Thread by @johnkonrad

A viral post of mine has sparked a flurry of comments telling me to "calm down." Here's a secret: I don't care. Not really. Adm Aquilino should've worn khakis, but fashion faux pas don't keep me up at night.

But he DID make a BIG mistake yesterday that 🤬 me, A🧵

https://twitter.com/johnkonrad/status/1677081479409549312

What 🤬 me is not that coveralls went viral, it's what did not go viral. Posts that only a handful of people from the vast naval Twitter and #miltweet community have retweeted.

Coveralls don't win wars, logistics wins wars... and are logistical capabilities are in deep trouble

Specifically, no senior navy leader seems to understand the growing reliance of INDOPACOM on RoRo for large-scale logistics movements. Or the fact a RoRo is currently ablaze in a major US port and two firefighters have died.

gcaptain.com/two-firefighte…

Nobody in the US Navy seems to draw a connection between this fire and the USS Bonhomme Richard tragedy.

In both cases initial response were hampered by the local ports lack of readiness. What's different is that here, after the deaths occurred, large fireboats were called in

Despite being the busiest port in the US, Newark doesn't have a single large fireboat (The second busiest, LA/LongBeach has 4)

Despite being the US Navy's largest port, nor does San Diego

In both cases, the Golden Hour of emergency response was wasted gcaptain.com/we-need-navy-f…

But nearby New York City's FDNY does. Although they arrived too late to rescue the downed firefighters they not only sailed massive pumping capacity and specialized shipboard firefighting equipment to contain the fire and prevent further fatalities...

They brought trained SHIPBOARD firefighters.

This is the power of fireboats. Their capabilities and equipment are vital but it is the specialized firefighting knowledge & experience of the fireboat crew that is stabilizing the situation.

During the BHR fire, Navy tugboats were neither readily available nor used in the BHR fire. Nothing was “brought to bear” in the critical early stage of the fire. Two hours into the incident, civilian captains aboard commercial tugboats owned by a private company, begged to help

fight the fire but instead, the Navy brought in laughably small police boats with tiny water cannons built to fight small fires on recreational boats, not 844′ warships.

And even when they finally did call in the big tugboats, confusion ensued because tugboat crews do not train with FED fire, did not carry the right couplings to tie into the ship's fire main, and Navy leaders did not understand the full extent of their capabilities.

What has stabilized this Newark situation is the specialized training fireboat crews, and FDNY emergency service rescue units, get to understand ship fires and coordinate with the military (primarily the US Coat Guard) and the port authority

The US Navy once had fireboats, it had a vast fleet of salvage ships, rescue tugs and the best trained ship fire and salvage masters in the world. But no longer.

Enlisted firefighters assigned to navy ships are still very talented and well-trained but they no longer have the external salvage ships required to fight large fires and flooding.

And @USNavyCNO @SECNAV have made it clear they are not interested:
gcaptain.com/us-navy-lied-c…

But why does this make me angry with Admiral Aquilino?

He is not in charge of buying fireboats, or coordinating salvage efforts, or fixing systemic problems in the US Navy. He is CO of the nation's oldest and largest combatant command.

He is in charge of the point of the spear

The most common reply is that ADM Aquilino is, by wearing a flight suit to a meeting with @DepSecDef, signaling his command's readiness to fight. Many believe he's demonstrating what we've learned from the attack on Pearl Harbor. Specifically.. always be #ReadyToFight

Readiness is crucial, but what are the images that go through your head when you remember Pearl Harbor. Is it the radar station that failed to get a warning to command or is it the massive SHIP FIRES that consumed the harbor?

Is it the fact we got knocked down that's most important, or the fact we were able to stand up rescue the survivors, put out fires and salvage much of the fleet that was the most significant lesson?

Is it of paramount importance for a Navy never to get hit, or is it more important to survive a surprise punch and keep fighting?

Many opinions will differ but if you don't understand the importance of the latter you should read this book: amzn.to/43koEiu

The Newark fire presents a unique chance for the US Navy to understand the vulnerabilities of #sealift RoRo ships - which @dotmarad and @US_TRANSCOM investing in heavily for INDOPACOM logistics - with battle damage, and to practice RoRo firefighting & salvage ops first-hand

We have a critical shortage of US Merchant Marine and @MSCSealift ships right now, if we lose any in battle @INDOPACOM will be forced to make very difficult choices. We must protect the ones we have.

But, my posts about the Newark RoRo fire aren't going viral. Instead, the Navy community is fixated on flight suits being worn @indopacom HQ being misnamed as coveralls.

Do I care? Yes, but I don't lose sleep over it. I do lose sleep over ADM Aquilino's over-reliance on RoRos

Few others in the US Military community seem to care or even take a moment to understand the grave vulnerabilities of the #Sealift fleet that must move over 90% of military supplies and equipment if ADM Aquilino - in coveralls or dress blues - must fight a large scale war.

#Logistics matter

It's disheartening to see that an ongoing incident proving the vulnerability of INDOPACOM's logistical plans isn't garnering attention but that seems to be the state of military affairs today. Billions of $ & attention to sexy fighters and ships but a total blind spot for sealift

In the grand scheme of things, what we call our flight suits doesn't matter. What does matter is ensuring the safety and efficiency of our logistical supply chains and the salvage and repair of damaged ships. #SupplyChainSafety

Forget about the Admiral's coveralls... what is crucial is that the US Navy get boots on the ground and men and equipment to Newark to gain first-hand experience in protecting the ships that are essential to our wartime supply chains. #BootsOnTheGround

Let's shift our focus from… twitter.com/i/web/status/1…

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