The political idea that a group of mullahs should control government began to gain traction amongst Pashtun clerics on British India's North West Frontier in the late-19th Century. The Sufi silsila of the Akhund of Swat was at the forefront of this. 2/
Akhund of Swat, Abdul Ghaffar, had provided support & religious justification for Afghan King Dost Muhammad's campaign against the Sikhs in 1834. He went on to lead Mujahideen against the British during the Ambela Campaign of 1862. In 1893, the British drew the Durand Line. 3/
By then, Akhund of Swat's Sufi silsila was again prominent thru the Hadda Mullah, Najmuddin, who established a network of mullahs in Pashtun areas across British India's North West Frontier. These mullahs asserted themselves through local dispute resolution. 4/
Their ad hoc courts & ability to enforce their decisions through groups of armed taliban posed a direct threat to the writ of the British Raj & any British claims to political legitimacy. In 1897, things came to a head with the Mohmand Campaign. 5/
The campaign posed the Hadda Mullah's network of mullahs & armed taliban against a British force which included a young cavalry officer named Winston Churchill. Though the NW Frontier was to remain British-ruled til 1947, the Brits learned to tread there lightly. 6/
The Brits were to continue to face opposition from militant taliban networks on NW Frontier til they quit India. In 3rd Anglo-Afghan War, Amanullah Khan used these same networks; & the Faqir of Ipi was to continue his resistance to British & later Pakistani rule until 1960 7/
By the 1980s, millions of Afghan refugees had relocated into those same areas of the old North West Frontier. The traditions of the Akhund of Swat, Hadda Mullah & Faqir of Ipi (amongst others) naturally took on new resonance with the anti-Soviet Jihad. 8/
Throughout the whole period outlined above, of course, was the development of Deobandism. A lot gets written about Deobandism, typically equating it with a kind of South Asian Salafism. 9/
Established in the wake of the 1857 Indian Mutiny & decline of Muslim power & prestige in Hindustan, the Dar ul-Uloom Deoband aimed to be a reformist & revivalist Sufi college, with a formal scholarly structure. Its students were known as taliban. 10/
The Deobandis aimed to reassert Muslim pride, prestige and ultimately power in Asia. They emphasised an anticolonialist mindset, and the importance of correct Islamic dress and behaviour. 11/
This same mindset found fertile ground on the NW Frontier, and "amr bil-maroof wa nahi 'an al-mankar" ,or Propagation of Virtue & Prevention of Vice, formed the core mission of the Hadda Mullah & his taliban. 12/
In 1915, senior Indian Deobandi figures attempted to solicit support from the Ottoman Empire and Afghan King Habibullah for a rebellion against the British Raj. The Silk Letter Conspiracy failed, but Deobandi goals & teachings endured. 13/
There are other names to drop here, too: e.g. the 16th Century Bayazid Ansari, known as Pir Roshan, who led an army of Sufis against the Mughal Empire. 14/
And the Indian cleric Shah Waliullah, an ancestor of Deobandism, who granted religious legitimacy to Ahmad Shah Baba's campaigns in Hindustan in the 18th Century. 15/
Syed Ahmad Barelvi, too, deserves a mention. Founder of the South Asian Salafistesque "Ahl-i-Hadith" movement, his influence looms large over the development of Afghan Jihadism for the past 200 years. 16/
But at its core, the original methods and intent to bring the rule of law back to the people, was no different to that of the Hadda Mullah a century beforehand, and stands firmly in a long Afghan tradition. /19
Mullah Omar was a Naqshbandi Sufi, and Sirajuddin Haqqani's honorific, "Khalifa", is a Sufi title. He too studied under a Naqshbandi master. /20
There's a whole book on this stuff (and more) waiting to be published. Please don't hesitate to contact me if you can help with that! /ENDS
#Afghanistan #Taliban
It's also worth noting that the Taliban of the 1990s did not set out to rule Afghanistan, but rather to pursue a mission of Amr bil-maroof in their native Kandahar. /17
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The speech I gave at a @tudresden_de symposium on Global Complicities: "Complicity with the #Taliban: how should aid agencies respond to increasing restrictions on women's rights in #Afghanistan?"
with the exception of girls’ secondary schools; but the Ministry of Education promised that they would reopen with the new academic year in March 2022.
Girls’ primary schools remained open, though – and women were still free to attend university.
I see several different analytical narratives surrounding the #Taliban drugs ban. So what is The Truth? 🧵 1/8
#Afghanistan
This July '23 presentation, by the head of UNSC 1988 Sanctions Monitoring team, argues that the ban on opium is simply due to the Taliban switching to methamphetamine instead; essentially, the ban is a con & the intl cmty should not be duped:
2/8
Then there's this, from Sept '22, arguing that the ban has been a complete failure:
3/8voanews.com/a/taliban-make…
This thread will be part #Afghanistan tourism advice, part impressions from 2 weeks as a tourist in Afghanistan. Either way, I hope it will be interesting. Here goes...1/20
As a foreigner, you need an official permission letter from the Ministry of Culture & Info, detailing who you are & which provinces you wish to travel through. You need to get this as soon as possible after you arrive in Kabul. 2/
If you travel anywhere without this letter, you could be detained if challenged by security forces. You need to have an Afghan national listed as a "guide". This is basically someone whom the IEA can hold accountable if you don't behave... 3/
The way I see it is this: the Taliban won the war, and now have the monopoly on power (some minor challenges in Panjshir aren't going to change that). This is the first time in decades that Afghanistan faces such a situation. The Taliban *are* the Taliban... 1/
and in no way should one expect them significantly to change their views. Block on girls' secondary schooling & imposition of facial covering should not come as a surprise to anyone. 2/
If anything, it's surprising they didn't impose facial covering immediately. Does anyone wonder why they didn't? Does anyone wonder why they are now not specifically imposing chadari (burqa), as they did during Taliban 1.0? 3/
1. Just returned to Europe after 15 months in #Afghanistan. In the wake of the Feb 2020 Doha Agreement, this was always going to be an historic year, but you may have read that no one could have predicted the #Taliban victory.
2. If you had crossed the frontline to visit the #Taliban late 2020/early 2021, you would have been left in no doubt. Their morale was sky-high; they were already rapidly seizing territory; and their enthusiasm and conviction that they were on the verge of victory was infectious.
3. There were hints of Taliban 2.0: young, black-turbanned Talibs took selfies with me in Musa Qala; in Wardak, another in faltering English and black & white Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan baseball cap asked about my origins, and what I thought about the Taliban.