An interesting report on Ukrainian tactical adaptation, from @olliecarroll, in the operations by the Ukrainian armed forces to breach the Surovikin Line. 1/11 🧵 #FollowTheSapper
2/ While it is uncertain how widespread this adaptation is, the Ukrainian tactical activities to conduct obstacle breaches appear to have assumed a lower signature to increase survivability and effectiveness.
3/ While breaching under armour, using special vehicles based on a tank chassis is a favoured method by Western military institutions, these platforms have easily detectable signatures for ground and aerial forces.
4/ Also, basic defensive doctrine for most armies emphasises targeting of combat engineers before and during their conduct of mobility support to an army during their offensive operations.
5/ Given minefields are generally covered by ‘observation and fire’ this clearance task can be extraordinarily lethal, even for the best armies - especially if they lack air cover.
6/ Therefore, Ukrainian sappers are adapting to lower their signature by undertaking dismounted mine clearance operations. Using these ‘infiltration tactics’, they are also seeking to enhance their survivability by dispersing more, and potentially achieve surprise.
7/ Dispersal is a tried & true response to increasing lethality on the battlefield since the beginning of the 1st Industrial Revolution. It is a key method to enhance one’s survivability. Dupuy graphs this lethality v dispersal gradient in “The Evolution of Weapons and Warfare”
8/ The trade off however is that breach activities are slower, exposing Sappers - and other elements of the breach and assault forces - to enemy direct and indirect fires. As such, the need for friendly fires, including HE, obscurants and EW, is increased
9/ Such is the brutal calculus that battlefield leaders must face in operations and wars of this type. There are often few good options in such a situation. All choices are relative.
10/ It remains to be seen how widespread this tactical adaptation is across the different Ukrainian axes of advance. But, as they have demonstrated throughout this war, the Ukrainian military is sure to be learning and adapting in order to defeat the Russian Army. End
Thank you to the following for the images and links in this thread: @CanadianArmy @TheEconomist
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
Lots of recent discussion about the ‘slow’ Ukrainian offensives. What is actually occurring now is a steady, deliberate taking down of the Russian 'operational system'. This takes time. 1/25 🧵
2/ What is this operational system? To understand what it is, and how Ukraine is ‘taking down’ the Russian operational system, two foundational concepts are important to understand: the operational art; and, systems destruction warfare.
3/ In war, we talk about strategy (the link of purpose with high level resource allocation & action) & tactics (involving attacks & conduct of specific combat ops). Because of the complexity of modern war, strategy and tactics are linked through what we call Operational Art.
The ripples from the Wagner mutiny in Russia over the weekend continue to propagate across the Russian systems. A quick assessment of the impact on Russia’s ‘fighting power’. 1/25 🧵
2/ The leader of the mutiny, Yevgeny #Prigozhin, has been transported into exile in Belarus. Reportedly staying in the only hotel in the capital of Belarus without opening windows, it is unlikely he will remain quiet or inactive for long.
3/ In Moscow, Putin has made several television appearances. He has denounced those who participated in the mutiny as ‘traitors’ and has heralded to courageous Russian soldiers and airmen who resisted the mutiny as it crept north towards the Russian capital.
In a 1973 lecture Sir Michael Howard discussed surprise, noting “this is an aspect...which needs to be studied above all others in the Armed Forces: the capacity to adapt oneself to the utterly unpredictable, the entirely unknown. Today, another surprise. 1/25🧵
2/ The past 24 hours have again highlighted the role of surprise in conflict. While #Prigozhin has been elevating the level of bitterness his videos for some time, his latest have probably seen him cross red lines for Russia’s leadership: he has 'crossed the Rubicon'.
3/ In an audio statement in the past 24 hours, #Prigozhin stated that: "Shoygu is killing children by throwing untrained soldiers, conscripts included, into the war…We only fight with professionals. But if someone stands in our path, we will destroy EVERYTHING in our way."
It has been nearly three weeks since the initial ground combat phase of the Ukrainian 2023 offensives commenced. What is the state of the campaign? 1/25 🧵
2/ In an interview with the BBC this week, President Zelensky described how progress in the Ukrainian 2023 offensives has been "slower than desired”. He then described how "Some people believe this is a Hollywood movie and expect results now. It's not." bbc.com/news/world-eur…
3/ This statement is an acknowledgement that military campaigns are very difficult to plan and assemble and are infinitely more complex to execute over time and space. The Ukrainians are fighting through a deep defensive regime constructed by the Russians (more on that later.
An interesting tactical #adaptation by the Russians in #Ukraine. Packing an old tank full of explosives and remotely driving it at Ukrainian positions. Of course, nothing new here. 1/10 🧵
2/ The German Army developed and used mini-versions of these during WW2 called Goliath 'tracked mines'. Carrying 60kg of explosive, they had over 600m of cable for remote operation.
3/ The Germans used them at Normandy, however they were never a very successful capability. They were slow and too easy to target.
My latest article is now available at the Sydney Morning Herald (@smh). In this article, I included some advice for those observing the Ukrainian 2023 offensives from afar… 1/11 🧵
2/ First, understand that in military operations first reports are almost always wrong. smh.com.au/world/europe/w…
3/ There have been many initial reports about success or failure in this offensive. We should remain wary of these in the short term and not rush to judgment about the overall success or otherwise of the Ukrainian offensives.