crept north towards the Russian capital.
4/ The mutiny has highlighted the brittleness of the Russian institutions of state. Putin will remain as President of Russia, but for how long is anyone’s guess. Peter Tesch’s excellent article on this is worth reading. aspistrategist.org.au/prigozhins-put…
5/ While it remains too early to make a full assessment of how the Wagner mutiny will impact on battlefield operations in Ukraine, there is the potential for three key repercussions on Russian military fighting power.
6/ Fighting power generally encompasses the intellectual, physical and moral aspects of military organisations. It is a framework I have used in other assessments.
7/ The physical aspects of war - the material, the fighting forces - provide the mass of people and equipment employed in conflicts. In the physical dimension, the Wagner mutiny will henceforth deny the Russian Army some of its best shock troops in the eastern part of Ukraine.
8/ The 2023 Russian offensive in eastern Ukraine, overseen by General Gerasimov, squandered lives and materiel with little gain. The only bright spot from a Russian perspective was the capture of Bakhmut.
9/ While this was not entirely a Wagner operation, it is hard to see how the Russians would have captured the city without the Wagner groups cunning use of human waves and elite ground forces.
10/ But Wagner was just one of many private military companies operating under the Russian military in Ukraine. A key benefit of these organisations, at least for Putin, is that their casualties are not recorded as official casualties in the war.
11/ However, with the recent directive from Defence Minister Shoigu that all private military companies must sign contracts with the Ministry of Defence, private military companies are in essence being absorbed into the Russian military.
12/ Intellectual Element. Beyond these physical impacts, there will also be implications for the intellectual dimension of Russian fighting power. Despite Prigozhin demands, it is unlikely that Putin will remove Defence Minister Shoigu or General Gerasimov.
13/ They have overseen some adaptation to Russian forces during the war, but generally it has been less imaginative and slower to adapt that the Ukrainians. Perversely, Prigozhin’s mutiny may have solidified the positions of these two senior Russian leaders.
14/ The rationale for the war was fatally undermined by Prigozhin as well. Prigozhin ‘crossed the Rubicon’ in his mutiny when he issued a video last week which challenged the purpose of Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine.
15/ In war, purpose matters. It provides the inspiration thar soldiers risk their lives for. Openly undermining the strategic rationale for the war will be a form of intellectual corrosion for Russian fighting power.
16/ This leads to a final part of Russia’s fighting power that has been impacted by the events of last weekend; the moral elements.
17/ The moral aspects of fighting power include things like espirit de corps, the values and ethical stance of military organisations, how the various levels of an institution interact and trust each other, and their general morale.
18/ Within the Russian military, there will be deep discomfort among many leaders in Ukraine and beyond about the loyalty of different units. There will be a continuing unease among senior leaders about who they can trust in their chain of command - above and below them.
19/ There are already reports that the former overall commander of Russian forces in Ukraine, General Surovikin, new of Prigozhin’s plans in advance. This will prove corrosive in the Russian systems and the lack of trust will pervade all the way to the office pf the President.
20/ This deficit in trust, by members of the military and security forces as well as by the general public looking at these organisations, will also degrade the morale of leaders and soldiers in the field.
21/ And while this is yet to manifest in battlefield outcomes, it will increase the pressure that Russian forces are exposed to under the current Ukrainian onslaught.
22/ There remains much that is to be revealed about the Prigozhin mutiny, and there are certain to be elements that may never be revealed to the public. It will irrevocably change the status of private military companies in Russia. abc.net.au/news/2023-06-2…
23/ And the mutiny will slowly, over time, corrode the fighting power of the Russian military. The Ukrainians, who know the Russian military better than anyone on the planet, will be sure to exploit this. End.
24/ Thank you to the following whose links and images were used in this thread: @abcnews @Liberov @washingtonpost @combined2forces @reuterspictures
@abcnews @Liberov @washingtonpost @combined2forces @reuterspictures 25/ Read the full article (free) here: abc.net.au/news

