A thread on the US approval for #F16 transfer to #Ukraine once pilot training is complete:
This US decision is important as it clears one of the obstacles to delivery from European operators - US authorisation as the original manufacturer.
Several issues remain, however: (1/10)
The first is who will service and turn the jets once in country? F-16 is a complex aircraft and the airframes likely to be sent are quite old. Even on high risk timeframes it will take years to train journeyman or master level maintainers who can supervise and assure. (2/10)
This means that just like any other FMS customer that the US has helped set up with an F-16 fleet, there will be a heavy reliance on civilian contractors to supervise and provide on-the-job training to Ukrainian maintainers in-country, even after months of initial training (3/10)
This is an issue because any F-16 bases set up inside Ukraine will be priority targets for Russian cruise and ballistic missile strikes. Therefore, more ground support equipment and contractors are needed to enable dispersed basing, and they’ll still be actively targeted (4/10)
This increases the political risk of Western contractors being killed by Russian strikes and in any case the US Administration has a ‘no boots on the ground in Ukraine’ policy, so no US contractor support is likely without a major policy change there. (5/10)
The F-16s likely to be sent are Dutch, Danish and Norwegian, but those air forces need their own F-16 maintainers + contractors to retrain on F-35 to support their current fleets. Thus, where the required maintainers come from is a key question that is so far unanswered (6/10)
Another key question is how to finance this in the near term. F-16 is cheap by Western fast jet standards but is still very expensive. Essential US support would have come out of the limited Presidential Drawdown Authority budget for military support to Ukraine as a whole (7/10)
Given a lack of European capacity, the key is finding a way to support Ukrainian Air Force to set up and sustainably operate F-16s without unacceptably drawing finite PDA budget away from more critical supplies of artillery, ammunition, tanks, IFVs, Patriot missiles etc.
(8/10)
It will also take significant time to train Ukrainian pilots as formation leaders to execute the complex 4-8 ship tactics required for the F-16 to operate effectively near the frontline under the concurrent threats of Russian layered SAM systems and fighter CAPs with R-37M (9/10)
Lastly, the weapons given will be critical to how effective an F-16 fleet can be. Key items like the long ranged AIM-120D variant of AMRAAM and JASSM standoff missile have yet to be approved, and may be deemed too sensitive to risk Russian (and Chinese) capture/ analysis (10/10).
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For those on the give Ukraine Tranche 1 Typhoon train, since the question has been asked; 1) The RAF does not have 53 serviceable Tranche 1s to give. There are far fewer now (c20-25). 2) Those remaining have much more limited combat/weapons capabilities than Tranche 2/3 (1/6)
3) Typhoon is not optimised for low altitude A-A, but would need to fly low near the frontlines in Ukraine, due to the Russian SAM threat. 4) Typhoon is not suitable to operate from dispersed, quite short and rough airbases that the UkrAF use to avoid Ru missile strikes (2/6)
5) The RAF Typhoon force is badly, badly overstretched already. Too many operational commitments with too few aircraft, and inadequate spares and munitions stocks. 6) Even a handful of Tranche 1s for Ukraine would use up lots of those scarce spares, engineers and airframes. (3/6)
Since the Dutch F-16 announcement has generated more talks on #fighters for #Ukraine; a few thoughts. 1) The Ukrainian Air Force would absolutely benefit greatly from Western fighters in terms of air-to-air and (potentially) air-to-ground lethality. But there are caveats (1/10)
Any western fighters that could plausibly be sent would still be at high risk from Russian SAMs, so would have to fly at very low altitudes within several tens of kilometres of the frontlines. This would dramatically reduce effective missile range and limit strike options (2/10)
Most common Western close-air-support weapons like Paveway II and AGM-65 Maverick require the pilot or a JTAC to use a targeting pod or other sensor to find, ID and designate the target for precision strikes. This sort of CAS is far harder when confined to very low level. (3/10)
A few thoughts on Western choices on supplying heavy weaponry and continued munitions shipments to #Ukraine;
There is a misleading narrative emerging about the political choices around the cost of long term support and the need for a ceasefire sooner rather than later (1/8)
If some sort of stalemate is reached (it absolutely has not been for now), and a ceasefire forced on Ukraine by limits on Western support; Russia will continue to rebuild offensive capability at scale. Therefore, Ukraine would still urgently need Western weapons at scale (2/8)
It is important to understand that currently Russian forces are slowly taking ground in the Donbass but at massive cost, and the appearance of bad Ukrainian force ratios is because 🇺🇦 is holding forces back to build up mobile units to go on the offensive again in Spring (3/8)
Given Putin’s renewed nuclear threats today, a quick thread on why #nukes really don’t offer an effective MILITARY tool. Before we go on; yes of course it would be a dangerous, world-changing break with the nuclear taboo, would invite conventional NATO retaliation etc. (1/5)
Typical ‘tactical’ nuclear weapons have a yield of between 1kt and 30kt. They are much smaller than megaton-range thermonuclear strategic nuclear warheads. Here is a very approximate model of a 10kt airburst over Lyman for illustration. Direct damage hardly clears the town. (2/5)
For scale, see here how this fits into just Donbas. Tactical nuclear weapons would be catastrophic for troops or civilians in the kilometre or two around the blast radius. But you would need to use lots to materially alter the balance of forces in Ukraine as a whole. (3/5)
Given interest in the Iranian Shahed-136 (and smaller Shahed-131) loitering munitions now being used at a rapidly increasing scale by Russia in Ukraine, and some of the breathless claims being made about them; a brief thread on what they can and can't do compared to jets (1/20)
Far from being cutting edge, loitering munitions have been around since the late 1980s; the Israeli Harpy being the most successful. They are essentially slow, propeller-powered missiles. Early variants had anti-radiation seekers to home in on enemy SAM radars. (2/20)
They were developed to combine the capabilities of target decoys with those of anti-radiation missiles. Due to fuel efficient, slow flight, they could travel hundreds of kilometres and loiter for several hours. If enemy SAM radars illuminated to engage, they would be hit. (3/20)
On Saki Airbase in #Crimea. The first two explosions happen in the middle of drifting smoke from a clearly already established fire. Looks black like fuel. No missiles visible in any footage. Later a third explosion exactly the same size, colour and propagation rate occurs.
(1/4)
So, my best guess is that Ukrainian forces hit the base with a fairly small loitering munition or improvised UAV, like the strike in Sevastopol a few days ago.
(thedrive.com/the-war-zone/d…)
But this time they got lucky and hit a parked aircraft or fuel truck, starting a fire.
(2/4)
The VKS has a bad habit of leaving piles of munitions next to parked aircraft, including ones that are fuelled and armed. My working theory is that Ukrainian loitering munitions or saboteurs caused an initial fuel fire that engulfed either piles of bombs or armed aircraft..
(3/4)