Thread by @WarintheFuture

A just and enduring peace is not possible until #Ukraine defeats Russian forces occupying its territory, ejects Russian forces and establishes the deterrent regime that ensures the long-term security of its territory and its people. 1/22🧵

2/ A key part of this is the ongoing Ukrainian offensives. It is now five weeks since the beginning of the Ukrainian offensives was confirmed by President Zelensky. As such, it is time for a campaign update on the 2023 Ukrainian offensives.

3/ In my 10 June Substack post about the Ukrainian offensives, I described three important battlegrounds in the wider Ukrainian 2023 campaign. Nothing has occurred yet which changes these 3 ‘battlegrounds’, although I would add two more: the adaptation and attrition battles.

4/ Battle of Logistic and Transport Hubs. This continues as part of Ukrainian deep battle. In the east and the south, the Ukrainians continue seek to seize or strike seize, key locations that will provide a hub for transport and the logistics required to sustain the Russians ops.

5/ Proximate to many of these are also where reserve forces are being held, and these are also high value targets. If you kill reserve forces, you degrade tactical adaptive capacity and the ability to react to Ukrainian battlefield gains.

6/ Seizing the Initiative. Both sides continue to seek the tactical & operational initiative. In the south, Ukraine has seized the tactical initiative and is conducting its breaches and attacks where and when it chooses, in a tough but steady ‘bite and hold’ approach.

7/ In the east, Ukraine has the initiative now in the Battle of Bakhmut. The Russians are however attacking on the Kreminna-Svatove axis. At the operational level, the Ukrainians have the initiative, with combat forces in reserve.

8/ The Adaptation Battle. The subject of how both sides have adapted has been a central theme of my writing about the war in #Ukraine. There are multiple examples of adaptation by both sides in this war.

9/ In the Ukrainian offensives, there is an example of tactical adaptation which Ukraine starting to use dismounted, distributed minefield breaching instead of heavy, mounted breach operations. Ukraine has also adapted its tactics in the south.

10/ At the same time, Russia has been adapting. A key adaptation has been their response to the introduction of HIMARS in mid 2022. Since then, the Russian have evolved their C2 and logistics to make it harder to target and more survivable, complicating the Ukrainian deep battle.

11/ The Attrition Battle. Every military activity features attrition. Even in peacetime, military organisations suffer attrition through training injuries, poor retention and bad equipment maintenance.

12/ This is magnified in war by combat losses, injuries and sickness as well as psychological injury. So, to call this war ‘a war of attrition’ is to just state the obvious about all military endeavours.

13/ That said, the fight to out-produce their adversary, and turn materiel into battlefield capacity at a faster and greater rate over a longer period of time, remains an important element for both sides in this war that Russia is pursuing against Ukraine.

14/ It is a war of industrial systems, with Russia, Ukraine, the US and Europe beginning to step up production of munitions and other equipment. Key materiel includes artillery ammunition, engineer equipment, drones, logistics and precision munitions.

15/ The Strategic Influence Fight. Beyond the battlefield, both sides seek to gain ascendancy in the battle of strategic influence. Ukraine has demonstrated mastery of strategic communications in the war. Russia has also shown the ability to influence the Chinese & global south.

16/ While many will focus on the tactical aspects of this campaign, the strategic influence campaigns of Ukraine and Russia are being rolled out at pace. We are being saturated with messages from Russian sources (& Russian apologists) about the failure of the Ukrainian offensives

17/ From the Ukrainian side, there is tight operational security about battlefield progress. The Ukrainians, have to be successful in their 2023 offensives, and they have to make politicians and citizens beyond Ukraine believe they have been successful.

18/ In conclusion, we have passed the ‘end of the beginning’ in the Ukrainian offensive. While some initial Ukrainian attacks probably did not succeed as well as some hoped, there has been steady progress & adaptation to Ukrainian operations.

19/ As with all wars, there is an abundance of ambiguity. The degree to which both sides are having their fighting power – intellectual, moral and physical – degraded in the Ukrainian offensives is unclear. The Ukrainians do have the operational initiative however.

20/ But there are months of tough fighting, artillery duels and influence operations ahead. The Ukrainians are seeking to advance against an enemy that has prepared well for a large-scale defensive campaign.

21/ The outcomes of the five key elements of the Ukrainian offensives described in this thread will largely determine the success or otherwise of Ukraine’s 2023 campaign. End.

22/ Thank you to the following for the links & images in this thread: @DefenceU @combined2forces @nytimes @Militarylandnet @IAPonomarenko - read more at my latest Futura Doctrina post here: mickryan.substack.com/p/the-ukrainia…