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More from @WarintheFuture

Jun 24
In a 1973 lecture Sir Michael Howard discussed surprise, noting “this is an aspect...which needs to be studied above all others in the Armed Forces: the capacity to adapt oneself to the utterly unpredictable, the entirely unknown. Today, another surprise. 1/25🧵
2/ The past 24 hours have again highlighted the role of surprise in conflict. While #Prigozhin has been elevating the level of bitterness his videos for some time, his latest have probably seen him cross red lines for Russia’s leadership: he has 'crossed the Rubicon'.
3/ In an audio statement in the past 24 hours, #Prigozhin stated that: "Shoygu is killing children by throwing untrained soldiers, conscripts included, into the war…We only fight with professionals. But if someone stands in our path, we will destroy EVERYTHING in our way."
Read 25 tweets
Jun 23
It has been nearly three weeks since the initial ground combat phase of the Ukrainian 2023 offensives commenced. What is the state of the campaign? 1/25 🧵
2/ In an interview with the BBC this week, President Zelensky described how progress in the Ukrainian 2023 offensives has been "slower than desired”. He then described how "Some people believe this is a Hollywood movie and expect results now. It's not." bbc.com/news/world-eur…
3/ This statement is an acknowledgement that military campaigns are very difficult to plan and assemble and are infinitely more complex to execute over time and space. The Ukrainians are fighting through a deep defensive regime constructed by the Russians (more on that later.
Read 25 tweets
Jun 18
An interesting tactical #adaptation by the Russians in #Ukraine. Packing an old tank full of explosives and remotely driving it at Ukrainian positions. Of course, nothing new here. 1/10 🧵
2/ The German Army developed and used mini-versions of these during WW2 called Goliath 'tracked mines'. Carrying 60kg of explosive, they had over 600m of cable for remote operation. Image
3/ The Germans used them at Normandy, however they were never a very successful capability. They were slow and too easy to target.
Read 10 tweets
Jun 14
My latest article is now available at the Sydney Morning Herald (@smh). In this article, I included some advice for those observing the Ukrainian 2023 offensives from afar… 1/11 🧵 Image
2/ First, understand that in military operations first reports are almost always wrong. smh.com.au/world/europe/w…
3/ There have been many initial reports about success or failure in this offensive. We should remain wary of these in the short term and not rush to judgment about the overall success or otherwise of the Ukrainian offensives.
Read 11 tweets
Jun 13
In the past week, Ukrainian armed forces have come under a spotlight as analysts pore over reports to divine how the 2023 offensive is progressing. It is much too early for such strategic judgements. It is however timely to review the Russian response. 1/25 🧵 Image
2/ Having culminated in their 2023 offensive, the Russians must now (largely) turn to the strategic defensive to defend against the Ukrainian campaign just commenced. What are the next moves for the overall Russian commander, General Valery Gerasimov?
3/ In an article published in May 2023, I characterised Gerasimov as a four-time loser. This is important context in considering his response to the developing Ukrainian 2023 offensive. A brief exploration of his recent failures are as follows. abc.net.au/news/2023-05-0…
Read 25 tweets
Jun 10
In his 9 June speech, President Zelensky noted that “for our soldiers, for all those who are in particularly tough battles these days. We see your heroism.” Now the Ukrainian 2023 offensive has begun, some initial thoughts & analysis (based on my longer substack piece). 1/24 🧵 Image
2/ While many describe this as a counteroffensive, I will be describing it as the 2023 offensive or 2023 campaign. This will be a campaign, consisting of multiple operations and offensives across a 1000km frontline.
3/ So far, the Ukrainian campaign has consisted of three key elements. In the preliminary phase, political strikes were conducted against Moscow and Belgorod to confuse the Russian leadership and prod it into making changes in force dispositions (including air defence). Image
Read 24 tweets

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